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Abstract
This thesis addresses the tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials between their
social value and the requirement to respect the autonomy of research participants.
Pragmatic trials are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of treatments in real-world settings
to inform clinical decision-making and promote cost-efficient care. These trials are often
embedded into clinical settings and ideally include all patients who would receive the
treatments under investigation as a part of routine care. Trialists increasingly adopt clusterrandomized designs—in which intact groups, such as hospitals or clinics, are allocated
randomly to study interventions—to simplify the inclusion of all patients. But including allcomers conflicts with the requirement to obtain written informed consent from research
participants. Since informed consent is central to respecting patient autonomy, the question
arises: how can the ends of autonomy and pragmatism be served simultaneously?
Some philosophers argue that patients have an obligation to participate in clinical
research and that this may negate consent requirements. I argue that while there may be
grounds for a prima facie obligation for patients to participate in clinical research, no
compelling argument has demonstrated that the obligation is enforceable. Others assert that
broad application of a waiver of consent will facilitate the conduct of pragmatic clusterrandomized trials. I demonstrate that this proposal sharply conflicts with the historical origins
of the waiver. I articulate a novel moral foundation for the use of a waiver of consent and
show that when trials evaluate treatments delivered directly to patients (e.g., drugs or
vaccines), the autonomy interests at stake for participants are too substantial to permit its use.
My solution draws a distinction between consent requirements in existing policy and
consent as an autonomous authorization. As many pragmatic cluster-randomized trials are
conducted in primary care settings with no research staff, I argue that patient autonomy can
be promoted and protected using clinical-style consent, in which health providers seek verbal
informed consent from patients and document it in the electronic health record. This
approach has been associated with high rates of recruitment and, thus, may satisfy both
requirements for social value and respect for autonomy.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Most clinical trials test whether a new medical treatment works in ideal conditions.
But the real world is messy and unpredictable. Patients and doctors need to know whether
medical treatments work when administered in doctors’ offices and community hospitals.
The solution: pragmatic trials. These trials mirror real-world clinical settings and include all
patients who would receive the treatments under investigation as a part of their routine care.
While patients are typically enrolled into a trial after they provide their written informed
consent, soliciting their consent can disrupt the workflow of busy clinics to the extent that the
trial no longer mirrors clinical practice. Seeking consent can also result in people refusing to
participate, consequently undermining the aim of pragmatic trials to include everyone. Since
consent is central to respecting the autonomy of prospective research participants, the
question arises: when written informed consent is a barrier to the conduct of pragmatic trials,
how can we respect patients’ choices without undermining the aim to include all or most
patients in these trials?
Some philosophers argue that patients have a moral duty to participate in pragmatic
trials without consent, while others suggest that pragmatic trials will often meet the
regulatory criteria to waive consent requirements. I argue that both solutions fail to respect
patient autonomy. My solution is to return to the ethical foundation of informed consent.
Informed consent is grounded in the principle of respect for autonomy, and it is meant to
allow patients to autonomously authorize their participation in research. When written
informed consent cannot be obtained in a pragmatic trial, I argue that alternative approaches
to obtaining consent are appropriate. For example, health providers can seek verbal consent
from patients and document their agreement in their medical records. This solution promotes
patient autonomy while simultaneously facilitating the conduct of pragmatic trials.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Canada is a global leader in health research. Despite its many strengths in health
care delivery and innovation, health care treatment decisions and policies often lack an
evidence base. This results in the overuse of ineffective or harmful treatments, resulting
in a substantial waste of health care expenditure and the underuse of effective treatment
(Brownlee et al., 2017; OECD, 2017; WHO, 2020).1 Ensuring treatments are safe and
effective for patients and reducing health care expenditure requires pragmatic randomized
controlled trials. Pragmatic trials are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of medical
treatments in real-world settings to inform clinical decision-making and promote costefficient uptake of evidence-based practices (Schwartz & Lellouch, 1967; Zwarenstein &
Treweek, 2009). These trials ideally include heterogenous groups of patients, occur in
settings identical to clinical practice, require no additional staff or resources, and analyze
data from electronic health records on patient-centred outcomes.
When designing a pragmatic trial, researchers can use standard patientrandomized designs in which individual research participants are randomly allocated to
different study interventions. But researchers increasingly use novel cluster-randomized
designs—in which intact groups, such as hospitals or clinics, are the units of
randomization—to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic trials. Cluster randomization
allows for most or all patients within a cluster to be treated with the same study
intervention, resulting in the potential for greater external validity and lower costs when
compared to standard patient-randomized trials. Thus, pragmatic cluster-randomized
trials can efficiently generate robust evidence to inform the decisions of patients, health
providers, and health system managers.

Recent evidence suggests that “one in ten patients in OECD countries is unnecessarily harmed at the point
of care. More than 10% of hospital expenditure is spent on correcting preventable medical mistakes…
[and] around one-fifth of health expenditure makes no or minimal contribution to good health outcomes”
(OECD, 2017, p.3). In 2021, total health spending in Canada was approximately $308 billion, or 12.7% of
Canada’s gross domestic product (CIHI, 2022).
1
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However, pragmatic cluster-randomized trials raise ethical issues that have not
been adequately addressed. The foremost problem is the issue of informed consent.
Pragmatic trials aim to mirror real-world clinical settings and ideally include all patients
who will receive the treatments under investigation as a part of their routine clinical care.
Soliciting patient’s written informed consent can alter or disrupt the workflow of busy
clinics to the extent that the trial no longer mirrors clinical practice and may result in
people refusing to participate, consequently undermining the aim of pragmatic trials.
Additionally, written informed consent can pose substantial methodological, logistical,
and financial challenges to cluster-randomized trials. Hence, some researchers believe
that informed consent is not appropriate for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. But to
conduct these trials without informed consent is clearly an infringement of patient
autonomy. The question, then, is whether the infringement on patient autonomy is
adequately justified by the social imperative to conduct this kind of research.
This thesis seeks to provide an answer to the question: how do we strike an
appropriate balance between the requirement to respect patient autonomy and the
imperative to conduct socially valuable pragmatic cluster-randomized trials? In this
introductory chapter of the thesis, I provide the reader with background information on
the complex issues at the intersection of ethics and clinical trial design. In section 1.1, I
describe the philosophical problem of research ethics in its most general form to
demonstrate the central role of autonomy and informed consent in the justification of
clinical research involving humans. In section 1.2, I explain the central features of
clinical trials—what is a randomized controlled trial, and what are the two main trial
types (explanatory and pragmatic) and designs (patient-randomized and clusterrandomized)—to demonstrate the tension between informed consent requirements and
the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. In section 1.3, I further elucidate the
tension through a real-world example of a pragmatic cluster-randomized trial conducted
recently in the hemodialysis setting in Ontario, Canada. I conclude in section 1.4 with an
outline of three sub-questions, to be addressed in the ensuing chapters of this thesis, that
must be answered to provide a solution to the overarching question of this thesis.
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1.1 The philosophical problem in clinical research
To conduct clinical research, researchers predominantly rely on people to
volunteer as participants. But given that clinical research aims to determine the safety,
efficacy, or effectiveness of health care interventions (i.e., treatments, procedures,
policies, or practices), it is common—or, at the very least, possible—for people who
participate in this kind of research to be exposed to a range of physical, psychological,
social, or economic risks. Consequently, the philosophical question at the heart of
research ethics is: when is it ethically permissible to expose people to risks in order to
generate or contribute to knowledge for the benefit of others?
The first comprehensive attempt to answer this question appears in the Belmont
Report, a statement of basic ethical principles that underlie the conduct of research
involving humans with associated guidance to assure that these principles are followed
(National Commission, 1978a). This document answers the question by appeal to three
core ethical principles: beneficence, justice, and respect for persons. Each principle gives
rise to ethical norms. When the norms for all three principles are fulfilled, exposing
research participants to risks for the benefit of others is justified. Although these ethical
principles are equally important, this thesis focuses on the conflict between beneficence
and respect for persons; as such, further attention is only given to these two principles.
The ethical principle of beneficence requires that foreseeable harms are
minimized, and that study participation poses a reasonable balance of benefits and harms
in relation to the knowledge to be gained. According to Emanuel and colleagues (2000),
“Only if society will gain knowledge… can exposing human subjects to risk in clinical
research be justified” (p.2703). They state that clinical research must be socially valuable
to be ethical—the knowledge gained, even without immediate practical ramifications,
should lead to health care improvements. Due to limited resources, clinical research “that
is likely to generate greater improvements in health or well-being given the condition
being investigated, the state of scientific understanding, and the feasibility of
implementing the intervention is of higher value” (ibid) and ought to be pursued.
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Although the social value of any particular study may be difficult to quantify,
international ethical guidelines state that socially valuable research is grounded in three
factors: “the quality of the information to be produced, its relevance to significant health
problems, and its contribution to the creation or evaluation of interventions, policies, or
practices that promote individual or public health” (CIOMS, 2016, p.1). Research ethics
committees are tasked with the review of proposed studies involving humans to ensure
that studies conform to ethical guidelines. They have the authority to approve, reject, or
stop studies, as their “main responsibility… is to protect potential participants in the
research, [while taking] into account potential risks and benefits for the community in
which the research will be carried out” (WHO, 2009, p.11). If a study has no prospect of
social value—that is, there is no possibility of producing or contributing to scientific
knowledge—then it would be unethical to allow the study to proceed. Thus, determining
the degree to which a proposed study has social value is an important part of justifying
the exposure of research participants to risks for the benefit of others.
The ethical principle of respect for persons dually requires “that individuals [are]
treated as autonomous agents, and… that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled
to protections” (National Commission, 1978a, p.4). While the concept of autonomy has
been the focus of much controversy and debate, an autonomous person is generally
understood as “an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals and of acting
under the direction of such deliberation” (p.5). To demonstrate respect for autonomy (i.e.,
to fulfill the first requirement of respect for persons) means “to give weight to
autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing
their actions unless they are clearly detrimental to others” (ibid). Conversely:
To show a lack of respect for an autonomous agent is to repudiate that person’s
considered judgments, to deny an individual the freedom to act on those
considered judgments, or to withhold information necessary to make a considered
judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to do so (ibid).
The principle of respect for autonomy in clinical research dictates the ethical
norm for researchers to obtain informed, voluntary, and revocable consent. Obtaining the
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informed consent of a prospective research participant is an ongoing didactic process; it
is not the discrete moment of a person’s signature on a form. According to Canadian
guidelines governing the conduct of health research involving humans, called the TriCouncil Policy Statement 2, informed consent “encompasses a process that begins with
the initial contact (e.g., recruitment) and carries through to the end of participants’
involvement in the project” (CIHR et al., 2018). In clinical research, recruitment often
involves a determination of eligibility by one’s health care provider and, if eligible, an
invitation to participate in research. This is followed by a consultation with either their
health care provider or a research coordinator who uses the consent form (often in paper
format) as the basis to provide a full disclosure of all information necessary for making
an informed decision.
Research regulations require a considerable amount of information about the
research to be outlined in consent forms (CIHR et al., 2018).2 As a result, many consent
forms average 15 to 20 pages long and take approximately 60 minutes to read (Pandiya,

“The information generally required [in consent forms] include: (a) information that the individual is
being invited to participate in a research project; (b) a statement of the research purpose in plain language,
the identity of the researcher, the identity of the funder or sponsor, the expected duration and nature of
participation, a description of research procedures, and an explanation of the responsibilities of the
participant; (c) a plain language description of all reasonably foreseeable risks and potential benefits, both
to the participants and in general, that may arise from research participation; (d) an assurance that
prospective participants: are under no obligation to participate and are free to withdraw at any time without
prejudice to pre-existing entitlements; will be given, in a timely manner throughout the course of the
research project, information that is relevant to their decision to continue or withdraw from participation;
and will be given information on their right to request the withdrawal of data or human biological
materials, including any limitations on the feasibility of that withdrawal; (e) information concerning the
possibility of commercialization of research findings, and the presence of any real, potential or perceived
conflicts of interest on the part of the researchers, their institutions or the research sponsors; (f) the
measures to be undertaken for dissemination of research results and whether participants will be identified
directly or indirectly; (g) the identity and contact information of a qualified designated representative who
can explain scientific or scholarly aspects of the research to participants; (h) the identity and contact
information of the appropriate individual(s) outside the research team whom participants may contact
regarding possible ethical issues in the research; (i) an indication of what information will be collected
about participants and for what purposes; an indication of who will have access to information collected
about the identity of participants; a description of how confidentiality will be protected (Article 5.2); a
description of the anticipated uses of data; and information indicating who may have a duty to disclose
information collected, and to whom such disclosures could be made; (j) information about any payments,
including incentives for participants, reimbursement for participation-related expenses and compensation
for injury; (k) a statement to the effect that, by consenting, participants have not waived any rights to legal
recourse in the event of research-related harm; and (l) in clinical trials, information on stopping rules and
when researchers may remove participants from trial” (CIHR et al., 2018).
2
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2010, p.98). The length of consent forms has also increased over time, and they are often
criticized for their excessive length and complex wording (Albala et al., 2010, p.7).
Consequently, prospective research participants must be given ample time to read and
review the consent form and ask questions before signing it voluntarily. The purpose of
the consent form is to document a patient’s understanding and acceptance of the
information within and to provide a reference for participants to revisit throughout the
duration of the study. But the overall purpose of this written informed consent process
involving consultation, discussion, and ongoing communication is to enable patients to
autonomously authorize their participation in a particular research activity.
The reason informed consent is sought from prospective research participants, as
described by Alexander Capron (2018), can be traced to three different yet overlapping
sources: patients’ right to self-determination, human rights law, and regulations. Capron
argues that the first source of informed consent requirements in research can be found in
a patient’s right to self-determination. He states that “a physician who provides medical
care with the best intentions may be horrified to be classed with a person who punches
someone else in the nose, but each involves an unconsented touching and hence amounts
to battery” (p.15). After reviewing a series of legal cases in which patient consent was not
obtained for medical care, he concludes that “the consent requirement is fundamentally a
manifestation of one’s right to decide not just which harms to avoid but more simply
which interferences with one’s body… to permit” (ibid). Recognizing that consent to
medical care began with a focus on patients’ interest to be protected from harm, Capron
maintains that consent to participate in research is about “protecting them against the
wrong that occurs when they, as moral agents with the right and responsibility to chart
their own lives and actions, are not given an opportunity to decide whether or not to
accept an intervention involving their person or things intimately associated with their
being” (p.16). In other words, patients have an unequivocal right to self-determination in
both clinical practice and research.

7

The second source of informed consent in research, according to Capron (2018),
is human rights law. Those familiar with research ethics often refer to the Doctors’ Trial3
and the subsequent development of the Nuremberg Code as the first moment in history
where the requirement to respect patient autonomy appears in an international human
rights document. The Nuremburg Code established a set of guiding principles that sought
to distinguish legitimate and unlawful medical experimentation. Its first principle states:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means
that the persons involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice… and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of subject matter
involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision
(Nuremburg Code, 1947).
Similar language was adopted in the United Nations’ (1976) International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treaty, which states, “No one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” Both human rights documents clearly
articulate a strict requirement for informed consent in research.
Finally, Capron (2018) suggests that the third source of informed consent in
research is federal regulations. This is in part because the Nuremburg Code was largely
ignored by physician-researchers in North America and Europe. It was believed that the
Nuremburg Code did not apply to non-Nazi research conducted by Americans and
Europeans in laboratories, hospitals, and academic settings. Medical paternalism was the
norm of the time, but this began to change with Henry Beecher’s (1966) condemnation of
twenty-two post-war unethical research projects in the United States, and the exposure of
the unethical Tuskegee syphilis study in 1972 (Rothman, 1991). These events led to the
National Research Act of 1974, the articulation of ethical principles for research in the
Belmont Report, and the United States’ new regulations governing the conduct of

3

A series of tribunals in which many Nazi criminals were prosecuted for Holocaust war crimes, including
their participation in the design and conduct of deadly medical experiments.
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research in 1981. These regulations sought to replace medical paternalism with “shared
decision-making, in which patients, closely advised by their physicians, control the
ultimate choices about treatment and research” (Capron, 2018, p.23). These regulations
would later become the Common Rule,4 which established some of the first detailed
requirements about the form and content of informed consent.
In sum, clinical research involves treating people as a means to the end of
developing or contributing to generalizable knowledge that can be used to benefit others.
To justify the conduct of clinical research, every study must have some prospect of
generating social valuable knowledge, and the risks posed by participation must be
minimized and reasonable in relation to the knowledge to be gained. Moreover,
prospective participants must agree, through an informed consent process, to participate
in research; using individuals without their consent is a violation of their autonomy. The
fact that informed consent is grounded in patients’ right to self-determination, human
rights laws, and regulations means that any infringement on the requirement to respect
the autonomy of research participants during the conduct of clinical research needs to be
carefully considered and adequately justified.

1.2 The tension in pragmatic-cluster randomized trials
It should now be clear that there is a presumption in all research involving human
participants that informed consent must be solicited and obtained from prospective
research participants prior to their enrollment in a study.5 But, as Lois Shepherd and Ruth
Macklin (2019) note, “the bedrock requirement for obtaining informed consent from
prospective research subjects… is eroding” (p.4). Indeed, an increasing number of
proposals to conduct clinical research without informed consent have been appearing in
the medical literature (Faden et al., 2013; Faden, Beauchamp & Kass, 2014). Capron

Most recently revised in 2018, the Common Rule is the United States’ regulations governing the conduct
of research involving human beings.
4

5

Recall that the principle of respect for persons dually requires that people are treated as autonomous, and
“that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protections” (National Commission, 1978a, p.4).
This second requirement means that, for some individuals who are not autonomous (e.g., young children),
informed consent can and should be obtained from surrogate decision-makers (e.g., parents).
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(2018) also fears that we are “moving away from informed, voluntary consent as the sine
qua non for ethical research with human beings” (p.22). To understand the rising
resistance to traditional research ethics norms, it is essential to understand the different
ways in which clinical research can be conducted.
The randomized controlled trial is a rigorous methodology, often considered the
gold standard, for generating high-quality scientific evidence. Randomization in its
simplest form is any process that can assign participants to different study arms based
solely on chance. For example, a coin toss can allocate a patient to either an experimental
or control arm of a trial. When competently executed, randomization creates two or more
study groups that are probabilistically similar on average with respect to known and
unknown risk factors (Friedman et al., 2015, p.92). It also prevents the potential of bias in
the allocation of participants to different study interventions (Shadish, Cook & Campbell,
2002, p.249).6 Essentially, a study’s internal validity—i.e., the extent to which a study
establishes a causal relationship between a treatment and an outcome (p.53)—depends on
randomization, and “most agree [randomization] is the best method for achieving
comparability between study groups, and the most appropriate basis for statistical
inference” (Friedman et al., 2015, p.123).
According to Daniel Schwartz and Joseph Lellouch (1967), randomized
controlled trials are either “explanatory” or “pragmatic.” An explanatory trial is “aimed at
understanding. It seeks to discover whether a difference exists between two treatments
which are specified by strict and usually simple definitions” (p.647, italics in original). In
other words, it is designed to determine the efficacy of an intervention in laboratory-like
or optimal conditions. To discover whether a treatment works in optimal conditions,
trialists aim to recruit a homogenous group of research participants based on strict
eligibility criteria. These trials often occur within specialized or academic centres,

6

Often called selection bias, it occurs when researchers or patients influence the choice of intervention,
either consciously or subconsciously. When selection bias is present, it can “easily invalidate the
comparison” of study interventions (Friedman et al., 2015, p.92).
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evaluate novel medical treatments or devices for regulatory purposes, and the results
typically have downstream implications for patients.
Explanatory trials play an integral role in the development of new health care
interventions. These trials are designed to test novel interventions in optimal conditions,
often “to verify a biological hypothesis” or to prove a cause-and-effect relationship that
may not otherwise be visible in normal conditions (Schwartz & Lellouch, 1967, p.644). If
the experimental intervention is proved to be inefficacious in such favourable conditions,
then researchers have essentially refuted a mechanistic hypothesis. In other words, the
experimental intervention does not work. However, if the experimental intervention
demonstrates signs of efficacy, the results of the explanatory trial cannot be generalized
to justify using the new intervention in clinical practice. This is in part because the
broader patient population is substantially and meaningfully different from those who
participated in the explanatory trial.
While most randomized controlled trials have been explanatory, the last two
decades has seen a growing interest in pragmatic trials and an almost exponential
increase in their conduct (Zwarenstein & Treweek, 2009; Patsopoulos, 2011). A
pragmatic trial is “aimed at decision. It seeks to answer the question—which of the two
treatments should we prefer?” (Schwartz & Lellouch, 1967, p.647, italics in original).
Essentially, they are designed to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention in realworld settings and aim to generate evidence to support the decisions of patients, health
care providers, and health system managers. Although randomized controlled trials are
rarely purely pragmatic or purely explanatory, various design choices can make a trial
more or less pragmatic (Loudon et al., 2013). Moreover, to determine whether a
treatment is effective in real-world settings, pragmatic trials differ in important ways
from explanatory trials. According to Taljaard and colleagues (2018),
Trials that are more pragmatic have broader eligibility criteria, recruit participants
at the time of presentation, include a diverse range of settings that mirror realworld circumstances, do not require highly specialized training or research
personnel, give healthcare providers flexibility in how the intervention is
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delivered, require no special strategy for monitoring protocol compliance, follow
and monitor patients as in routine clinical practice, have clinically meaningful and
patient-centered outcomes, and include all randomized patients in analysis (p.2).
The reason for the increasing interest in pragmatic trials is, in part, due to the
imperative to increase Canada’s (and other countries’) capacity to integrate high-quality
scientific evidence into clinical practice. Kalkman and colleagues (2017) state that “a
pragmatic trial has social value due to the fact that it generates real world knowledge that
is directly applicable to decision-making” (p.140, italics in original). Pragmatic trials test
a wide range of interventions (e.g., diagnostic, preventive, therapeutic, and delivery
system interventions), and can test new interventions against current interventions used
routinely in practice or test the comparative effectiveness of different interventions headto-head (Taljaard et al., 2018). Consequently, the results of a pragmatic trial can tell us
whether an intervention works and, more importantly, for whom it works in the messy
circumstances of real-world settings.
When designing an explanatory or pragmatic trial, trialists can choose between
two broad types of designs: patient-randomized designs and cluster-randomized designs.
In a patient-randomized trial, individual patients are identified and recruited by
researchers to participate in a study. Recruitment generally involves an independent
assessment by a researcher to ensure patients meet specific eligibility criteria established
in a study’s research protocol. If eligible to participate, the written informed consent of
the patient is solicited and either provided or refused. Once the written consent of a
patient has been obtained, the patients (now research participants) are randomized to one
or more experimental or control intervention arms and observed for their outcomes.
Cluster-randomized trials are different than patient-randomized designs in that the
units of randomization are intact groups rather than patients themselves (Donner & Klar,
2000). These groups, called clusters, vary widely in type and size; for instance, clusters
may be hospitals, medical practices, schools, communities, or geographical regions. In a
cluster-randomized trial, clusters are identified by researchers and recruitment generally
involves approaching a gatekeeper—who are “individuals or bodies who may be called
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upon to protect the group-based interests that are affected by enrollment into a CRT
[cluster-randomized trial]” (Weijer et al., 2012)—for permission to include their cluster
in a trial. Once permission is granted, clusters are randomized to implement one or more
experimental or control interventions within the cluster. Individual patients are observed
for their outcomes.
Cluster-randomized trials are methodologically inferior and statistically more
complex than patient-randomized trials (Taljaard et al., 2020). These trials require more
research participants than patient-randomized trials because “outcomes from multiple
patients in the same cluster are usually positively correlated” (p.254).7 Clusterrandomized trials are also more prone to selection bias because individual patients are
often identified and recruited after clusters have been randomized, and “unless this is
done blinded to the cluster’s allocation (which can be difficult or impossible to ensure),
differential inclusion of patients may result” (ibid). For these reasons, the use of cluster
randomization, as opposed to patient randomization, must be clearly justified.
According to the Ottawa Statement on the Ethical Design and Conduct of Cluster
Randomized Trials, “reasons for adopting the CRT [cluster-randomized trial] design are
diverse, and range from sheer necessity… to other scientific, practical, or logistical
reasons” (Weijer et al., 2012). Cluster randomization is necessary when evaluating
cluster-level intervention, which are interventions that can only be delivered to an entire
cluster (Eldridge, Ashby & Feder, 2005, p.93). Examples of cluster-level interventions
include water treatments delivered to groups of households with a shared water supply
(Pickering et al., 2019), and community physical activity programs delivered to rural
villages (Solomon et al., 2014). Cluster randomization may also be necessary when
evaluating professional-level interventions, which are interventions directly delivered to
health care providers that may have consequences for their patients. Examples of
professional-level interventions include decision support algorithms delivered to
physicians to assist with medication dosing (Nieuwlaat et al., 2014), and training sessions

According to Taljaard and colleagues (2020), “the number of patients required for a [typical] CRT
[cluster-randomized trial] is six times that under individual randomization” (p.254).
7
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delivered to nursing home staff to implement evidence-based nonpharmacological
interventions for managing aggressive patient behaviour (Rapp et al., 2013).
Sometimes cluster randomization is used to evaluate individual-level
interventions, which are interventions directly delivered to patients such as prescribing
physical activity regimens (Cheng et al., 2014) and providing patients with antibiotics
(van Oostveen et al., 2018). In these cases, cluster randomization is not used out of
necessity; in theory, patient randomization can be used. Given that cluster-randomized
designs are methodologically complex and statistically inefficient, why do researchers
opt to use a cluster-randomized design to evaluate individual-level interventions? In our
review of a random sample of 40 cluster-randomized trials exclusively evaluating
individual-level interventions, 25 trials (62.5%) reported a justification for the use of
cluster randomization (Taljaard et al., 2020, p.259). The most common reported
justifications were logistical or administrative convenience (15 trials, 60%), to avoid
contamination8 (13 trials, 52%), and to be more pragmatic or enhance external validity (5
trials, 20%) (ibid).
Indeed, cluster-randomized designs are thought to be inherently more pragmatic
than patient-randomized designs (Ford & Norrie, 2016, p.459). This belief is exemplified
by Eldridge and colleagues (2008), who state that “cluster randomised trials are
pragmatic, measuring effectiveness rather than efficacy and should therefore be both
internally and externally valid” (p.876). As stated above, internal validity refers to the
extent to which differences identified between randomized groups are a result of the
intervention being tested. Potential barriers to internal validity in cluster-randomized
trials include insufficient sample sizes and a lack of blinding, but researchers can enhance
internal validity by following guidelines and “recommendations for adequate power and

8

Contamination occurs when the members of one group in a trial are exposed to the intervention that is
meant for the other group. For example, “in a trial of dietary change, people in the control group might
learn about the experimental diet and adopt it themselves” (Torgerson, 2001, p.355). Contamination can
lead to a type II error, i.e., the “rejection of an effective intervention as ineffective because the observed
effect size was neither statistically nor clinically significant” (ibid).
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appropriate analyses” and ensuring that those who identify and recruit patients are
blinded to their allocation status (p.878).
External validity, or generalizability, “refers to the extent to which study results
can be applied to other individuals or settings” (Eldridge et al., 2008, p.877). Cluster
randomization is believed to enhance the external validity of a randomized controlled
trial. According to Dron and colleagues (2021), many patient-randomized trials “are
carried out with specific types of patients under controlled conditions, with strict
inclusion and exclusion criteria… for improved internal validity, but often this internal
validity is achieved at the expense of external validity (explanatory trials). This type of
trial design has been criticised for not reflecting real-world conditions and having
unrealistic clinical populations, leading to poor external validity. As such, evidence from
cluster trials is appealing to policy makers because their implementation can more
accurately reflect the real-world roll-out of novel interventional strategies” (p.704).
Additionally, cluster randomization allows for most or all patients within a cluster to be
treated with the same study intervention. As a result, cluster-randomized trials require
less research infrastructure to manage the allocation of study interventions. This
facilitates a central aim of a pragmatic trial to require no additional staff or resources than
would be available in clinical practice.
Concerns have been raised about whether cluster-randomized designs have
greater external validity and lower costs than patient-randomized designs (Goldstein et
al., 2018a; Taljaard et al., 2020). Because cluster-randomized trials require a greater
number of participants than patient-randomized trials, cluster-randomized trials will
generally be more expensive if informed consent is required. It is by obviating the need to
recruit participants that makes these trials substantially less expensive. Moreover, clusterrandomized trials do not necessarily have greater external validity. According to Taljaard
and colleagues (2020), “the perception that cluster randomization by itself increases the
degree of pragmatism and external validity may rest on the misperception that the design
facilitates inclusion of whole clusters without the need for informed consent” (p.255,
italics in original). Thus, cluster-randomized trials are less expensive and have greater
external validity when compared to patient-randomized trials only when informed
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consent is not required. This creates a point of tension: high-quality evidence can be costefficiently produced in a pragmatic cluster-randomized trial only when informed consent
from prospective research participants is not obtained.
Recent trends show that pragmatic cluster-randomized trials are increasingly
conducted without informed consent. In our review of the reporting of informed consent
in 1,988 pragmatic trials published between 2014 and 2019, we found that later trial start
year, cluster randomization, self-identification as pragmatic, and higher income country
settings were significantly associated with not obtaining consent (Zhang et al., 2021).
Another review that examined the rationale, methodological quality, and reporting of
cluster-randomized trials in critical care settings published between 2005 and 2019 found
that “the need for consent was waived in most (31 [53%]) cRCTs [cluster-randomized
trials]… [and] seven studies (12%) did not explicitly report their consent procedures”
(Cook et al., 2021). We also conducted a review of cluster-randomized trials in the
hemodialysis settings published between 2000 and 2019 and found that “three [clusterrandomized trials] (10%) received a waiver of consent… and five (16%) trials either did
not discuss the consent process or it was unclear if patients provided informed consent”
(Al-Jaishi et al., 2020a).
It is difficult to explain why there is a growing trend to conduct pragmatic clusterrandomized trials without informed consent. Yet, an increasing number of commentators
argue that written informed consent conflicts with the aims of pragmatic trials and raises
various challenges when using a cluster-randomized design. With respect to the aims of
pragmatic trials, Jeremy Sugarman and Robert Califf claim that “obtaining conventional
written informed consent may be not only ethically unnecessary but may render such
research impracticable because of logistical burdens and may introduce selection bias”
(2014, p.2381). The consent process may be costly, requiring additional research staff
and resources, and it may also negatively impact recruitment and disrupt the workflow of
busy clinics to the extent that the trial no longer mirrors clinical practice (Pletcher et al.,
2014; Kim, 2018; Dal-Ré et al., 2019). This would invariably reduce the generalizability
of the results and thereby undermine the pragmatic nature of the trial. With respect to
cluster randomization, some argue that informed consent “is not relevant in a cluster
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randomized trial because patients receive the same treatment regardless of whether or not
they consent” (Vickers, 2014, p.619). Others refer to cluster randomization as a design
that can help bypass or lessen the need for informed consent (Ford & Norrie, 2016;
Ramsberg & Platt, 2018). Some go so far as to argue that if informed consent is required,
“the efficiency gained by cluster randomization is lost” (Spence et al., 2018, p.816).
To conduct pragmatic cluster-randomized trials without informed consent is
clearly an infringement of patient autonomy. But conducting socially valuable research
that can inform clinical decision-making and promote cost-efficient uptake of evidencebased practices in clinical practice is integral to the advancement of health care. The
question, then, is whether the infringement on patient autonomy is adequately justified by
the imperative to conduct this kind of socially valuable research.

1.3 Illustrating the tension: the hemodialysis setting
A clear example of the imperative to conduct pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
exists within nephrology. End-stage kidney disease is a leading cause of mortality and
morbidity worldwide (Liyanage et al., 2015), and the global prevalence of kidney failure
in 2017 was estimated to be 5.3 to 9.7 million people (Himmelfarb et al., 2020). Almost
23,000 Canadians are currently living with kidney failure (Liyanage et al., 2015), and
over 5,000 Canadian patients start hemodialysis treatments every year (Forzley et al.,
2017). Hemodialysis provides a life-sustaining treatment option for people with kidney
failure. Although session duration and frequency can alter, hemodialysis often requires
three- to five-hour treatments thrice weekly to clear toxins from the patient’s blood and to
remove excess fluid.
However, the quality of life of such patients is poor, life expectancy is short, and
health care costs are high (Saran et al., 2018). According to Himmelfarb and colleagues
(2020), “Mortality is very high among patients on dialysis, especially in the first 3
months following initiation of haemodialysis treatment. Approximately one-quarter of
patients on haemodialysis die within a year of initiating therapy in HICs [high-income
countries], and this proportion is even higher in LMICs [low- and middle-income
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countries]” (p.575-576). In Canada, 58.5% of patients on hemodialysis die within five
years (CIHI, 2020). This prognosis is worse than most cancers.
The leading cause of death in this patient population is cardiovascular disease,
and death due to cardiovascular disease is 20 times higher for patients receiving
hemodialysis than the general population (Cozzolino et al., 2018). This is because
standard treatments used to effectively prevent cardiovascular disease in the general
population (e.g., statins and anti-platelet drugs) are largely ineffective in patients on
hemodialysis. Without the pace of treatment advancement seen in oncology, and as “the
population of patients receiving dialysis continues to grow rapidly… [we can expect]
millions of deaths resulting from kidney failure each year” (Himmelfarb et al., 2020,
p.574). Thus, there is an imperative to develop new treatments for patients on
hemodialysis to help reduce mortality and morbidity related to cardiovascular disease,
and to enhance the quality of life of these patients worldwide.
Unfortunately, fewer clinical trials are conducted in nephrology than in other
medical disciplines, and their quality is often poor (Trippoli et al., 2004). Many aspects of
care for end-stage kidney disease are guided by clinical opinion and physiological
studies, rather than from knowledge of treatment effects gained through rigorously
conducted and sufficiently large clinical trials (Archdeacon et al., 2013; Levin et al.,
2013). Embedding pragmatic cluster-randomized trials into the delivery of hemodialysis
care has been proposed as an efﬁcient method to generate practice-guiding evidence
(Dember et al., 2016). Many facets of dialysis care, such as duration and frequency of
treatments, electrolyte content of dialysate, and targets for blood pressure, could be
informed by pragmatic trials.
One initiative to improve hemodialysis treatments for patients with cardiovascular
disease in Canada was the Major Outcomes with Personalized Dialysate Temperature
(MyTEMP) trial (Al-Jaishi et al., 2020b) (see Textbox 1). This pragmatic clusterrandomized trial examined the effects of temperature-reduced hemodialysis on
cardiovascular mortality and major cardiovascular events over four years, from April
2017 to March 2021. Eighty-four dialysis facilities in Ontario, which delivered
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hemodialysis treatments to over 15,500 patients, were randomized to provide either
temperature-reduced personalized hemodialysis (0.5ºC to 0.9ºC below each patient’s
body temperature) or usual care (standard fixed temperature of 36.5ºC). Facilities were
included in the trial if they had 15 or more patients and each facility’s medical director
agreed to adhere to their cluster’s assigned treatment protocol. Over 98% of the data for
patient baseline characteristics and outcomes were obtained from data sources housed at
the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences.9 This allowed researchers to access
anonymized health information about the patients in each hemodialysis facility for the
purposes of analysis. In addition, each facility was requested to send de-identified data
from 15 patients every month (a single page of data collection) to document whether the
facilities were adhering to their assigned interventions.

Textbox 1: Details of the MyTEMP trial.
Aim: To test the effectiveness of outpatient hemodialysis centres randomized to either a
personalized temperature-reduced dialysate or a standard-temperature dialysate protocol.
Design: Pragmatic, registry based, open-label, cluster-randomized trial.
Population: 84 hemodialysis centers in Ontario, Canada providing 4 million dialysis sessions to
approximately 15,500 patients over a 4-year follow-up.
Interventions: Hemodialysis centers were randomized to provide dialysis treatments (1) between
0.5°C and 0.9°C below the patient’s pre-dialysis body temperature, to a minimum dialysate
temperature of 35.5°C, or (2) at the standard temperature of 36.5°C.
Data collection: 98% obtained through administrative data sources housed at the Institute for
Clinical Evaluative Sciences. Other data, collected as part of routine care, was obtained from a
random sample of 15 hemodialysis sessions per month.
Outcome: Composite of cardiovascular-related death or major cardiovascular-related
hospitalization.
Ethics approval: Western University’s Health Science Research Ethics Board, on behalf of 13
institutions overseeing 45 hemodialysis centres, approved the study with a waiver of consent. The
remaining institutions received ethics approval and were granted a waiver of consent from their local
research ethics committees.

9

The Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences is an independent, non-profit corporation in Ontario,
Canada that houses data collected through the routine administration of Ontario's health care system.
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The MyTEMP ethics application was approved centrally by the Health Sciences
Research Ethics Board at Western University through the streamlined review system
managed by Clinical Trials Ontario.10 This process allows a single qualified research
ethics committee in Ontario to provide ethical review and oversight for multiple research
sites participating in the same clinical trial. The research ethics approval was given on
behalf of 13 institutions (overseeing 45 hemodialysis centres), and the remaining
institutions received ethics approval from their local research ethics committees. Western
University’s research ethics committee approved the study and the researchers’ request
for a waiver of consent. This means that the trial proceeded without the prospective
informed consent of any participant. The results of the trial have yet to be published.
The MyTEMP trial is not the only pragmatic cluster-randomized trial in
hemodialysis proceeding without informed consent. Three other examples of
hemodialysis trials with similar designs, recruitment procedures (i.e., no consent), and
arguments for why informed consent is not required include the recently completed Time
to Reduce Mortality in End-Stage Renal Disease (TiME) trial (Dember et al., 2019), the
ongoing Randomised Evaluation of Sodium Dialysate Levels on Vascular Events
(RESOLVE) trial (National Library of Medicine, 2016) and the proposed Outcomes of a
Higher vs. Lower Hemodialysate Magnesium Concentration (Dial-Mag Canada) trial
(National Library of Medicine, 2019).
The MyTEMP investigators argued that participation in their trial would pose no
more than minimal risk to patients. In the event a patient receives treatment from a
facility randomized to the usual care arm, which was approximately half of the patients in
the trial, they would receive care that is no different from what they would otherwise
receive outside of the trial. For those randomized to the novel intervention of lower
dialysate temperature, known risks included the potential to feel cold as the blood
returning to the patient is colder than body temperature. The researchers also argued that
it would be methodologically, logistically, and financially impracticable without a waiver
of consent. In effect, researchers believe that socially valuable research of this kind

10

An independent, not-for-profit organization established with support from the Government of Ontario.
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would be seriously impeded if informed consent from each prospective research
participant was required. What underlies this dilemma is: how and to what degree ought
we to respect the autonomy of patients given the imperative to conduct socially valuable
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials?

1.4 Thesis question and outline
Once again, this thesis seeks to answer the question: how do we strike an
appropriate balance between the requirement to respect patient autonomy and the
imperative to conduct socially valuable pragmatic cluster-randomized trials? To provide
an answer for this question, I will focus on the following sub-questions: (1) Do patients
have an enforceable moral duty to participate in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
without their informed consent? (2) Can a waiver of consent be broadly used to facilitate
the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials? (3) Can alternative models of consent
promote and protect the autonomy of patients and facilitate the conduct of pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials? Each of these questions represents a different approach to
answering the overarching thesis question that requires careful consideration.
Those who take the first approach, described in chapter 2, aim to obviate
informed consent requirements in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials through an appeal
to a patient’s moral duty to participate in clinical research. But do patients have a moral
duty to participate in research? And, if so, does a patient’s moral duty to participate in
research override a researcher’s duty to obtain informed consent? To resolve the tension
in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials, proponents of this approach will argue that
patients have an enforceable moral duty to participate in research. This is a duty that, by
definition, acts as sufficient grounds to eliminate informed consent requirements in
certain circumstances, thereby allowing socially valuable pragmatic cluster-randomized
trials to proceed uninhibited.
Those who take the second approach, described in chapter 3, aim to obviate
informed consent requirements in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials by arguing that a
waiver of consent can be broadly used to facilitate the conduct of these trials. A waiver of
consent can be granted by a research ethics committee if researchers prove that: “(1) the
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research would not be feasible or practicable to carry out without the waiver or
modification; (2) the research has important social value; and (3) the research poses no
more than minimal risk to participants” (CIOMS, 2016, p.37). But where did these
criteria come from? And when is it justifiable to conduct clinical research without
informed consent? To resolve the tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials,
proponents of this approach will posit various philosophical frameworks that can justify
the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials with a waiver of consent.
I develop a third approach, described in chapter 4, to resolve the overarching
question. Instead of exploring ways in which informed consent requirements can be
eliminated, my approach is to explore whether alternative models of informed consent—
namely, simple opt-out consent, integrated consent, short form consent, and electronic
consent—can serve the ends of autonomy and pragmatism simultaneously. But are these
consent models ethically permissible and practically feasible for pragmatic clusterrandomized trials? To resolve the tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials, I draw a
distinction between consent requirements in existing policy and informed consent as an
autonomous authorization and explore whether alternative models of consent can satisfy
the conditions of an autonomous authorization.
It is only when we have answers to these three questions that we will have a firm
grasp of when it may be permissible to trade-off patient autonomy against the imperative
to conduct socially valuable pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. Though contextualized
by the hemodialysis setting, this thesis seeks to offer broader guidance for informed
consent issues in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. Hence, in the concluding chapter of
this dissertation, I address the generalizability of my arguments to other clinical contexts
and conclude by raising questions for future research.
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Chapter 2: The moral duty to participate in pragmatic clusterrandomized trials
Established in the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the requirement to respect
the autonomy of research participants is in tension with the imperative to conduct
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. So how might we ethically proceed with the conduct
of this socially valuable research? One approach to resolve this conflict, taken primarily
by philosophers, has been to argue that patients have a moral duty to participate in
clinical research that offers the prospect of direct therapeutic benefit. In brief, they argue
against the view that people who participate in research are acting above and beyond the
call of duty. They posit that, in certain circumstances, people ought to participate in
activities that aim to contribute to generalizable knowledge and thereby improve the lives
of future patients.
Although there has been considerable debate as to whether a moral duty to
participate in clinical research exists, the arguments articulated in favour of a moral duty
only support a prima facie duty; in other words, a duty to participate in clinical research
that can be overridden by countervailing considerations. As I will demonstrate, these
arguments, in and of themselves, fail to give an account of how socially valuable research
can proceed without obtaining informed consent from prospective research participants.
What is required to resolve the conflict is a convincing argument that supports an
enforceable moral duty—a duty that, by definition, obviates the requirement to obtain
informed consent. If such a moral duty exists, it would act as sufficient grounds to
override the requirement to obtain the consent of prospective research participants,
thereby allowing pragmatic cluster-randomized trials to proceed uninhibited.
Hence, in this chapter, I focus on the question: do patients have an enforceable
moral duty to participate in socially valuable clinical research? In section 2.1, I provide
an overview of the longstanding debate with regards to whether patients have a moral
duty to participate in clinical research with direct therapeutic benefit. I demonstrate that
their arguments only support a prima facie moral duty to participate in clinical research
and argue that this cannot obviate a researcher’s duty to obtain informed consent. Hence,
in section 2.2, I construct three of the strongest arguments in favour of an enforceable

23

moral duty, and subsequently demonstrate that each argument succumbs to persuasive
counterarguments. I thus conclude in section 2.3 that, barring any novel arguments, this
approach fails to resolve the conflict between the requirement to respect patient
autonomy and the imperative to conduct pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.

2.1 Overview of the debate
Hans Jonas (1969), in his canonical essay entitled Philosophical Reflections on
Experimenting with Human Subjects, claimed that clinical research involving humans
raised “inherently philosophical [questions] as it concerns… a genuine conflict of values
involving principles of a high order” (p.220). The first principle—respect for
autonomy—is fundamentally deontological: there is a widely held belief that we ought to
respect the autonomy of individuals and not treat people instrumentally. The second
principle is fundamentally consequentialist: social progress in medicine is for the greater
good. According to Jonas, these principles conflict in clinical research since it often
requires treating people instrumentally for the greater good. In other words, people are
exposed to the risks of experimentation not for their own benefit, but primarily for the
benefit of others.
Jonas (1969) claimed that our Western cultural tradition places a primary
inviolability on the principle of respect for autonomy and the subsequent requirement to
obtain informed consent. The primacy placed on respect for autonomy is justified, he
argued, because “progress is an optional goal, not an unconditional commitment” and a
“slower progress in the conquest of disease would not threaten society” (p.245). Jonas
concluded that “society would indeed be threatened by the erosion of those moral values
whose loss, possibly caused by too ruthless a pursuit of scientific progress, would make
its most dazzling triumphs not worth having” (ibid).
These philosophical reflections represent the predominant view in the research
ethics literature: the primacy of respect for autonomy over social progress makes
participation in clinical research supererogatory; it is praiseworthy but not morally
obligatory. This means that participation in clinical research is akin to other
supererogatory activities, such as donating blood or giving to charity. This view is
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evidently reflected in international ethical guidelines. For instance, the Nuremburg Code
(1947) states that the “voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,”
and the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki (2013) states, “while the
primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal can never
take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects” (p.2191).
Even contemporary international ethical guidelines for research involving humans state
that “scientific and social value cannot legitimate subjecting study participants or host
communities to mistreatment, or injustice” (CIOMS, 2016, p.1).
Recent empirical work conducted in the United States also substantiates the
predominant view that participation in research is supererogatory (Weinfurt, Lin &
Sugarman, 2019). In this study, a total of 2,994 English-speaking adults completed a
national survey in which they answered questions measuring attitudes about their
responsibility to participate in research. When prompted with the statement, “All patients
have a responsibility to participate in some research studies to improve health care,”
40.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed, while only 19.1% agreed or strongly agreed.
When prompted with the statement, “I have a responsibility to participate in some
research studies to improve health care,” 31.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed, while
26.5% agreed or strongly agreed. Finally, when prompted with the statement, “No one
has a responsibility to participate in research,” 39.5% agreed or strongly agreed, while
22.9% disagreed or strongly disagreed. According to the authors, these findings suggest
that “the majority of patients do not currently sense a responsibility to participate in
research” (p.579).11 Essentially, this study demonstrates the status quo. If someone argues
that there is a moral duty to participate in research, they are challenging the status quo.
Nevertheless, there have been numerous attempts to argue that there is a moral
duty to participate in clinical research involving direct therapeutic benefit. Proponents of
these arguments claim that it is a prima facie moral duty. To say that a person has a

It is worth noting that the authors of this study consider the terms “responsibility” and “obligation” as
synonymous. According to the authors, “the initial draft of the survey used the term obligation, but
respondents with lower literacy level found it to be confusing” (p.575).
11
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prima facie moral duty to perform an action, according to William David Ross (1930),
means that a person ought to perform that action unless it conflicts with another prima
facie moral duty of equal or greater importance that favours not performing that action
(or favours performing some other action instead). Ross gives the following example to
show that one’s prima facie duty of fidelity (i.e., to keep one’s promises) can be
overridden by the prima facie duties of beneficence or non-maleficence:
If I have promised to meet a friend at a particular time for some trivial purpose, I
should certainly think myself justified in breaking my engagement if by doing so I
could prevent a serious accident or bring relief to the victims of one (p.18).
The original arguments in support of the prima facie duty to participate in clinical
research were articulated (but not endorsed) by Arthur Caplan. Motivated by the fact that
the research ethics literature at this time was focused on the protection of research
participants, Caplan (1984) sought to explore “the moral reasons that ought to lead
someone to participate in research in the first place” (p.1). He maintained that the reasons
underlying a moral duty to participate in clinical research came in three forms: the moral
duty is incurred because (1) we all accept and continue to accept the benefits of research,
(2) participating in research produces goods and prevents harms, and (3) the knowledge
gained from research is a public good. These three interrelated arguments are commonly
referred to as the justice argument, the beneficence (or non-maleficence) argument, and
the public goods argument, respectively.
Contemporary philosophers John Harris (2005), Rosamond Rhodes (2008), and
G. Owen Schaefer (2009), among others, continue to promulgate these arguments (see
Table 1). These authors argue against the predominant view in order to incite a cultural
shift. Indeed, Schaefer and colleagues (2009) explicitly state that their argument does
“not suggest that people have an obligation to become full-time guinea pigs. Instead,
there needs to be a cultural shift in the moral framework that we bring to participation in
research” (p.72). Rather than viewing research participation as supererogatory, the
cultural shift would help to emphasize participation in clinical research as a moral good.
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Table 1: Three arguments to support a prima facie duty to participate in clinical research.
Moral foundation

Reconstrued argument

Author endorsement

Justice

Premise 1: If we accept the benefits of research, then
we must participate in the social practice which
produces them; otherwise, we are free riding on others
(i.e., acting unfairly).

Harris (2005); Rhodes
(2008)

Premise 2: We all accept the benefits from the
existence of the social practice of clinical research,
and we will continue to accept the benefits from these
and other advances.
Conclusion: We have a duty to participate in clinical
research.

Beneficence/ Nonmaleficence

Premise 1: If our actions can or will produce good or
prevent something bad from occurring, then we have a
duty to perform those actions.

Harris (2005); Rhodes
(2008)

Premise 2: Participating in clinical research can or will
produce good or prevent something bad from
occurring.
Conclusion: We have a duty to participate in clinical
research.

Public goods

Premise 1: Scientific knowledge produced by medical
research is a public good.

Schaefer et al. (2009)

Premise 2: Participation in clinical research is a
critical way to support this public good.
Conclusion: We have a duty to participate in clinical
research.

But, in the words of Caplan (1984), “the arguments against a duty to serve as a
subject in biomedical research seem to have been so persuasive as to have made the topic
otiose” (p.3). Indeed, each of the arguments in favour of a prima facie duty to participate
in clinical research have inspired many counterarguments (see Table 2). Although the
three potential foundations and supporting arguments for the prima facie duty have been
contested, the same arguments are being misappropriated to justify the conduct of
research without informed consent. For example, a recent publication considers “how an
obligation to participate should apply to consent waivers in the context of data research”
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(Ballantyne & Schaefer, 2018, p.392). The authors argue that a prima facie duty “can
ground waivers of informed consent for secondary research using public sector health
data, even when obtaining such consent would be practicable” (ibid).
Table 2: Eight arguments against a prima facie duty to participate in clinical research.
Moral foundation

Criticisms

Justice

It is unclear that those who participated in research in the past were creating a
debt that had to be discharged by those who reaped the benefits of their
participation; if so, this undermines any altruism of their choice to participate
(see Caplan, 1984).
Merely benefiting from those who have previous participated in research is not
morally objectionable. For example, we all benefit from the risks and burdens
assumed by firefighters, but no one supposes that everyone has a duty to be a
firefighter (see Schaefer et al., 2009).
The argument assumes we all benefit from research, when millions of people
worldwide have little or no access to its benefits (see de Melo-Martin, 2008).

Beneficence/ Nonmaleficence

Proponents do not explain why one has a specific obligation to participate,
rather than a prima facie duty to promote the welfare of others or to contribute
to research through other beneficent acts such as donating to the research
enterprise (see Shapshay & Pimple, 2007; Schaefer et al., 2009)
Empirical research indicates that participating in research rarely produces good
or prevents harm since the failure rate of clinical research is high and a lot of
research is wasteful and lacks value (see Yarborough, 2017).

Public goods

It is not evident that health, safety, or scientific knowledge are public goods (see
Jonas, 1969; Fried, 1974; Caplan, 1984).
While an individual might be obligated to engage in activities to maintain public
goods, it is unclear why such an obligation would extend to the improvement or
advancement of public goods (see Jonas, 1969; Caplan, 1984).
Most people already contribute to research without active participation, e.g.,
people contribute to public goods by paying for health care through taxation,
insurance premiums, or out of pocket (see Allhoff, 2005; Brassington, 2008)

But a prima facie duty to participate in clinical research, in and of itself, cannot
obviate a researcher’s duty to obtain informed consent. According to Rhodes (2017), the
fact that “we have a duty to participate in biomedical research [means] that it is
something that each of us should do, that it is our obligation to participate, that
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participation is the right thing to do, and that failing to participate, without significant
justification, is wrong” with the caveat, “nothing that I say involves forcing people to
become participants in clinical research” (p.319). This is because an individual may have
conflicting prima facie duties such that the duty to participate in clinical research does
not prevail.
The demands of the prima facie duty, then, is that people should say “yes” when
asked to participate; if they say no, without reason, they are acting immorally. While
those engaged in the debate rarely clarify what counts as a sufficient reason not to
participate in clinical research, Sandra Shapshay and Kenneth Pimple (2007) claim that
“when participation requires nothing more than a minor inconvenience, you should. […]
Insofar as the demand of participating is greater, in terms of time, hardship or risk, a
person is justified in spending his or her time, money and effort in discharging her [prima
facie] obligations in another way” (p.417).
Whether a prima facie duty to participate in clinical research exists is therefore
inconsequential to the question of how we can proceed with pragmatic clusterrandomized trials without the informed consent of prospective research participants.
What is required to resolve the issue is a persuasive argument supporting an enforceable
moral duty. An enforceable duty, by definition, is one that cannot be overridden by
countervailing considerations. In the context of clinical research, an enforceable duty
means that people can justifiably be conscripted into certain studies without their
informed consent, thereby allowing pragmatic cluster-randomized trials to proceed
uninhibited by the requirement to solicit and obtain consent. Thus, only when there is an
enforceable duty can we set aside informed consent requirements.
This point is worth repeating: why argue for an enforceable moral duty to
participate in clinical research, and how might this change the status quo? According to
Angela Ballantyne and G. Owen Schaefer (2018), an enforceable duty means that
“researchers would no longer be required to demonstrate that gaining consent is
impracticable” (p.393) to be granted a waiver of consent from a research ethics
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committee.12 In fact, if an enforceable moral duty exists, they state that “it could be
ethically acceptable for researchers not to seek consent from them even if obtaining
consent were practicable” (p.394).

2.2 An enforceable duty to participate in clinical research
The literature on an enforceable moral duty to participate in clinical research is
sparse. Only two substantive arguments have previously been articulated. The first
argument, posited by both Harris (2005) and Rhodes (2005; 2017), is grounded in social
contract theory. In section 2.2.1, I explicate this argument that suggests our moral duty to
participate in clinical research is analogous to our civic duty to participate in the judicial
system. However, I provide two counterarguments: I argue that the analogy between
these two systems is weak, and that the implication of their argument is either an unjust
or practically unworkable research system.
In section 2.2.2, I explicate and strengthen another one of Rhodes’ (2008)
arguments. This argument, grounded in Kantian deontological theory, suggests that
participation in clinical research is mandatory when it aims to preserve one’s own life or
autonomy because participating in this kind of research is an act that offers the best
chance for rational agents to fulfill their perfect duty of self-preservation. But I argue
that, given the nature of clinical research, it cannot be guaranteed that participation offers
any chance for achieving the ends of self-preservation. I also demonstrate that a perfect
duty to participate in clinical research is inconsistent with Kant’s categorical imperative.
It is rather surprising that no attempt has been made to construct an argument in
support of an enforceable moral duty to participate in clinical research grounded in
consequentialist theory. It may be that consequentialists generally find it difficult to
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Recall from the introductory chapter of this thesis, a waiver of consent can be granted by a research
ethics committee if researchers demonstrate that: “(1) the research would not be feasible or practicable to
carry out without the waiver or modification; (2) the research has important social value; and (3) the
research poses no more than minimal risk to participants” (CIOMS, 2016, p.37).
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generate any obligations with binding force.13 Nonetheless, in section 2.2.3, I construct a
robust argument grounded in consequentialist theory. This argument, following Peter
Singer’s argument for a moral duty to donate to charity, posits that if patients have the
power to prevent suffering and death from occurring without sacrificing anything of
comparable moral importance by participating in clinical research, then they have an
enforceable moral duty to do so. However, I argue that the consequential argument, while
potentially true for acts of donation, rests on a false empirical assumption in the context
of clinical research, and that the implication of this argument is a research system that
allows for patients to be limitlessly exposed to serious harms, including risk of death,
without their informed consent.

2.2.1 The social contract argument
The first argument invoked to support an enforceable moral duty to participate in
clinical research stems from Hobbesian and Lockean moral and political philosophy, in
which they generate duties by appeal to a tacit cross-generational social contract (see
Lloyd & Sreedhar, 2018; Tuckness, 2020). Briefly, this view maintains that people are
free and equal in the state of nature, a state without government or duties to each other.
But since this is a state of perpetual conflict (as self-interested people compete for limited
resources and power), each individual person concedes their independence by agreeing
via a social contract to obey a sovereign power that has the authority to create and
enforce laws. Accordingly, the social contract to obey the sovereign creates certain
duties; for instance, the duty to obey the laws established by the government, the duty to
participate on juries to aid in the administration of justice, and the duty to pay taxes to
support the common defense.
The central principle is that people form societies with governments that provide,
among other things, justice and defense for its citizens. The citizens, by agreeing to live
in these societies, incur duties to their community. One problem with this account is that

Since the consequentialists’ foundational principle is to always act to maximize utility, the good, or the
happiness of the greatest number, then moral duties seemingly have no binding force. For example, a duty
to repay creditors can be overridden if a person can maximize the good for more people by donating all
their money to charity.
13
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few people have explicitly agreed to establish a government to which they incur these
obligations. Locke’s solution is to rely on a tacit agreement: by living in a society or by
accepting the benefits provided to you by living in a society, you have tacitly agreed to
the social contract and therefore incur certain duties (Tuckness, 2020).
Contemporary philosophers pick up on the tacit cross-generational social contract
to argue that an enforceable duty to participate in clinical research is generated alongside
the other duties generated under social contact theory. They provide arguments by
analogy, citing participation on a jury and paying taxes as duties to our community that
override individuals’ autonomy. For example, Harris (2005) states that there are “a wide
variety of what we might term ‘mandatory contribution to public goods.’ […] Taxation is
of course the clearest and commonest example” (p.244). He continues with another
example:
There are many senses in which participation in vaccine or drug trials involve
features relevantly analogous to jury service. Both involve inconvenience and the
giving up certain amounts of time. Both are important public goods. [Both are] an
integral part of ‘due process,’ helping to safeguard the liberty and rights of
citizens (ibid).
He concludes, “we do not usually insist on informed consent in such cases [of moral and
civic obligations], we are usually content that they merely consent or simply acquiesce”
(p.245).
Another argument by analogy comes from Rhodes (2005), who provides the
following example:
In the same way that we have endorsed laws that require us to pay taxes and to
serve on juries, reasonable people should accept an obligation to periodic service
as research subjects… To withhold endorsement from such a policy would be
taking advantage of the kindness of others—that is, being a free-rider on the
system and failing to recognize the moral equality of others—hence,
unreasonable. In the sense that no reasonable person could withhold agreement
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without injustice, we should subscribe to a social contract for reasonable research
participation when others are willing to commit themselves as well (p.25).
Their argument is essentially this: by tacitly agreeing to live in a society whose
government provides publicly accessible health care—regardless of whether one accepts
that care—citizens incur a duty to participate in clinical research. Since enforceability is
justifiable in the case of jury duty and taxation, “the same or indeed more powerful
arguments would surely justify it in the case of science research” (Harris, 2005, p.244245).
But Harris and Rhodes refuse to accept the consequences of their own arguments.
Harris (2005) claims that “[his] own view is that voluntary means are always best and
that any form of compulsion should be a last resort to be used only when consensual
means had failed or where the need for a particular research activity was urgent and of
overwhelming importance” (p.245). Rhodes (2005) states that, “informed consent would
certainly have an important role within [her] framework” (p.26). This suggests that, for
most clinical research, Harris and Rhodes believe that the requirement for informed
consent should remain. Indeed, Harris (2005) explicitly states, “I am not here advocating
mandatory participation in research, merely arguing that it is in principle justifiable, and
may in certain circumstances become justified” (p.245, italics added).
What, then, are the circumstances in which there is a justifiable enforceable duty
to participate in clinical research that obviates the requirement to obtain informed consent
from prospective participants? According to Harris (2005), it is reasonable to assume that
informed consent is not needed when: (1) the research aims to provide “significant
benefits to humankind;” (2) “the costs and risks involved [to the participant] are
minimal;” and (3) the research “is in their own and the public interest” (p.245).
According to Rhodes (2017), “when the physical risks or burdens involved are
insignificant and the study is scientifically important, informed consent may also be
unnecessary” (p.325). Note that, as Ballantyne and Schaefer (2018) observed, these
criteria are the regulatory criteria to obtain a waiver of consent without the criterion that
obtaining informed consent would render the conduct of research impracticable.
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Pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting provide a
compelling case in which an enforceable duty would be justified on their account.
Consider the MyTEMP trial (see Textbox 1). Briefly, this pragmatic cluster-randomized
trial evaluated the effects of temperature-reduced hemodialysis compared to standardtemperature hemodialysis on cardiovascular mortality and major cardiovascular events.
Does it meet Harris’ and Rhodes’ criterion of having the prospect of generating socially
and scientifically valuable knowledge?
Recall that socially valuable research is grounded in three factors: “the quality of
the information to be produced, its relevance to significant health problems, and its
contribution to the creation or evaluation of interventions, policies, or practices that
promote individual or public health” (CIOMS, 2016, p.1). The MyTEMP trial was a welldesigned study that aimed to reduce death and major cardiovascular events in patients on
hemodialysis. The results of this study will directly inform hemodialysis policies in
Ontario and may be applicable to other similar dialysis settings. Moreover, given that
approximately 25% of patients receiving hemodialysis treatment in high-income
countries die within a year of initiating treatment (Himmelfarb et al., 2020), almost 60%
of Canadian patients on hemodialysis die within five years (CIHI, 2020), and the leading
cause of death in this patient population is cardiovascular disease (Cozzolino et al.,
2018), this trial meets Harris’ and Rhodes’ criterion of social and scientific importance.
According to the MyTEMP researchers, this trial also meets Harris’ and Rhodes’
risk criterion as, on their view, it posed no more than minimal incremental risk to
participants. With respect to the interventions, patients whose facilities were randomized
to provide standard-temperature hemodialysis were exposed to identical risks to those
outside of the trial. The MyTEMP researchers also stated that the interventions were no
more than minimal risk because they were “similar to a quality-control measure that
could be implemented by a dialysis centre director” (Al-Jaishi et al., 2020b, Appendix 5).
There were also no additional risks posed by data collection procedures, as baseline and
outcome data were retrieved from routinely collected and anonymized administrative
health care data.
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Harris’ (2005) third criteria is particularly relevant in this context: the research
must be “in both personal and public interest” (p.245). According to Danielle Wenner
(2017), for research to be in the public’s interest, it must be “responsive to the health
priorities of communities, seeking to ensure that studies have the potential to address
important health deficits” (p.99). In 2019, there were almost 41,000 Canadians14 living
with end-stage kidney disease, and “the number of patients receiving dialysis nearly
double over 20 years, from 11,601 in 2000 to 23,125 in 2019.” (CIHI, 2020, p.4).
Moreover, this disease disproportionately affects Indigenous peoples in Canada, who are
nearly three times as likely as non-Indigenous patients to receive treatment (Collier,
2013). Providing maintenance hemodialysis treatment is also costly, averaging “$60,000
per patient per year when delivered thrice weekly (conventional) and even higher when
delivered in shorter sessions daily or longer sessions nocturnally,” and these treatments
use “disproportionate resources relative to the size of the prevalent dialysis population
and outcomes achieved” (Ferguson et al., 2020, p.20). Addressing this health disparity is
evidently in the public’s interest.
The requirement for research to be in the patients’ own interest is limiting for
most clinical research.15 However, in the context of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials,
patients who participate in clinical research like the MyTEMP trial may have some
prospect of direct therapeutic benefit and, importantly, patients on hemodialysis—given
how end-stage kidney disease is a chronic condition—are often the patients who will also
benefit from the completion of the study. Even patients who receive kidney transplants
may have recurrent kidney disease, or suffer from chronic organ rejection, or miss doses
or stop taking their anti-rejection medication altogether, all of which will result in a
return to dialysis (National Kidney Foundation, 2021). Thus, according to Harris and
Rhodes’ criteria, there would be a justified enforceable duty to participate in the
MyTEMP trial.

14
15

Excluding Quebec citizens.

For instance, phase I clinical trials test the safety, side effects, dosing, and timing of new treatments, and
hence offer no prospect of therapeutic benefits for those who volunteer to participate. Participating in this
research is likely not in the interest of many patients, although some may be interested in participating for
altruistic reasons, for compensation, or to learn more about an illness.
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2.2.2 Rejection of the social contract argument
The central claim underlying Harris’ (2005) and Rhodes’ (2005; 2017) social
contract argument is that the enforceable moral duty to participate in clinical research is
analogous to the enforceable duty to participate on a jury. Arguments by analogy are
often used to demonstrate that an idea is worth taking seriously with the ultimate
objective of persuading the reader to a certain point of view. On their view, if jury
participation is analogous to research participation, and if there is a duty to participate on
juries without consent, then there is a duty to participate in clinical research without
informed consent. But the strength of an analogy largely depends on the number of
morally relevant similarities between the two domains. The more differences, the weaker
the analogy. This, I believe, is the first reason to reject their argument. There are at least
two substantial and meaningful ways in which participating on a jury is different from
participating in clinical research.
First, jury participation in Canada is required equally of all adult citizens, such
that all citizens qua citizens are eligible to participate. Once called to participate, it is
only a minority of individuals who will be found exempt. In contrast, clinical research
evaluates the treatment of diseases and disabilities and, accordingly, those eligible for
participation are those suffering from some illness. As a result, the duty to participate in
clinical research is not incurred by citizens qua citizens; instead, it is incurred in virtue of
one’s illness. This places an additional burden on those suffering from disease and
disability, while most of the population—namely, healthy individuals—would be exempt
from fulfilling their duty.
Second, participating on a jury is an essential part of the Canadian judicial system
because it allows every citizen accused of a criminal offense to be tried by a jury of one’s
peers. The judicial system would be fundamentally undermined if the duty to participate
was only incurred by a subset of society, rather than comprised of a fair and equal
representation of the population. Participation in clinical research is not an essential part
of the Canadian health system in the same way since the health system would not be
fundamentally undermined if those who participate were from a subset of society. Indeed,
our current system relies on a subset of society (i.e., healthy individuals and those with
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illnesses who volunteer for clinical research) and is nonetheless able to generate
scientifically and socially valuable knowledge.
Therefore, one reason to reject Harris’ and Rhodes’ argument is the weakness of
the analogy. But, for the sake of argument, we can assume that their argument is sound.
Another way to reject their argument is to demonstrate that the operationalization of the
duty would result in a problematic research system. So how would this duty be
operationalized? Harris (2005) suggests that the research recruitment process should be
modelled after the United Kingdom’s process of selecting jurors.16 He states:
All British citizens between 18 and 70 are liable for jury service. They may be
called, and unless excused by the court, must serve. This may involve a minimum
of 10 days but sometimes months of daily confinement in a jury box or room,
whether they consent or not. However, although all are liable for service only
some are actually called. If someone is called and fails to appear they may be
fined. Most people will never be called but some must be if the system of justice
is not to break down. Participation in, or facilitation of, this public good is
mandatory (p.244).
But if the research participant recruitment process is based on the jury selection
process, this would result in a system that is inferior our current volunteer-based system.

16

What would the recruitment process for clinical research be in Ontario, Canada if modelled after our jury
selection process? According to the Government of Ontario (2021), every year approximately 700,000
Ontario residents would receive a letter from the Ministry of Health indicating that they have been
randomly selected from the Registered Persons Database under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan to be
considered for inclusion in a “participant roll.” Like a jury roll, it would be a list of potential research
participants who would be eligible during the ensuing year to serve as a participant. Everyone who receives
the letter would be required by law to accurately complete an accompanying questionnaire and return it
within 30 days using a pre-addressed postage-paid envelope. Questionnaires would include queries
regarding demographic, employment, and private health information. Completed questionnaires would be
received and sorted for eligibility. Those who are eligible may receive another letter, called a summons, at
any time for up to three years after completing the questionnaire. The summons would indicate a location,
date, and time that each person would be required to attend as part of a “research panel.” Like a jury panel,
it would be a large group of prospective participants from whom one or more studies could be conducted.
Prospective participants would have the opportunity to request a deferral or excusal at the time they receive
a summons by providing any available documentation that supports their request. Whether selected for a
study or dismissed, people selected to create a research panel would be ineligible for research service for
the next three years.
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The jury recruitment process is fair because it selects jurors from a pool of all citizens
using a random lottery system. But not all citizens have an equal chance of being
recruited into clinical research using a random lottery system because people do not have
an equal chance of becoming sick. A random lottery system in this context fails to attend
to the social determinants of health,17 whereas our current volunteer system allows for
anyone, regardless of income, education, and so forth to participate in clinical research.
Such a recruitment system also excludes people who are motivated to participate
in research. We do not allow people who are motivated to participate in the judicial
system to become jurors on their own accord. Similarly, people may be motivated to
participate in research to meaningfully contribute to society, to improve the lives of
future patients, to learn more about their illness, to receive specialized treatment, or to
receive compensation. Regardless of their motivation, if a person is not randomly
selected, they would not be allowed to participate.
Finally, this system would include people in research who are not motivated to
participate. Consider that many people do not have an interest in serving on a jury. There
are many websites that convey different ways to avoid jury duty—people can attempt to
prove economic hardship, request deferrals or advancement of the date, use their student
status, or even “say that you are quite sick, going out of town… [or] if you have young
children, consider using them as an excuse” (WikiHow, 2019). Even if selected for a jury,
these websites indicate further ways of being dismissed. In terms of clinical research,
there will be those who attempt to render themselves ineligible and, if they are included
without their consent, they would likely not be inclined to comply with the research
protocol or adhere to the intervention to which they are randomized. If enough
participants do this, it will undermine the researchers’ ability to detect meaningful results
from the study.

Social determinants of health are non-medical factors that can affect one’s health, such as income,
education, housing, gender, and race.
17
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In sum, Harris’ and Rhodes’ argument fails for two reasons. Their analogy is only
a strong as the similarities between the judicial and research system, and I have argued
that these systems differ in substantial and meaningful ways. Moreover, I have argued
that even if we take their argument to be sound, the operationalization of an enforceable
duty will either be unjust (as the duty disproportionately burdens those will illness) or
will result in a recruitment system that is worse than the current volunteer-based system.

2.2.3 The deontological argument
The second argument invoked to support an enforceable moral duty to participate
in clinical research stems from Kantian deontological theory. Kant (2005) argued that the
fundamental principle underlying our moral duties is a categorical imperative; a
command applying to all rational agents unconditionally. The first formulation of Kant’s
categorical imperative is: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law” (p.81). Many commentators take this
formulation of the categorical imperative as a decision-making procedure for moral
reasoning. The procedure is as follows: formulate a maxim; recast that maxim as a
universal law that applies to all rational agents; consider whether that maxim creates any
contradiction in a world governed by this law; and, if no contradiction occurs, then ask
whether a rational agent would will to act on that maxim (Johnson & Cureton, 2016).
Although Marquis (1983) dismisses the idea that patients have a moral duty to
participate in clinical research, he believes that there are two ways to argue for a moral
duty to participate in research. The first strategy is an appeal to a social contract, as
outlined in the previous section. The second, however, involves an appeal to Kantian
deontological theory as described above. Marquis gives an example of how someone
might argue for a moral duty to participate in research grounded in Kantian theory. He
beings by asking us to consider the maxim, “when offered the opportunity to participate
in clinical research, I shall refuse” (p.46). Following the decision-making procedure,
Marquis states that if this maxim were universalized then the research enterprise would
come to an abrupt halt, hence no advancement in medicine and, consequently, everyone
would be worse off. Since this is not something a person would rationally will, the
“maxim is immoral and one has an obligation to act on its opposite” (ibid).
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Marquis subsequently denies this line of argument by appealing to the second
formulation of Kant’s (2005) categorical imperative, “Act as to treat humanity, whether
in your own or in that of any other, in every case at the same time as an end, never as a
means only” (p.88). One reading of this formulation, presumably Marquis’ (1983)
interpretation, is that any activity that treats people as means to an end is immoral. In his
words, “The second formulation forbids using people merely as means. Enrolling
someone in a randomized clinical trial involves exactly that” (p.47). So, on his view,
clinical research unavoidably treats people as a means to the end of scientific progress.
As this would be contrary to the second formulation of the categorical imperative, there is
no moral duty to participate in clinical research.
Marquis, however, fails to consider the complexities of Kant’s second
formulation. Another reading of this formulation is that it stipulates a less stringent
requirement: do not treat people merely or only as a mean to an end, but as ends in
themselves. This does not mean that we can never treat a rational person as a means to an
end; rather, it means that it is permissible to treat a person as a means to an end only
when this person is simultaneously treated as an end in themselves. On this interpretation,
it is morally permissible for researchers to treat prospective research participants as a
means to the end of scientific progress when the participants adopt the ends of research as
their own. In this way they are not treated merely as a means to an end. Thus, one could
argue that rational agents are duty-bound to participate in clinical research when not
treated merely as a means to an end.
Rhodes (2008) picks up on the deontological argument above, which she
expresses this as follows:
We each should live our lives by taking responsibility for ourselves, in Kantian
terms, as good rulers over ourselves. Looking into the future with awareness of
the fragility of our bodies, we owe it to ourselves to take steps that would make it
most likely that we could fend off disease and disability so as to retain our
autonomy. Because biomedical research offers our best chance for achieving that
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end, and because we cannot will an end without also willing the necessary means
to achieve it, we are duty-bound to participate (p.37-38).
Both Kantian arguments above stipulate that there is some type of duty to
participate in clinical research, but they fail to clarify in what ways we are duty-bound.
Marquis’ argument engenders a strong picture for the role of informed consent insofar as
patients who autonomously authorize their participation in research are adopting the ends
of research as their own and thus are not treated merely as a means to some end. Rhodes’
argument, however, can be shown to support an enforceable moral duty to participate in
research.
Kant (2005) writes of two types of duties: perfect and imperfect duties. A perfect
duty is one which “permits of no exception to the advantage of inclination,” while
imperfect duties can admit of exceptions (p.81). In other words, perfect duties are “strict
injunctions turning every particular act that falls under these duties into a binding duty,”
(Statman, 1996, p.211) while imperfect duties “bind us in a much looser way, leaving
ample room for personal discretion” (ibid). For example, a perfect duty to refrain from
murder means that any particular act of murder is impermissible, while an imperfect duty
to help others can be fulfilled at any time and in many different ways.
As demonstrated in section 2.1, if the moral duty to participate in clinical research
admits of exceptions—i.e., if it is a prima facie duty that allows for individuals with
countervailing considerations to refuse participation—then it fails to account for how we
can proceed with socially valuable clinical research without the informed consent of
prospective participants. Although Shapshay and Pimple (2007) have previously argued
that the duty to participate in clinical research is an imperfect duty (i.e., rational agents
have a moral duty to participate in research insofar as they should say “yes” when asked
for their consent), what is required to resolve the conflict is an argument in support of a
perfect duty to participate in research.
Kant’s (2005) main example of a perfect duty to oneself is to refrain from suicide.
He asks us to consider the maxim: “From self-love I adopt it as my principle to shorten
my life when its longer duration is likely to bring about more ill than satisfaction” (p.81).
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This maxim is inconceivable when universalized, as it creates a contradiction: reason
urges the agent to both end and preserve life. Hence, this is a duty that admits of no
exceptions; rational agents have a perfect duty to refrain from suicide so as to retain their
autonomy.
To refrain from suicide is commonly depicted as a particular act that falls under
the perfect duty of self-preservation. Another particular act that arguably falls under a
perfect duty of self-preservation is the act of participating in clinical research, provided
that the research prolongs one’s life, preserves one’s autonomy, or accomplishes both. In
light of this, re-consider Rhodes’ (2008) argument. She states, “we owe it to ourselves to
take steps that would make it most likely that we could fend off disease and disability so
as to retain our autonomy” (p.38). In other words, her first premise is that a rational agent
has a perfect duty to oneself to fulfill a particular act that falls under a duty of selfpreservation. She continues, “biomedical research offers our best chance for achieving
that end” (ibid). In other words, her second premise is that the act of participating in
(some) clinical research offers the best chance for self-preservation. Presumably, the
research would have to aim at preserving one’s own life or rationality. Thus, Rhodes
concludes, “we are duty-bound to participate in research,” (ibid) such that we have a
perfect duty to participate in research that aims to preserve one’s own life or autonomy.
This argument can be schematized as follows:
P1: Rational agents have a perfect duty of self-preservation.
P2: If rational agents have a perfect duty of self-preservation, then any particular
act that falls under this duty is enforceable.
P3: Participating in clinical research (that aims to preserve one’s own life or
autonomy) is a particular act that offers the best chance for achieving the ends of
self-preservation.
C: Therefore, rational agents have an enforceable duty to participate in clinical
research (that aims to preserve one’s own life or autonomy).
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Once again, a compelling case for this duty would be the MyTEMP trial (AlJaishi et al., 2020b). As previously stated, something particular to the chronic disease
context, unlike most research contexts, is that the benefits of the knowledge gained by the
completion of research often applies to both current and future patients, including those
who participate. Thus, a person is acting to prolong their own life by participating in a
well-designed hemodialysis study that seeks to reduce patient mortality. Moreover, a
person is acting to preserve their autonomy by participating in these trials. Patients on
hemodialysis are “at a greater risk of dementia and Alzheimer’s disease diagnoses [and]
older patients on hemodialysis who [are] diagnosed with dementia [or Alzheimer’s
disease are] subsequently at a twofold higher risk of death” (McAdams-DeMarco et al.,
2018, p.1339). With the awareness of this prognosis, and because “we owe it to ourselves
to take steps that would make it most likely that we fend disease and disability [that
directly affects] our autonomy” (Rhodes, 2008, p.38), there is a perfect duty to participate
in the MyTEMP trial and similar pragmatic cluster-randomized trials conducted in the
hemodialysis setting.

2.2.4 Rejection of the deontological argument
The problem with Rhodes’ (2008) deontological argument stems from the third
premise. Rhodes states that it is because clinical research offers “our best chance” for
achieving the ends of self-preservation that we have a perfect duty to participate in
research. But why should we think that the best chance we have to retain or preserve
one’s own life or future autonomy is participating in clinical research? To enroll patients
into clinical research requires that the study interventions are in equipoise; that is, it
cannot be known prior to the conduct of research that one intervention is better than the
other(s). Some research may offer a chance of self-preservation, but any chance of selfpreservation relies on the results of the trial demonstrating a treatment to be effective.
Indeed, given that the effectiveness of the treatment is only known after the completion
of the trial, it is quite plausible that participating in research exposes people to treatments
that result in harmful outcomes. That is, participating in clinical research—even if it aims
to preserve one’s life or autonomy—is a particular act that offers a chance for negatively
impacting one’s life and autonomy.
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With respect to end-stage kidney disease, participating in pragmatic clusterrandomized trials like the MyTEMP trial is not a patient’s “best chance” for achieving the
ends of self-preservation. Life expectancy for patients on hemodialysis varies depending
on many factors, such as a patient’s other medical conditions, on how well they follow
their treatment plan (e.g., attending dialysis appointments, taking prescribed medication,
adhering to diets), and whether they receive treatment in low- or high-resource settings or
in rural or urban areas. Patients on hemodialysis living in a rural area might have a better
chance to preserve their own life simply by moving to an urban area rather than
participating in clinical research in their current area. It is far from clear that participating
in clinical research offers the best chance for preserving one’s life or autonomy.
A more reasonable argument would suggest that rational agents have a perfect
duty to accept medical treatments that are proven to preserve one’s life or autonomy. For
example, if there existed a vaccine to prevent the onset of dementia, Kant would say that
we must take it given that receiving this vaccination against a life- and autonomythreatening disease is a particular act that offers the best chance for prolonging one’s life.
However, this argument would only hold if the hypothetical vaccination was known to be
the best (or most effective) treatment that has been proven to preserve one’s life and
autonomy. Again, given that the effectiveness of a treatment under evaluation in clinical
research cannot be known prior to the start of the study, it cannot be guaranteed that it
offers any chance (and definitely not the best chance) for achieving the ends of selfpreservation.
A second objection to Rhodes’ (2008) argument in support of a perfect duty to
participate in clinical research is that there is an inconsistency between Kantianism and
her argument. It is antithetical to Kantianism to suggest that we have an enforceable duty
to participate in research as such a duty clearly prohibits people from adopting the ends
of research as their own. In other words, a perfect duty to participate in research cannot
be generated from the categorical imperative since it would treat people merely as a
means to an end. While Marquis (1983) dismissed a duty to participate in clinical
research for similar reasons, the difference here is that Marquis failed to consider that
patients, through an informed consent process, can adopt the ends of research as their
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own and therefore not be treated merely or only as a means to an end. But to make
participation in research compulsory and consequently obviate the need for informed
consent, as a perfect duty suggests, this would by definition treat people merely as a
means to an end. Thus, there cannot be a perfect duty to participate in clinical research.

2.2.5 The consequentialist argument
At the outset of this chapter, I noted that the prevailing view about participation in
clinical research is that the act of volunteering as a research participant is supererogatory.
It is an act which is morally praiseworthy, but not morally blameworthy if someone
refrains from participating. The prototypical example of a supererogatory act, to which
participation in research is often compared, is a charitable donation. Donating some of
one’s own capital is regarded as an act of charity, and thus it is believed that there is
nothing morally wrong with refraining from giving. However, if it can be argued that the
prototypical example of a supererogatory act is, in fact, an enforceable moral duty, then
there may be an analogous argument for why participation in clinical research should also
be regarded as an enforceable moral duty.
In Famine, Affluence and Morality, Peter Singer (1972) proffers an argument that
people have a moral obligation to donate to charity to aid those needlessly suffering and
dying from poverty. His argument can be schematized as follows:
P1: Suffering and death are bad.
P2: If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we have a moral obligation
to prevent it.
P3: It is in our power to prevent suffering and death by donating to charities.
C: Therefore, we have a moral obligation to donate to charities.
Singer’s (1972) argument begins with an intuitive assumption that “suffering and
death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad” (p.231). The second, more
contentious premise is supported by a thought experiment. He asks us to imagine the
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following: “if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to
wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is
insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing” (ibid).
The controversial nature of this analogy stems from Singer’s claim that neither
geographical proximity to the child nor the quantity of individuals nearby obviates a
person’s obligation to rescue the child. Singer (1972) states that “the fact that a person is
physically near to us… may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not
show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away”
(p.232). Hence, the proximity argument may only give us a reason for helping those near
to us first; although Singer believes that “the development of the world in a ‘global
village’” means that there is “no possible justification for discrimination on geographical
grounds” (ibid).
Singer (1972) also claims that “the fact that there are millions of other people in
the same position… as I am, does not make the situation significantly different from a
situation in which I am the only person who can prevent something bad from occurring”
(p.232). He concedes that it makes a psychological difference (e.g., one feels less guilty
about doing nothing if others also do nothing), but to Singer there is no moral
difference—everyone is wrong to do nothing. He states, “The result of everyone doing
what he really ought to do cannot be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he
ought to do” (p.234).
Finally, Singer’s third premise is an empirical claim. This premise is only true if
there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that donating to charities does in fact prevent
suffering and death. He argues that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that donations
to certain charities will prevent suffering and death, thus, given the truth of the other
premises, Singer concludes that we have a moral obligation to donate to charity.
There are two ways to understand the enforceability of Singer’s (1972)
conclusion. What he refers to as the “moderate version” of his argument is that we have a
moral duty to prevent bad things from happening, limited only by a sacrifice of
“something morally important” (p.241). The “strong version” of Singer’s argument
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generates a moral duty to prevent bad things from happening, limited only by a sacrifice
of something with “comparable moral significance” (p.241). Endorsing the strong
version, he says that this view “does seem to require reducing ourselves to the level of
marginal utility,” defined as “the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much
suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift” (ibid). On this view,
people are required to give as much money to charity to prevent the suffering and death
of those living in poverty so long as they or their dependents do not end up in poverty.
I acknowledge that Singer (1993) advocates setting a lower standard in his later
work because doing so “might actually result in more aid being given… it would mean
that in order to do the maximum to reduce absolute poverty, we should advocate a
standard lower” (p.245). Indeed, Singer (2002) states that “the one central point in all
[his] writing on this topic, from ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’ onward, has been that
the failure of people in the rich nations to make any significant sacrifices in order to assist
people who are dying from poverty related causes is ethically indefensible” (p.127). Yet
my purpose here is to draw on the strong version of Singer’s argument to generate a
consequentialist argument in support an enforceable moral duty to participate in research.
A corresponding argument based off the stronger version of Singer’s argument can be
schematized as follows:
P1: Suffering and death are bad.
P2: If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening without
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we have a moral obligation
to prevent it, limited only by a sacrifice of something with comparable moral
significance.
P3: It is in our power to prevent suffering and death by participating in clinical
research.
C: Therefore, we have a moral obligation to participate in clinical research,
limited only by a sacrifice of something with comparable moral significance.
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Consider the context of end-stage kidney disease where suffering and death are
prevalent. Patients on hemodialysis experience a substantial amount of suffering; indeed,
the most common side effects include hypotension (causing dizziness), abdominal and
muscle cramps, anemia (causing weakness), bone disease, pericarditis (causing chest
pains), high potassium levels (causing rhythm disturbances in the heart), amyloidosis
(causing joint stiffness and pain), and depression (Mayo Clinic, 2021). Overall, “the
majority of published data shows strong weakening of the QoL [quality of life] of
patients receiving hemodialysis” (Dabrowska-Bender, 2018, p.581). Moreover, as
previously stated, almost 60% of Canadian patients on hemodialysis die within five years
(CIHI, 2020), often due to cardiovascular disease (Cozzolino et al., 2018). Death and
suffering of this kind might also be prevented, or at least substantially reduced, if patients
receiving hemodialysis participate in the MyTEMP trial. The question, then, is whether
premise two is true: would patients sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance by
participating in the MyTEMP trial? If not, patients have a moral duty to participate in it.
Singer explicates “without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance”
as “without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is
wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the
bad thing we can prevent” (p.231). Recall that the investigators of the MyTEMP trial
argued that participation would pose no more than minimal incremental risk to
participants. The study interventions either pose identical risks to those outside of the
trial, or patients may feel colder than they otherwise would. There are also no additional
risks posed by data collection procedures, as data are retrieved from routinely collected
and anonymized administrative health care. And given the substantial suffering and death
of patients on hemodialysis, there is no sacrifice of comparable moral importance.
Therefore, patients have a moral duty to participate the MyTEMP trial and other similar
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials conducted in the hemodialysis setting.

2.2.6 Rejection of the consequentialist argument
One way to object to the consequentialist argument in favour of a moral duty to
participate in research is to refute the second premise. Recall that the supporting
argument for the second premise is the drowning child thought experiment. In the thought
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experiment, a person can save the life of a child without sacrificing something with
comparable moral significance. But once the child is saved, presumably this person has
dispelled their duty as there is no one left to save. Likewise, if everyone donated enough
money to alleviate global poverty, then surely after this goal is attained our obligation
would lessen or dissipate altogether. In terms of research participation, “if there were
enough (or a surplus) of research participants, the case for research participation as a
moral obligation would be as weak as moral appeals for blood transfusion volunteers
when there is (and will be) no blood shortage” (Rennie, 2011, p.43).
Singer (1972) responds to this sort of objection, stating that “this is not to deny
the principle that people in the same circumstances have the same obligations” (p.234).
He believes that, given the current context of global poverty, there is an obligation to
donate. Given different circumstances, such as a world in which there was no poverty,
than surely Singer would agree that our obligations would differ. Similarly, given the
current state of global health, e.g., in 2017, chronic kidney disease resulted in 1.2 million
deaths and was the 12th leading cause of death worldwide (Carney, 2020), the
consequentialist would insist that there is a duty to participate in certain clinical research
studies like the MyTEMP trial.
Yet the consequentialists argument heavily relies on the third premise; that it is in
our power to prevent suffering and death by participating in research. The implicit
consequentialist assumption is that the more people who participate in research, the
greater the social benefits—better treatments, improved quality of life, and less
preventable deaths. The argument is compelling to the extent that clinical research targets
important global health problems and successfully implements the knowledge gained into
clinical practice. However, the above assumption partly depends on empirical facts about
how clinical research is conducted and implemented in clinical practice.
As expressed by Mark Yarborough (2017), those who tout the benefits of medical
progress to support the moral duty to participate in research fail “to take into account all
the consequences of [the research] system, both good and bad, when weighing claims that
we are all obligated to support it” (p.328). He presents a summary of empirical evidence
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(e.g., meta-analyses, systematic reviews, and seminal articles) that demonstrates the high
failure rate of clinical research, and the amount of research that is wasteful, exploitative,
and lacks significant value. Essentially, to say that it is in our power to prevent suffering
and death by participating in clinical research fails to consider the steps between
participation and the derivation of social benefit that are needed to make this premise
plausible. Indeed, the evidence suggests that a duty to participate would result in a greater
number of individuals being exposed to harms for little or no social benefit.
Another objection to the consequentialist argument is that the operationalization
of the duty would result in a research system that allows for patients to be exposed to
severe harm and even risks of death without their consent. Returning to the strong version
of Singer’s (1972) argument, people have a moral duty to prevent bad things from
happening, limited only by a sacrifice of something with comparable moral significance
(p.241). This argument, when reconstructed to apply to pragmatic cluster-randomized
trials, is that if people could prevent the suffering and death of patients receiving
hemodialysis by participating in the MyTEMP trial, then they are morally required to
provided that those enrolled do not end up dying or suffering to a greater extent than
other patients receiving hemodialysis. Since the incremental risks associated with
participating in MyTEMP are minimal and there is substantial potential to develop and
contribute to generalizable knowledge that can prevent death and major cardiovascular
events of future patients, patients have an enforceable duty to participate.
But in the broader context of clinical research, this argument also permits the
conduct of trials that pose substantial harm to healthy individuals without their informed
consent, provided that those enrolled do not end up dying or suffering to a greater extent
than those who are currently dying or suffering. For example, each year approximately
400 million people are infected with dengue fever (Rose & Sekhar, 2019). There are no
antivirals for the disease and the only licensed vaccine is not widely used due to safety
concerns (ibid). Controlled human infection model studies—trials in which a strain of an
infectious agent is administered to healthy volunteers who are then closely monitored for
evidence of infection and to anticipate or manage symptoms—are currently being used to
assess the efficacy of novel vaccines in development for dengue (ibid). Although
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participation may result in death and will in most cases result in participants suffering
from the effects of the disease, participants enrolled in the study are provided with better
medical care than those suffering and dying from dengue. Given that healthy individuals
could prevent suffering and death from dengue by participating in these studies without
their consent and since the sacrifice of harm and autonomy (though significant) is not of
comparable moral significance, there would be a moral duty for people to participate in
this type of research without consent—and surely that is not right.
In sum, the consequentialist argument for an enforceable duty to participate in
clinical research fails for two reasons. The argument rests on the faulty assumption that
the more people who participate in clinical research, the greater the social benefits.
Second, a reductio ad absurdum argument demonstrates that the consequentialist
argument would allow for any research, regardless of the harms posed to participants, to
be conducted without consent provided that the prospect of social benefit is preventing
the suffering and death of more people than those participating in the research.

2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I demonstrated that the debate about whether patients have a moral
duty to participate in clinical research narrowly focuses on whether patients are morally
required to accept when asked to participate. But since this prima facie duty cannot
obviate a researcher’s duty to obtain informed consent, I put forth the three strongest
arguments based in three diverse philosophical origins in favour of an enforceable duty.
Although pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting, as exemplified
by the MyTEMP trial, is one of the most probable contexts in which an enforceable duty
would arise, I showed that each supporting argument for an enforceable duty succumbs to
persuasive counterarguments. Therefore, barring any novel arguments, the first approach
to resolve the conflict between respecting patient autonomy and the imperative to conduct
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials fails. In the next chapter, I explore a second
approach: the emerging practice of using a waiver of consent that permits the conduct of
low-risk clinical research on patients without their informed consent.
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Chapter 3: Using a waiver of consent to facilitate the conduct
of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
In the introductory chapter, I demonstrated that the conduct of pragmatic clusterrandomized trials is in tension with the requirement to obtain written informed consent
from prospective research participants. The question this thesis seeks to address is
whether the infringement on patient autonomy is justified by the imperative to conduct
socially valuable clinical research. Those who took the first approach, discussed in the
previous chapter, attempted to resolve the conflict by arguing that there is an enforceable
duty to participate in clinical research. If such a duty exists, then the informed consent of
patients need not be obtained. But each supporting argument for an enforceable duty
could not be sustained. These arguments were unconvincing even in the hemodialysis
setting, a compelling setting for which such a duty could arise. So, barring any new and
convincing argument for an enforceable duty to participate in research, the first approach
failed to resolve the tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials between the
requirement to respect patient autonomy and the imperative to conduct socially valuable
clinical research.
The second approach to resolve the tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
is the use of a waiver of consent. A waiver of consent can be granted by a research ethics
committee if researchers prove that: “(1) the research would not be feasible or practicable
to carry out without the waiver or modification; (2) the research has important social
value; and (3) the research poses no more than minimal risk to participants” (CIOMS,
2016, p.37).18 The use of a waiver of consent is an increasingly common practice for
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials, and some researchers argue that “many low risk
pragmatic trials assessing comparative effectiveness of commercially available medicines
could fulfil the three provisions of the Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences (CIOMS) ethical guidelines [for a waiver of consent]” (Dal-Ré et al., 2019, p.3).
But the waiver of consent, including its component criteria, is undertheorized in the
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These three criteria in international research ethics guidelines are also consistent across national
regulatory documents.
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research ethics literature. In this chapter, I will focus on the question: can a waiver of
consent be broadly used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials?
I begin, in section 3.1, with a brief history of the waiver of consent to demonstrate
that its development was not intended to permit clinical research involving individuallevel therapeutic interventions (i.e., interventions directly delivered to participants, such
as prescribing drugs, physical activity regimens, or hemodialysis treatments to patients)
without informed consent. Consequently, an explication of the underlying philosophical
framework is required to know when, if ever, a waiver of consent is justifiable in
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials that evaluate individual-level interventions. In
section 3.2, I explore two frameworks—the rights-based framework and the presumed
consent framework—that have been proposed as a philosophical foundation for the use of
a waiver of consent. I enumerate flaws in both frameworks, and, in section 3.3, I advance
a “specified principlism” framework as a promising foundation for a waiver of consent.
The upshot of this framework is that the use of a waiver of consent in pragmatic clusterrandomized trials is permissible, but only in very limited circumstances. I thus conclude
in section 3.4 that, without any other new and compelling frameworks, this approach fails
to resolve the conflict between the requirement to respect patient autonomy and the
imperative to conduct socially valuable pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.

3.1 The development of the “waiver of consent” in regulation
Prior to the Second World War, efforts to regulate research involving human
participants were few and far between (Fluss, 2004). The Nuremberg Code (1947) is
often considered the first modern ethics guidelines governing health research involving
humans. Its first principle—“the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential”—established the requirement to obtain informed consent as a central ethical
protection in research. All subsequent ethical guidelines for research involving human
participants continue to uphold informed consent as a central ethical protection.
Due to the significance of obtaining informed consent for research participation,
prominent research scandals often involved consent violations. For example, Henry
Beecher (1966) published an exposé of twenty-two unethical studies conducted in the
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United States between 1945 and 1965. Essentially, according to David Rothman’s (1991)
recapitulation of Beecher-as-whistleblower, all the studies “endangered the health and
well-being of subjects without their knowledge or approval” (p.75). The Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, spanning from 1932 to 1972, is arguably the most well-known example
of unethical research in the United States. Researchers enrolled 600 African-American
men (399 with syphilis, 201 without) in a study that aimed to record the progression of
untreated syphilis. Although consent was obtained from participants, “there was no
evidence that researchers had informed the men of the study purpose… Researchers told
the men they were being treated for ‘bad blood,’ a local term used to describe several
ailments, including syphilis, anemia, and fatigue” (CDC, 2020).
Public revelation of details of the Tuskegee study in 1972 lead to a United States
Senate inquiry and a series of congressional hearings on biomedical and behavioural
research involving human participants. The United States’ government sought to prevent
future unethical research; thus, in 1974 the National Research Act was signed into law.
This Act created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research (henceforth, the National Commission). The
National Commission’s task was to develop ethics guidelines for the conduct of
biomedical and behavioural research involving human participants, to make
recommendations for the application of their guidelines, and to explicate the underlying
ethical principles. Their work was completed with the publication of the Belmont Report
(National Commission, 1978a).
Over a span of five years, the National Commission released ten reports and
additional appendices. Within these reports is where the modern notion of a waiver of
consent and its criteria were initially developed. The National Commission’s (1978b)
report, Institutional Review Boards, is where the term “waiver” is first used to describe
instances in which consent need not be obtained from prospective research participants.
However, as stated by the members of the National Commission, “the protection of
human subjects in federally funded research [was] far from uniform” (p.100). The term
“waiver” did not have a settled technical meaning; references to it across various
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regulatory documents encompassed what we now refer to as four distinct circumstances,
only one of which is the modern conception of a waiver of consent.
For example, according to the members of the National Commission’s (1978b)
report, FDA regulations “permit a waiver of the consent requirement if the investigators
‘deem it not feasible or in their professional judgment contrary to the best interests’ of the
subjects. This is explained as applying to cases in which (1) the communication of
information to obtain consent would seriously affect the patient's well-being or (2) the
patient is in a coma or is otherwise incapable of giving consent, his representative cannot
be reached, and it is imperative to administer a drug without delay” (p.104). The first
circumstance in which the term “waiver” was invoked is currently called “therapeutic
privilege.” The second circumstance is currently referred to as an “emergency exception
to consent.”
The third circumstance in which the term “waiver” was invoked is currently
called “a waiver of documentation of informed consent.” The members of the National
Commissions (1978b) believed that the written consent form may pose risks to
participants “in certain studies of illegal behavior or drug abuse,” and in other studies that
“may place an undue burden on the research while adding little protection to the subjects”
(p.28); for example, telephone surveys and mailed questionnaires. Thus, they stated that a
research ethics committee “may waive the requirement for documentation of consent in
the interest of protecting the subjects” (p.28).
The circumstance that corresponds with the contemporary usage of a waiver of
consent is found in the National Commissions’ (1978b) recommendations within the
Institutional Review Boards report. Recommendation (4)(H) states:
Informed consent is unnecessary (i) where the subjects' interests are determined to
be adequately protected in studies of documents, records or pathological
specimens and the importance of the research justifies such invasion of the
subjects' privacy, or (ii) in studies of public behavior where the research presents
no more than minimal risk, is unlikely to cause embarrassment, and has scientific
merit (p.21).

55

Plainly the members of the National Commission believed a waiver of consent should
only be granted for two types of research: retrospective reviews of identifiable patient
medical records or biospecimens, and for field research in the social sciences that present
no more than minimal risk. In their comments on Recommendation (4)(H), the authors
specify that granting a waiver of consent “must be essential to the methodological
soundness of the research, and must be justified by the importance or scientific merit of
the research” (p.30-31).
The reports and recommendations from the National Commission laid the
foundation for the Common Rule, which is the current regulations in the United States
that govern all research involving human beings (DHHS, 2022). The United States was
among the first countries to create regulations specific to the review, approval, and
oversight of research (Emanuel et al., 2011, p.157) and many countries, including
Canada, based their informed consent requirements upon those within the Common Rule.
In the 1981 United States research regulations, the criteria for a waiver of consent, based
on Recommendation (4)(H) from the National Commission’s (1978b) Institutional
Review Board report, were as follows:
(1) the research involves no more than minimal risk to the subject; (2) the waiver
or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) the
research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration; and
(4) whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent
information after participation (President’s Commission, 1981, p.97-98).
The definition of minimal risk, which first appeared in the National Commission’s
(1978c) Research Involving Those Institutionalized as Mentally Infirm report, refers to
“the risk (probability and magnitude of physical or psychological harm or discomfort)
that is normally encountered in the daily lives, or in the routine medical or psychological
examination, of normal persons” (p.8). The second criterion ensures that “subjects'
interests are determined to be adequately protected” and the third criterion ensures that
the waiver of consent is “essential to the methodological soundness of the research”
(National Commission, 1978b, p.30-31). The fourth criterion refers to studies “where
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participants have been deceived in the course of research,” because, according to the
members of the National Commission, “it is desirable that they be debriefed after their
participation” (p.27).
Canada’s Tri-Council Policy Statement, first promulgated in 1998, copied the
United States’ four regulatory requirements for a waiver of consent. However, the
Canadian regulations added the following fifth requirement: “(5) the waived or altered
consent does not involve a therapeutic intervention” (CIHR et al., 1998). The first
revision to the Tri-Council Policy Statement occurred in 2010. One substantial change
was the inclusion of a new section following the five criteria, called “Application,” which
described the circumstances in which a waiver of consent would be permissible. The only
example provided was “social science research, particularly in psychology” (CIHR et al.,
2010). Specific guidance for the secondary use of data (including retrospective review of
medical records) and biospecimens was moved to Article 5.5.
While all five criteria need to be met for a research ethics committee to grant a
waiver of consent, low-risk social science studies and retrospective review of medical
records offer the clearest examples of when research is rendered impossible or
impracticable if informed consent was required.19 In some psychological studies, it is
impossible to answer the scientific question if participants are aware of the true purpose
of the study prior to its start. And while it is theoretically possible to obtain informed
consent for retrospective review of medical records, it is impracticable insofar as it
“would create expense and inefficiency without materially furthering the goal of showing
respect for the patients whose records we examine” (Levine, 1986, p.147).
Two years after the revisions to the Tri-Council Policy Statement, the first and
only comprehensive ethics guidance document specific to cluster-randomized trials—the
Ottawa Statement on the Ethical Design and Conduct of Cluster Randomized Trials—was

Impracticable is defined as “a degree of hardship or onerousness that jeopardizes the conduct of
research” (CIHR et al., 2018). It can be impracticable in a variety of ways (e.g., for logistic, practical, or
economic reasons) to conduct research with informed consent, but it was the potential to undermine the
“methodological soundness of the research” that the National Commission (1978b) was originally
concerned about.
19
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published (Weijer et al., 2012). This guidance document identified seven ethical issues
and set forth fifteen recommendations for addressing the issues posed by clusterrandomized trials. One of the ethical issues identified pertains to the difficulties
associated with obtaining informed consent in cluster-randomized trials.
The difficulties in obtaining informed consent in cluster-randomized trial have
been linked to the level of the intervention under evaluation. Edwards and colleagues
(1999) distinguish between cluster-level interventions and individual-level interventions.
Cluster-level interventions are indivisible at the individual level, such as “promoting
lifestyle changes on local radio;” whereas individual-level interventions are directly
delivered to individual participants, such as a “cluster trial of a routine vaccine versus an
experimental vaccine” (p.1407).
The emerging consensus in the literature promotes an expanded use of a waiver of
consent for cluster-randomized trials evaluating cluster-level interventions (Edwards et
al., 1999; Eldridge, Ashby & Feder, 2005; McRae et al., 2011; Sim & Dawson, 2012).
According to these commentators, since cluster-level interventions affect whole clusters
of people, “individuals cannot therefore decide or act independently” (Edwards et al.,
1999, p.1408) and “there is little or no scope for any individual community member to
opt out (although individual consent may feasibly be given or withheld for outcome
assessment or access to health records)” (Sim & Dawson, 2012, p.481).
The Tri-Council Policy Statement was replaced in 2014 with the Tri-Council
Policy Statement 2 due to substantial revisions. Notably, the fifth criterion for a waiver of
consent was removed. It is unclear why those involved in the revisions removed this
criterion; however, the section on “Application” was expanded upon, thus providing
some insight. The examples in which a waiver of consent was thought to be permissible
included low-risk social science research, research involving the continued use of data or
human biological materials, and for “some population and public health studies… For
example, a cluster-randomized trial comparing the efficacy of two different stop smoking
campaigns in two or more communities… [or] comparing the effectiveness of different
types of water treatment facilities” (CIHR et al., 2014). Clearly, the use of a waiver of
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consent was thought to be permissible for certain public health studies; specifically,
cluster-randomized trials evaluating cluster-level interventions.
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences’ International
Ethical Guidelines for Health-research Involving Humans were most recently revised in
2016, adding specific recommendations for obtaining informed consent in clusterrandomized trials. These recommendations are also aligned with those provided in the
Ottawa Statement. The CIOMS (2016) international ethical guidelines state:
As a general rule, researchers must obtain informed consent from participants in a
cluster randomized study unless a waiver or modification of consent is granted by
a research ethics committee. Waivers or modifications of informed consent may
be necessary in some cluster randomized trials in which it is virtually impossible
to obtain individual informed consent. This occurs when the intervention is
directed at an entire community, making it impossible to avoid the intervention.
Examples include a study comparing methods of incinerating waste or
fluoridating the drinking-water supply to prevent dental carries. Members of the
intervention community cannot avoid being affected by the intervention, so
obtaining individual informed consent is impossible (p.79).
In sum, the creation and development of the waiver of consent demonstrates its
purpose was to permit the conduct of (1) retrospective review of medical records with
adequate privacy and confidentiality protections, (2) research in the social sciences that
posed no more than minimal risk, and (3) public health cluster-randomized trials
evaluating cluster-level interventions.
However, the use of a waiver of consent is an increasingly common practice for
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials that evaluate individual-level therapeutic
interventions. A recent systematic review of 103 pragmatic or comparative effectiveness
trials performed at least in part in the United States and published in 2014 and 2017
found that 23 (22%) of the trials were done with a waiver of consent (Lin, Jochym &
Merz, 2020). In our recent systematic review of all cluster-randomized trials in the
hemodialysis setting published between 2000 and 2019, 13% reported a waiver of
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consent—all involved individual-level therapeutic interventions (Al-Jaishi et al., 2020a).
In our other review of a random sample of 40 cluster-randomized trials evaluating
individual-level therapeutic interventions, 20% reported a waiver of consent (Taljaard et
al., 2020). If these trials were individually randomized, as opposed to cluster randomized,
many of these would be standard drug trials in which patients’ informed consent would
be necessary. Indeed, the CIOMS (2016) guidelines state that for cluster-randomized
trials that evaluate individual-level interventions, “individuals may be able to consent to
the intervention before it is administered in that cluster. For example, parents will not be
able to consent to their children’s school being randomized to a vaccination programme
or to being allocated to that cluster, but they could consent or refuse to consent to their
child’s vaccination at school” (p.80).
Given that regulations were not created with pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
of individual-level therapeutic interventions in mind, this raises the focal question of this
chapter of whether a waiver of consent should be broadly used to facilitate the conduct of
these trials. Is the use of a waiver of consent ethically justifiable for this purpose?

3.2 Philosophical frameworks for a waiver of consent
Neither regulatory nor ethics guidance documents provide a general justification
for the use of a waiver of consent. As was demonstrated in the previous section, the
development of the waiver of consent was meant to permit a narrow set of research
activities, including retrospective review of medical records, low-risk social science
studies, and public health cluster-randomized trials evaluating cluster-level interventions.
To know whether it is permissible to use a waiver of consent for other types of
research—specifically, pragmatic cluster-randomized trials evaluating individual-level
therapeutic interventions—an explication of the underlying philosophical framework is
needed. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, two plausible philosophical
frameworks have been proffered to justify the use of a waiver of consent: the rights-based
framework and the presumed consent framework. In what follows, I explicate both
frameworks and argue that neither is persuasive.
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3.2.1 Rights-based framework
Gelinas and colleagues (2016) posit a rights-based framework to ground the
conduct of research with a waiver of consent. Their framework comprises two
interrelated criteria: research without consent is permissible “either when research stands
to infringe no rights of research participants… or when the expected social value of
research that does infringe on participant rights outweighs the gravity of the minor rights
infringement” (p.37). They also claim that obtaining consent must be impracticable; that
is, “obtaining consent imposes (prohibitively) high costs of time or economic resources
on researchers or that obtaining consent threatens the scientific validity of the research, as
might happen when getting consent threatens to introduce certain kinds of selection bias
into the study” (p.36). They continue, “The reason consent must, on either justification,
be impracticable for it to be justifiably waived is that, in general, obtaining consent helps
to promote transparency and trust in the research enterprise” (ibid).
Gelinas and colleagues’ (2016) argument begins with the claim that there are two
purposes of informed consent. First, they say, “the primary function of informed consent
in human research is to protect autonomy,” where autonomy is defined as possessing
“rights that grant [people] a sphere of personal control over [their] life and decisions”
(p.36). The secondary function of consent is “to protect and advance the interests of
prospective research participants” (ibid). This is based on the idea that “people will
typically consent to something only if they believe that doing so advances their interests”
(ibid).
On Gelinas and colleagues’ (2016) view, the two functions of informed consent
are separable. For example, they say, “Tom may set back Mary’s interests when he buys
the last seat at a concert that Mary was hoping to see or declines to interview Mary for a
job she wants, but he does not violate Mary’s rights” (p.36). Similarly, the authors
suggest that patients have a right to refuse medical treatment and research participation,
even if receiving the medical treatment or participating in research would serve their
interests. Thus, they believe that a waiver of consent is permissible when no rights of the
participants involved are infringed upon, regardless of whether they have or express an
interest in research participation. Indeed, they surmise that:
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The most basic function of consent is to waive rights of control, allowing others
to interact with us in ways that would otherwise be wrong. Consent is needed
when, and only when, interactions stand to wrong one of the parties involved, by
violating their personal sovereignty or rights of control (ibid).
Gelinas and colleagues (2016) ask us to consider “purely observational research
regarding human behavior in a public place” (p.36). On their view, a waiver of consent is
permissible because, even if the observational study violates someone’s interest in not
being observed for the purpose of research, it does not violate any rights of control and
obtaining consent would render the research impracticable. However, there are cases in
which the use of a waiver of consent would violate participants’ rights. Gelinas and
colleagues state, “If including someone in research without consent violates a right, it
must be… the right not to be subject to bodily intrusion without one’s informed consent.”
(ibid).
So, according to Gelinas and colleagues (2016), what justifies the use of a waiver
in cases where rights are infringed? They say, “rights are not absolute, and certain types
of infringements on rights can easily be outweighed by competing considerations,
including the promoting of social good” (p.37). They provide an example of trespassing
on private land to save the life of a person in need of immediate rescue. They continue,
“In a similar fashion, minor rights infringements of research subjects can, we think, be
justified for the sake of generating socially valuable knowledge” (ibid).
Consider the MyTEMP trial (see Textbox 1). Recall that a waiver of consent was
granted for this pragmatic cluster-randomized trial wherein patients were provided either
temperature-reduced dialysis (0.5ºC to 0.9ºC below each patient’s body temperature) or
standard-temperature dialysis (36.5ºC) depending on the protocol assigned to their
cluster. Was the use of a waiver of consent in the MyTEMP trial justified? According to
Gelinas and colleagues (2016), a waiver of consent is justified only if (1) the rights
infringement is minor, (2) the infringement is outweighed by the expected social value,
and (3) obtaining consent would render the research impracticable.
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First, Gelinas and colleagues (2016) believe that a waiver of consent is
permissible for “cluster randomized studies that involve aspects of care over which
institutions, not patients, hold a right of control” (p.39). Specific details about
hemodialysis treatments, including the temperature at which hemodialysis is provided,
are not disclosed in the clinical consent process; a patient’s dialysis temperature is often
decided by the treating nephrologist or occasionally set as a local policy. Indeed, the
MyTEMP researchers considered the interventions to be “similar to a quality-control
measure that could be implemented by a dialysis centre director” (Al-Jaishi et al., 2020b,
Appendix 5). Given what occurs in the clinical setting, Gelinas and colleagues are likely
to conclude that the bodily intrusion that occurs when modifying patients’ hemodialysis
temperature is not within the patients’ right of control, amounting to a minor
infringement on their right to bodily integrity.
Second, if you agree that the infringement on patients’ right to bodily integrity is
minor, then it must be argued that the infringement is outweighed by the expected social
value. Again, the expected social value is substantial for both current and future patients,
as well as health providers and health system managers. Recall that about 25% of patients
die within the first year and almost 60% die within five years of initiating hemodialysis,
often from cardiovascular complications. The MyTEMP trial aims to help reduce
mortality and major cardiovascular events. Moreover, due to the pragmatism of the trial,
the results should provide robust evidence that can be swiftly and cost-effectively
integrated into the clinical setting in Ontario, Canada, and will be generalizable to other
similar clinical settings.
Finally, to obtain informed consent from over 15,500 patients at 84 clinics over
four years would impose prohibitively high costs of both time and economic resources on
researchers. Even if the costs were not prohibitively high, the aim of pragmatic trials is to
integrate research into real-world clinical settings to maximize external validity at
minimal cost. Devoting additional resources, such as hiring additional staff to recruit
patients, and deviating from routine clinical practice are both contrary to the aims of
pragmatism. Therefore, the rights-based framework can justify the use of a waiver of
consent for the MyTEMP trial.
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3.2.2 Problems with the rights-based framework
Gelinas and colleagues (2016) provided two arguments for their framework, one
argument in support of each criterion. Their first argument explains why a waiver of
consent is justified when no rights are infringed upon. They start with the claim that the
purpose of informed consent is to protect the autonomy of research participants, where
autonomy is defined as possessing rights of control over one’s life and decisions. They
correctly believe that autonomous people have a right of control over their bodies, hence
why they state that including someone in research without consent violates “the right not
to be subject to bodily intrusion without one’s informed consent” (p.36). They conclude
that if no rights are violated in the conduct of research, then a waiver of consent is
justified.
But Gelinas and colleagues (2016) construe the need to protect autonomy too
narrowly as the need to protect the right to bodily integrity. Rather, the ethical principle
of respect for autonomy means that “individuals should be treated as autonomous agents”
(National Commission, 1978a, p.4). To treat people as autonomous requires that
prospective research participants “to the degree that they are capable, be given the
opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them,” (p.10) and this principle
also provides the “ethical grounding for the requirement to respect the privacy of
persons… we must respect the individual’s autonomy regarding personal information”
(Levine, 1986, p.163).
To reiterate in the jargon used by Gelinas and colleagues (2016), respect for
autonomy gives rise to, at least, two rights: the right to bodily integrity and the right to
privacy. Thus, even if research does not involve bodily intrusion, patients have privacy
rights that may be undermined. For example, patients provide private demographic and
medical data in clinical practice under the presumption that it will be kept confidential
and only used to further their own health outcomes. Some prospective observational
studies, such as those that involve the review of medical records, would infringe upon
patients’ privacy rights if they were conducted without informed consent. Empirical work
demonstrates that few people would permit researchers access to their medical records
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without informed consent, even if researchers could guarantee the advancement of
medical knowledge (Kass et al., 2003).
Broadening the scope of “rights of control” to include both bodily integrity and
privacy poses a relatively minor problem with the rights-based framework. If we accept
the argument that people have a right to bodily integrity and health information privacy,
then there will simply be very few cases in which criterion one of Gelinas and
colleagues’ (2016) framework obtains. The only example that plausibly meets this
criterion would be their example of “purely observational research regarding human
behavior in a public place” (p.36). All this means is that most, if not all research
(including many observational studies) cannot proceed with a waiver of consent unless
Gelinas and colleagues’ second criterion obtains: a waiver of consent is justified when
the rights infringement is minor and outweighed by the prospective social value.
The argument in support of the second criterion relies on the claim that all rights
are not absolute; it must be the case the rights can trade-off against one another. Gelinas
and colleagues’ (2016) example of trespassing on private land to save someone’s life
aims to push our intuitions towards accepting that rights are not absolute (p.37).
However, Alan Gewirth (1981) has argued that “agents and institutions are absolutely
prohibited from degrading persons, treating them as if they had no rights or dignity”
(p.16). He continues, “other specific absolute rights may also be generated from this
principle” (ibid). His examples include the right not to be tortured and the right not to be
made the intended victim of a homicidal project. It may be argued by extension that the
right to be free from research without informed consent is absolute. In fact, the United
Nations considers this right to be absolute. Article 7 of the United Nations’ (1976)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treaty states:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation.
But, for the sake of argument, if we grant Gelinas and colleagues (2016) that the
right to be free of research without informed consent is not absolute, the next premise of
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their argument is that patients’ rights can be outweighed by the expected social value of
the research. As I argued above, Gelinas and colleagues would likely consider the bodily
infringement in the MyTEMP trial as an example of a minor rights infringement that is
outweighed by the expected social value.
However, Gelinas and colleagues would be wrong think that modifying a patient’s
hemodialysis treatment without their informed consent for the purposes of research
constitutes a minor infringement on bodily integrity. Running reduced-temperature
dialysate directly into a patient’s vein—which can result in unpleasant shivering for the
entire treatment duration—without informed consent is a non-trivial infringement on
bodily integrity. Patients often experience unpleasant shivering during normal dialysis
treatments. Indeed, participants involved in a recent qualitative study (involving focus
groups and interviews with patients on hemodialysis and their caregivers) expressed
concern about the lack of availability of blankets during dialysis sessions (Sass et al.,
2020, p.5). One participant stated, “Yes, definitely we need the warm blankets. I don’t
think I can do dialysis without the warm blankets” (p.8). Reducing the temperature of
hemodialysis treatments by 0.5 to 0.9°C would exacerbate discomfort to the extent that
patients may consider stopping their life-sustaining treatment. Thus, alterations to a
patient’s hemodialysis treatment in this way is a non-trivial infringement on their bodily
integrity.
Moreover, while specific details regarding hemodialysis are not disclosed in the
clinical consent process, the current informed consent process for dialysis often falls
short of ethical and legal requirements (Brennan et al., 2017; Li & Brown, 2020). Patients
are often provided less information than required to provide voluntary and informed
consent to clinical dialysis care, and empirical evidence suggests that the “vast majority
of nephrology patients want to be given as much information as possible, good or bad,
including prognosis” (Brennan et al., 2017, p.1003; see also Fine et al., 2005). It is not
sufficient to rely on common practice as a means of qualifying the modification of a
patient’s hemodialysis treatment without their informed consent as a minor rights
infringement.

66

It is also unclear why the rights infringement, whether major or minor, can be
overridden by the expected social value of clinical research. Gelinas and colleagues
(2016) posited that rights can trade-off against one another. Their example: the right to
life can override property rights in certain circumstances. They did not argue that rights
can be infringed upon by the promise of advancing medical knowledge. We could
charitably interpret “the expected social value of research” as “the rights of future
patients,” which would mean that a waiver of consent is justified when the rights of
future patients outweigh the rights of current patients. But the rights of current patients
override the ill-defined rights of future patients. Consider the causal uncertainty between
the conduct of research and fulfilling the rights of patients. Resource waste is an issue in
all areas of research, but more so in nephrology where “billions of dollars have been
spent on kidney disease research in the past decades, with no tangible progress in clinical
practice” (Yaseen et al., 2019, p.69). The lack of tangible progress is due to the number
of randomized controlled trials published in nephrology—which is lower than that in
other medical subspecialties—and because most of the larger clinical trials in nephrology
yield negative results (ibid). Even if it could be argued that future patients have some
prima facie right to advances in nephrology practice, there is no guarantee that these
advances will be achieved by overriding the right to bodily integrity of current patients.

3.2.3 Presumed consent framework
A second framework considers a waiver of consent to be a species of presumed
consent. In other words, the use of a waiver of consent is justified if there are strong
reasons to believe that participants would agree if they were asked and capable of
providing informed consent. Two arguments have been proffered to support this
framework. Francis Baker and Jon Merz (2018) provide an argument grounded in the
legal doctrine of privilege, while Scott Kim and Franklin Miller (2016) provide an
argument grounded in the ethical principle of respect for autonomy.
According to Baker and Merz, the legal requirement to obtain informed consent is
based on the principle, succinctly stated by Judge Cardozo, that “every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body” (Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 1914). This means that if a
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physician provides a medical or surgical treatment to a patient without their consent, this
amounts to a case of battery (Baker & Merz, 2018, p.580). Or if a physician fails to
adequately inform the patient when consent is sought, this amounts to a case of
negligence (ibid).
Due to concerns of battery and negligence, is informed consent always required to
provide medical or surgical treatment? Baker and Merz (2018) state that the legal
doctrine of privilege provides insight on when informed consent need not be obtained:
Privilege provides an affirmative defense to a prima facie tort such as battery,
assault, or trespass. If a defendant can show that either she has the plaintiff’s
consent or she was acting in furtherance of a goal of sufficient social importance,
then privilege will insulate her from liability for the plaintiff’s damages (p.580).
In clinical practice the notion of privilege allows for health providers to
administer emergency treatment to incapacitated patients at risk of death or serious bodily
harm without their consent. In Baker and Merz’s (2018) view, privilege only provides an
affirmative defense when it is “reasonable to believe that most people in an emergent
condition, such as immediately after being in a serious car accident, would agree to
medical care for their injuries” and there is “no evidence that the individual patient would
not have wanted to be treated under the circumstances” (p.580). Thus, when these
conditions are met, medical treatment can be administered without seeking consent.
Baker and Merz (2018) also believe that the notion of privilege underlies the
conduct of research without informed consent. They appeal to a statement by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) on their regulations governing the Exception from
Informed Consent Requirements for Emergency Research (21 CFR 50.24). They claim
that the FDA “would not consider writing a rule that would permit the waiver of
informed consent in a situation where if consent were requested, it would be refused”
(p.580). Thus, Baker and Merz conclude that the notion of privilege underlies the conduct
of emergency research without informed consent.
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Since “the right to consent extends beyond trials run in emergency settings to
other interventional or experimental studies,” (p.580) Baker and Merz (2018) assert that
“the ethical and legal legitimacy of the privilege to provide standard of care treatment or
to waive consent for research is predicated upon the reasonable belief that potential
subjects would agree if they were asked and capable of consent” (ibid, italics added).
They suggest that a simple majority is appropriate for the least intrusive research (e.g.,
“the secondary analysis of blood samples”), but for clinical research “there must be good
evidence that the overwhelming majority of individuals who would be enrolled would
agree, if asked” (p.583).
Kim and Miller’s (2016) argument stems from the ethical (rather than legal)
foundation of informed consent: respect for autonomy. They begin by suggesting “it is
possible to show respect in ways other than obtaining informed consent” (p.2). They state
that respect for autonomy “also encompasses trust, transparency, and considerations of
other legitimate expectations that arise from relationships between clinicians and patients
and between clinical investigators and research participants” (ibid). Thus, on their view,
any alternative to informed consent that lacks trust and transparency “does not give
individuals any opportunity to directly authorize their participation in research” (p.3).
Kim and Miller posit that—when trust and transparency are both present—a waiver of
consent can conform to the principle of respect for autonomy.20 It does so when each of
the criterion that must be met to grant a waiver of consent conforms with the principle of
respect for autonomy to the greatest degree possible. Using the criteria outlined in the
United States’ Common Rule, Kim and Miller demonstrate how the criteria conform to
respect for autonomy. Note that Kim and Miller use the pre-2018 Common Rule criteria
for a waiver of consent (see Textbox 2).

20

It may seem oxymoronic to say that a waiver of consent, which means that patients are not approached
for their informed consent, can be consistent with transparency, which means that patients are made aware
of ongoing clinical research. However, patients can be made aware of ongoing research using notification
strategies, e.g., posters or pamphlets, when a waiver of consent is granted by a research ethics committee.
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Textbox 2: Common Rule pre-2018 requirements for a waiver of consent.
“An IRB [Institutional Review Board] may approve a consent procedure which does not include, or
which alters, some or all of the elements of informed consent set forth in this section, or waive the
requirements to obtain informed consent provided the IRB finds and documents that:
(1) The research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects;
(2) The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects;
(3) The research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration; and
(4) Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information after
participation.” (DHHS, 2009).

First, Kim and Miller (2016) state that the minimal risk criterion “is used to set
the risk threshold above which no alternative to regulatory consent is compatible with
respect for persons” (p.3). This criterion relies on the implicit claim that most patients
would not agree to be exposed to more than minimal risk without their informed consent.
Second, the rights and welfare criterion requires research ethics committees to ask
whether “participants [would] object to the waiver or consider that [the] waiver has
potential to cause adverse consequences for them” (p.4). As Baker and Merz’s (2018)
suggest, researchers must demonstrate that an overwhelming majority of participants
would agree to participate if they were asked and capable of providing informed consent.
Third, the impracticability criterion requires research ethics committees to judge whether
the research would be impossible or impracticable if consent was required, and whether
any alternative model of consent could be implemented prior to granting a waiver of
consent. The implicit empirical premise is that patients, when given the option, generally
prefer to be asked for their informed consent. Finally, the criterion of providing
additional pertinent information to patients when possible (e.g., using posters, letters, or
other media) is a way to ensure trust and transparency are maintained throughout a study.
With the presumed consent framework in mind, consider the following: can a
waiver of consent be used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized
trials? Returning to the MyTEMP trial (see Textbox 1), the research ethics committee
responsible for granting the waiver of consent agreed with the researchers’ determination
that the study met the criteria for a waiver. However, the investigators did not
demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of patients receiving hemodialysis
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treatments in participating facilities would have agreed to participate, if asked. In other
words, the rights and welfare criterion for a waiver of consent did not obtain.
According to Baker and Merz (2018), “waivers should be rare and based on much
more explicit input… among the target population” (p.584). Their scoping review found
that “many people—an average rate roughly on the order of 30%—do not take part in
research when asked” (p.582). They point out that “a number of [other] studies have
asked people about the acceptability of waivers in [pragmatic] trials, and a consistent
majority favor consent in some form to outright waivers” (p.584). Thus, pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials, generally, cannot proceed with a waiver of consent.21

3.2.4 Problems with the presumed consent framework
The presumed consent framework relies on the legal and ethical foundations
provided by Baker and Merz (2018) and Kim and Miller (2016) respectively. Baker and
Merz show how the legal doctrine of privilege underlies the exception to informed
consent for emergency treatment in clinical practice and for participation in research
evaluating emergency treatment. But they fail to provide an argument for why privilege
underlies the waiver of consent in non-emergency settings—they merely assert that this
should be the case. The problem with this assumption is that it conflates the exception to
informed consent in emergency settings with the exception in non-emergency settings.
Privilege can only be invoked in a particular circumstance; specifically, when a
patient is incapable of providing informed consent and requires immediate intervention
without which they may die or sustain serious injury, and there can be no evidence that
the patient would refuse the intervention if asked. As Baker and Merz (2018) correctly
claim, these criteria are often met in the emergency clinical setting and for research
evaluating emergency medical interventions. However, most circumstances in clinical
practice and research do not share these features. In the non-emergency clinical and
research settings, patients can provide informed consent or, if incapable, the lack of life-

21

Further empirical work could be conducted to determine whether the hemodialysis setting presents a
unique case where an overwhelming majority of patients would consent, if asked. However, we should not
treat the absence of research as evidence that no one would object to the use of a waiver.
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threatening urgency provides ample time to approach their legal representatives for
consent. Thus, privilege cannot be invoked as a defense against battery and negligence in
non-emergency settings.
Moreover, privilege does not provide a reason why a waiver of consent can be
justifiably used in the non-emergency setting. For example, waivers of consent are
permitted for retrospective review of medical records even though patients may be
capable of providing consent for the use of their records, there is no urgency to conduct
the review, and there is no treatment being administered to patients. As discussed in the
previous section of this chapter, the waiver of consent was developed, in part, to permit
the conduct of low-risk social science research in which patients or their legally
authorized representatives may be capable of providing informed consent, but “nondisclosure [is deemed] essential to the methodological soundness of the research”
(National Commission, 1978b, p.6). In these cases, it is not that patients are incapable, or
their representatives are unreachable; rather, it is impracticable to obtain consent due to
scientific considerations.
The case of Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan (1965) provides further
evidence that privilege cannot be invoked as an affirmative defense in the conduct of
non-emergency research.22 In determining what constitutes an “informed” consent,
Justice Hall claimed that physicians have a duty to provide a fair and reasonable
explanation of the proposed treatment, including anticipated and probable side effects and
risks. He continued, “There can be no exceptions to the ordinary requirements of
disclosure in the case of research as there may well be in ordinary medical practice… The
example of risks being properly hidden from a patient when it is important that he should

22

The defendants involved in the case of Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan (1965) were conducting
an experiment involving an anesthetic drug, fluoromar. Halushka, a student at the time, was offered $50 to
participate in the study. He agreed after being told the experimental drug was safe and that numerous
experiments involving this drug had been conducted. However, fluoromar was a new drug and was being
tested for the first time, and Halushka was not informed about the risks of the drug or the study procedures.
As a result of participation, Halushka went into cardiac arrest and was unconscious for four days, followed
by ten days of in-hospital recovery. He was unable to return to university due to concentration problems
and fatigue. The jury found the defendants guilty of battery and negligence. The court acknowledged that
there are exceptions to informed consent requirements when it comes to clinical treatment (i.e., privilege),
but these exceptions do not hold in cases of experimentation.
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not worry can have no application in the field of research. The subject of medical
experimentation is entitled to a full and frank disclosure of all the facts, probabilities and
opinions which a reasonable man might be expected to consider before giving his
consent” (ibid). Justice Hall clearly sets the precedent that privilege cannot be invoked as
a defense in non-emergency research settings. Thus, due to the aforementioned reasons,
the legal argument fails to support the presumed consent framework.
Kim and Miller’s (2016) argument aims to support the presumed consent
framework by grounding a waiver of consent in the principle of respect for autonomy.
They correctly claim that respect for autonomy is operationalized by obtaining informed
consent. However, they also claim that trust and transparency must be present for a
person to autonomously authorize their participation in research. The latter claim means
that people cannot make an autonomous decision to participate in clinical research in the
absence of trust and transparency. Thus, on their view, trust and transparency are
necessary conditions of respect for autonomy. And since, on their view, a waiver of
consent conforms to the principle of respect for autonomy and a waiver of consent, by
definition, does not provide prospective participants the opportunity to authorize their
participation in clinical research, trust and transparency must also be jointly sufficient
conditions of respect for autonomy.
The problem with Kim and Miller’s (2016) arguments is that trust and
transparency are neither necessary nor jointly sufficient conditions of respect for
autonomy. If they were necessary, then it would not be feasible for people to make
autonomous decisions without the presence of trust or transparency. But people do. For
example, when a person purchases a car from a seedy salesperson, they make an
autonomous decision to purchase the car knowing the salesperson is untrustworthy.
People can also make autonomous decisions without complete transparency. If
transparency requires a full disclosure of all the relevant facts, people could not
autonomously decide to take medication without a complete knowledge of all possible
side effects. And yet they do. Or consider psychological studies in which researchers tell
prospective participants that the true purpose of the study is being withheld from them,
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and people nonetheless decide to participate—is this not an autonomous decision?
According to Benjamin Freedman (1975), “the informing of the patient/subject is not a
fundamental requirement of valid consent. It is, rather, derivative from the requirement
that the consent be the expression of a responsible choice” (p.35).
Moreover, if trust and transparency were jointly sufficient conditions of respect
for autonomy, people would be able to make an autonomous decision without the act of
making a choice. The absurdity of this claim ought to be self-evident. The act of making
a choice is the sine qua non of making any decision. An autonomous decision requires
that someone “makes choices, typically, on the basis of reasons, arguments, or beliefs—
and that he remains open to the claims of reasons, so that further rational argument might
lead him to change his mind… [and] that he can live with the consequences of his
choices” (Freedman, 1975, p.35). If you dispense with choice, which occurs when a
waiver of consent is used in clinical research, you dispense with autonomy—regardless
of the presence of trust or transparency.
Without a foundation in ethics or law, the presumed consent framework fails to
ground the use of a waiver of consent. But even if a novel foundation could be provided,
a final problem with this framework is that it is overly restrictive. The presumed consent
framework is comprised of a single criterion: the use of a waiver of consent is justified if
participants would agree to participate if asked. Consequently, the justified use of a
waiver of consent relies on patients’ preferences. The reliance on patient preference leads
to two troubling conclusions. First, a waiver of consent cannot be justifiably used for a
retrospective review of medical records; a type of research in which its use is
uncontroversial. According to the presumed consent framework, for a waiver of consent
to be justifiably used we need to know: what evidence do we have to suggest patients
would agree, if asked, to participate in research involving the use of identifiable medical
records? A recent survey of 1,246 patients in two academic hospitals in the United States
demonstrates,
A total of 291 patients (23.4%) were willing to share all items with any
researcher, whereas 46 (3.7%) were not willing to share any items. The remaining
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909 (72.9%) were willing to share selectively, meaning that they wanted to share
at least 1 item with at least 1 type of institution with a general preference toward
sharing within the institution in which the patient received care, followed by
sharing with researchers from non-profit institutions (Kim et al., 2019).
According to Baker and Merz (2018), a simple majority, which occurs when more
people would consent than those who would refuse, might be adequate for medical record
reviews. The results of the survey revealed that only 23.4% of patients were willing to
share all the information in their medical records (Kim et al., 2019). Since a waiver of
consent for identifiable medical records allows researchers to access all the information
within the patient’s records, there would need to be a simple majority of patients who are
willing to share all the information in their medical records. Clearly, this is not the case.
The second troubling conclusion is that the presumed consent framework has no
mechanism for determining whether patients’ preferences are reasonable or unreasonable.
Moreover, if patient preferences are unreasonable, we would nonetheless be required to
adhere to them. For instance, people have expressed an unreasonable preference to have
their informed consent obtained for the use of anonymized data (Willison et al., 2003). It
is an unreasonable preference insofar as there are no plausible infringements on people’s
autonomy with the use of anonymized data as the data are in no way connected to an
individual patient. But, as people have expressed this preference, the use of a waiver of
consent would not be justified even for the types of research it was created to permit.

3.3 The specified principlism framework
Given the problems with the two existing frameworks, I propose a novel
framework to ground the use of a waiver of consent. In what follows, I argue that the
specified principlism framework is the most promising grounds for the use of a waiver of
consent. This framework suggests that the criteria of the waiver of consent are a
specification of the exceptional cases in which it is morally permissible for the imperative
to conduct socially valuable clinical research to override informed consent requirements.
In other words, the use of a waiver of consent is morally permissible when the
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requirements of beneficence override the requirements of respect for autonomy in accord
with specified conditions.
Specified principlism is a method for resolving ethical issues that arise in the
biomedical and behavioural sciences. In the context of clinical research, specified
principlism uses a set of basic ethical principles—e.g., beneficence, justice, and respect
for persons—that generate various, non-absolute moral requirements. As stipulated in the
National Commission’s (1978a) Belmont Report, beneficence “requires that we protect
against risk of harm to subjects and also that we be concerned about the loss of the
substantial benefits that might be gained from research” (p.16); justice requires “there be
fair procedures and outcomes in the selection of research subjects” (p.18); and respect for
persons dually requires “that individuals [are] treated as autonomous agents, and… that
persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protections” (p.4).
The first requirement of respect for persons (i.e., respect for autonomy) is fulfilled
when prospective research participants autonomously authorize their participation in
research through an informed consent process. The principle of beneficence conflicts
with respect for autonomy when socially valuable research cannot proceed if informed
consent is required. When this occurs, our choices are to conduct the research without
consent, thereby failing to demonstrate respect for autonomy; or to refrain from
conducting research, thereby failing to abide by beneficence requirements. Neither seems
appropriate.
What should be done when principles or their requirements conflict? Henry
Richardson (1990) and David DeGrazia (1992) contend that specification can be used to
resolve conflicts between principles and their requirements. This approach has also been
endorsed by advocates of principlism, including Tom Beauchamp and James Childress
(1979; 2019), and Robert Veatch (1995). When conflicts between principles or their
requirements occur, the answer, according to DeGrazia (1992), “is to tailor one of the
norms to make it more specific” (p.525). John Arras (2017) further describes the process
of specification as follows:
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Initial abstract formulations of principles will become increasingly concrete,
specified, and delimited as one approaches the level of the particular case. Thus,
what begins as a straightforward abstract principle (e.g., autonomy) might end up
as a highly complex and richly nuanced principle with built-in exceptions (p.16).
Arras continues, “The more specified versions of the original principle are different
norms from their original source, but they remain tethered to it by advancing the same
value in ways that might be action-guiding in particular circumstances” (ibid). He
provides the following example to further illustrate his point:
Schematically, the final action-guiding principle would look something like:
Women and men have a decisive right of reproductive liberty except when
conditions X, Y, or Z obtain, where good reasons might be given within the ambit
of the overarching principle for the enumerated exception clauses (ibid).
In clinical research, the abstract principle of respect for autonomy generates the
concrete requirement for researchers to obtain informed consent from prospective
research participants. When a conflict arises in a particular case, the act of specification
adds exception conditions to the requirement to obtain informed consent, which generates
a new requirement that still follows from respect for autonomy.
How are exception conditions generated and how do we ensure these conditions
are justified and sufficient? Proponents of specified principlism insist that a robust
justification can be achieved through reflective equilibrium. Reflective equilibrium,
originally posited and developed by John Rawls (1971), is the endpoint of the process of

examining “our moral judgments about a particular issue by looking for their
coherence with our beliefs about similar cases and our beliefs about a broader range
of moral and factual issues” (Daniels, 2016). To resolve a conflict between cases and
moral intuitions, the process to achieve reflective equilibrium involves an examination of
our moral intuitions and a further specification of the ethical principles that generate the
conflict.
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We can examine our moral intuitions and generate exception conditions to
informed consent by exploring the strongest cases for proceeding with research without
consent. Bearing in mind the history of the development of the waiver of consent, let us
examine retrospective review of medical records. In these studies, existing identifiable
patient data from electronic databases, medical charts, or other sources of routinely
collected data (e.g., results of lab tests, health provider notes, reports) are used to answer
one or more research questions. These studies often involve the review of hundreds of
records. Some of these records may belong to patients who cannot be contacted, such as
deceased patients or patients whose contact information has changed. The time and
expense associated with hiring additional research personnel to find and contact hundreds
of patients to obtain their consent would be prohibitive, and, as Robert Levine (1986)
argues, would not further “the goal of showing respect for the patients whose records we
examine” (p.147). Thus, one exception criterion to obtaining informed consent from
research participants is when the research would not be feasible to conduct with informed
consent.23
Medical records reviewed in these studies may contain highly personal and
sensitive information. Collecting this information for the purposes of research without
obtaining the informed consent of patients may seem problematic; as Levine (1986)
notes, “breaches in confidentiality can result in serious social injury” (p.147). Yet, if
privacy safeguards and assurances of confidentiality are in place (e.g., de-identification of
data, only abstracting data required to answer the research question, seeking research
ethics committee review), the risk posed to patients by the use of their data is minimal.
Thus, a second exception criterion to informed consent is when the risks posed by
research participation are no more than minimal.

23

It is important to note that the feasibility of obtaining consent does not rest solely on considerations of
resources (e.g., time, expense, staff). There may also be logistical or methodological considerations that
play a role in determining feasibility. But the key consideration worth emphasizing here is that, even if
researchers had infinite resources, obtaining informed consent would not further the goal of promoting or
protecting patients’ autonomy.
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Retrospective reviews of medical records can also generate scientifically and
socially valuable knowledge. According to Vassar and Holzmann (2013), the
retrospective review is “a popular methodology widely applied in many healthcare-based
disciplines… and valuable information may be gathered from study results to direct
subsequent prospective studies” (p.2). In other words, these studies, when properly
designed and conducted, have some prospect of social value. Conversely, if a research
activity has no prospect of generating scientifically or socially valuable information (e.g.,
due to poor methodological design), then it should not be conducted even if obtaining
informed consent was feasible.24 Thus, a third exception criterion to obtaining informed
consent from research participants is when the research can generate scientifically and
socially valuable knowledge.
Finally, informed consent is required when there are foreseeable infringements on
patients’ autonomy interests. This is because, as respect for autonomy dictates, people
must be given the opportunity to choose what should happen to them or their personal
information. But patients are neither intervened upon nor approached for additional data
collection during a retrospective review of medical records. While there are no bodily
infringements that occur in these studies, the use of patient data without their informed
consent is an infringement on patient autonomy. However, these infringements are minor
when safeguards are in place to protect patients’ privacy and confidentiality. Major
autonomy infringements include those against bodily integrity (e.g., administering
physical examinations, drugs, vaccines) and the use of sensitive heath data (e.g.,
substance abuse, suicide attempts, criminal activity) without informed consent. Thus, a
fourth exception criterion to obtaining informed consent from research participants is
when there is no more than a minor infringement on autonomy.
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This is often referred to as the scientific validity requirement of research. According to Ariella Binik and
Spencer Hey (2019), “validity imposes an absolute requirement on ethical research… if a study does not
support valid inferences, it is unethical” (p.3). They continue by claiming that the scientific and social value
requirement “presupposed scientific validity but adds further stipulation that the hypothesis should be
relevant to pressing scientific, clinical or social uncertainties” (ibid).
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In sum, through the process of specification using the case example of
retrospective review of medical records, we arrive at the following action-guiding
principle: respect for autonomy dictates a requirement for researchers to obtain informed
consent from research participants, except when the research (1) would not be feasible to
conduct with informed consent; (2) poses no more than minimal risk; (3) can generate
scientifically and socially valuable knowledge; and (4) poses no more than a minor
autonomy infringement.
However, we have not yet reached a reflective equilibrium. Reflective equilibrium
requires this action-guiding principle to be consistent with our beliefs about other cases,
so let us examine the most contemporary case for which the use of a waiver of consent is
believed to be justified: a public health cluster-randomized trial evaluating a cluster-level
intervention.
Consider the Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation study
(COMMIT, 1995). This public health study aimed to evaluate a multi-modal, communitylevel smoking cessation intervention designed to increase quit rates among cigarette
smokers in 22 communities in Canada and the United States. In this cluster-randomized
trial, two communities were selected from each of the participating 11 regions (states or
provinces) and, within each region, one community was randomly allocated to the control
intervention (i.e., continue with usual public health programs for smoking cessation),
while the other community was allocated to the experimental study intervention. The
study intervention was a mass education program involving (i) public education through
media and billboard campaigns (ii) targeted messaging towards smokers from health care
providers, and (iii) additional financial resources. Telephone interviews were conducted
using random-digit-dialing with cross-sectional samples of approximately 3,000
households per community. Through the telephone interviews, approximately 1,100
smokers were identified in each community to be contacted annually for 5-years with
follow-up interviews. Informed consent for the study interventions was not obtained from
research participants, but those contacted by telephone or by mail for data collection at
baseline and during follow-up could decline to respond. There was no significant impact
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on smoking prevalence and no effect on the quit rate of heavy smokes, although there
was an improved quit rate for mild to moderate smokers.
In this example, the question is whether the use of a waiver of consent is
justifiable for the study interventions, as informed consent would be required during the
telephone interviews for data collection. With respect to the study interventions, requiring
informed consent would have rendered the trial infeasible. The study interventions in the
COMMIT trial were cluster-level interventions targeted at entire communities, e.g.,
promoting smoke-free policies over the radio, television, and billboards. If we consider
research participants to be only those people living within the participating communities
who encounter the interventions (rather than people passing through), identifying those
who in fact encounter the interventions would not be possible. If we consider all those
living in the participating communities to be research participants, requiring the informed
consent of hundreds of thousands of individuals would be prohibitively time consuming
and expensive. Most importantly, cluster-level interventions often manipulate the
physical or social environment in a cluster, making it practically impossible for cluster
members to avoid. The unavoidability of cluster-level interventions renders the
participant’s refusal of consent meaningless, because the decision to decline the
intervention cannot be respected.
The public health interventions in the COMMIT trial also posed no more than
minimal risk. Recall that minimal risk refers to the incremental physical, psychological,
social, and economic risks posed by participation, study interventions and data collection.
Given that the control communities were randomized to continue with their usual public
health initiatives, there was no incremental risk posed by the control arm. The
incremental risk posed by the intervention arm to the other half of the communities was
also minimal. For example, there could have been an economic burden placed on
communities required to implement various components of the intervention; however,
each intervention community was provided with an average of $220,000 per year for four
years to support the execution of the intervention.
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The COMMIT trial could also produce scientifically and socially valuable
knowledge. The value of any study must be determined prior to enrolment and, hence,
prior to granting a waiver of consent. A research ethics committee must determine
whether the study is likely to produce high-quality scientific evidence that addresses an
important health issue. According to the Government of Canada (2021), “Smoking is the
most important cause of premature death in Canada. […] About 17% of deaths were due
to smoking… [and it] is responsible for more deaths than overweight and obesity,
physical inactivity, or high blood pressure. Since the COMMIT trial was a well-designed
research study that aimed to increase smoking cessation, there was substantial prospect of
scientific and social value. Even though the experimental study intervention did not
change quit rates of heavy smokers, the results contributed to a growing body of evidence
and were consistent with the findings of many other community studies on smoking
cessation.
Finally, the COMMIT trial posed no more than a minor autonomy infringement
on community members. Due to the nature of the study intervention, even if cost and
time were not an obstacle, obtaining informed consent would not further the goal of
showing respect for autonomy. People do not have a choice about what public health
interventions are in place in their communities. For example, it is not within the scope of
one’s autonomy to choose what commercials can be permitted on television or the radio,
or what sort of materials can be distributed at community events.
The use of a waiver of consent in the COMMIT trial is justified as it meets the
four exception criteria to informed consent. Therefore, the action-guiding principle is
consistent with our beliefs about two distinct cases that the waiver of consent was
developed to permit. A final step to reflective equilibrium requires an examination of the
criteria with our “beliefs about a broader range of moral and factual issues” (Daniels,
2016). Compare these four exception criteria with current CIOMS (2016) international
ethical guidelines. A waiver of consent can be granted by a research ethics committee if
researchers prove that:
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(1) the research would not be feasible or practicable to carry out without the
waiver or modification; (2) the research has important social value; and (3) the
research poses no more than minimal risk to participants (p.37).
The first criterion of a waiver of consent confirms that there is indeed a conflict
between beneficence and respect for autonomy. If it is feasible to conduct research with
informed consent, then there is no conflict between beneficence and respect for autonomy
and, therefore, informed consent must be obtained. The second criterion is a requirement
of beneficence, and “refers to the importance of the information that a study is likely to
produce” (CIOMS, 2016, p.1). Beneficence also requires that risks are minimized in
relation to the knowledge to be gained. Hence, the third criterion also stems from a
welfare concern: if the research poses no more than minimal risk, then the infringement
on patient autonomy through the use of a waiver of consent is justified.
Note that the CIOMS guidelines only invoke welfare criteria for a waiver of
consent. There is no criterion stipulating that the research can pose no more than a minor
autonomy infringement, and the lack of an autonomy criterion is consistent across ethics
guidelines and regulatory documents. Thus, to achieve a reflective equilibrium, we must
consider whether the addition of an autonomy criterion better explains our moral
intuitions about cases for which the use of a waiver of consent is justifiable. I contend
that it does.
First, the autonomy criterion remains consistent with the history of the
development of the waiver of consent. For the two types of research studies examined
above—retrospective review of medical records and the COMMIT trial—the addition of
an autonomy criterion does not affect the broad use of a waiver of consent. In a
retrospective review of medical records with privacy and confidentiality safeguards in
place, there are only minor autonomy interests at stake and, hence, these studies remain a
strong candidate for a waiver of consent. In the COMMIT study, the interventions, like
all cluster-level interventions, are not divisible to individual participants. The
infringement on the autonomy of individuals living within enrolled communities is minor
insofar as there is no infringement on bodily integrity and privacy interests.
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Second, the addition of an autonomy criterion better explains cases in which
research poses no (or low) risk but the use of a waiver of consent is intuitively
problematic. In other words, people have an interest in choosing whether to be enrolled in
a study that involves an infringement on their autonomy even if there are no foreseeable
infringements on their welfare. For example, people have a choice whether to participate
in an innocuous survey study because of their interest in choosing how to spend their
time or with whom to share their data. It seems wrong to use a waiver of consent when
there is a foreseeable infringement on autonomy, even if there are no foreseeable risks
involved in the research.
Finally, the autonomy criterion was generated by the specified principlism
framework. This framework is more robust than the rights-based and presumed consent
frameworks insofar as it does not fall prey to the criticisms raised against them. Gelinas
and colleagues (2016), in support of the rights-based framework, construed autonomy
rights too narrowly by excluding patients’ right to privacy. Autonomy infringements,
according to the specified principlism view, are broadly understood to incorporate bodily
integrity and privacy rights. Gelinas and colleagues also failed to explain how rights
trade-off against the imperative to conduct socially valuable clinical research. The
specified principlism framework, however, explains how principles and their
requirements trade-off against one another. Using reflective equilibrium, this framework
derives exception criteria to establish the necessary conditions under which the
requirement to respect patient autonomy via informed consent can be overridden by the
requirements of beneficence.
For the presumed consent framework, Baker and Merz (2018) correctly described
the exception to informed consent requirements for emergency research and how the
legal doctrine of privilege acts as its foundation. But they failed to appreciate that
privilege cannot be invoked in non-emergency settings (i.e., privilege does not provide a
reason why informed consent need not be obtained for a retrospective review of medical
records). The specified principlism framework, however, is consistent with the history of
the waiver of consent, as it grounds the use of a waiver of consent for retrospective
reviews of medical records, low-risk social science studies, and public health studies that
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evaluate cluster-level interventions. The specified principlism framework also avoids the
inconsistencies generated by incorporating trust and transparency into the principle of
respect for autonomy.
Now that the specified principlism framework has grounded the use of a waiver of
consent, we can consider the implications for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials of
individual-level therapeutic interventions, such as the MyTEMP trial. Should a waiver of
consent have been granted for this study? Only if the four exception conditions are
satisfied: the research (1) would not be feasible to conduct with informed consent; (2)
poses no more than minimal risk; (3) can generate scientifically and socially valuable
knowledge; and (4) poses no more than a minor autonomy infringement.
As has been previously argued, the MyTEMP trial can generate scientifically and
socially valuable knowledge. Chronic renal disease is a worldwide public health problem.
One of the most common causes of mortality is cardiovascular complications, and many
current drugs used to treat cardiovascular disease do not work for this patient population.
Reducing the dialysate temperature seems to be one of the most effective and inexpensive
interventions to manage cardiovascular complications (Sakkas et al., 20117). However,
the MyTEMP trial fails to meet the other three criteria required to justify the use of a
waiver of consent.
First, the research would, theoretically, be feasible to conduct with informed
consent. Hiring additional research personnel at each of the 84 participating hemodialysis
would likely be a cost constraint, but the hemodialysis setting is unique in that health care
providers are available and regularly interact with patients. In Canada, patients require incentre hemodialysis treatments on average for three to four hours a session, three to four
times a week. Since the intervention requires health care providers to interact with a
patient’s dialysis machine, a health care provider could feasibly obtain the patient’s
informed consent without incurring substantial costs in terms of time and resources.
Second, the risks of the study may seem minimal. According to Sakkas and
colleagues (2017), “patients tolerate long term cold dialysis very well, reporting high
levels of satisfaction (76%-80%)” while the most commonly reported side effect of
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receiving cold dialysis are related to cold sensations and incidences of shivering. But,
from the patient’s perspective, some people experience cold as deeply unpleasant. Even if
for most patients the sensation of cold is tolerable, we need to consider the trajectory of a
patient who currently receives treatment at body temperature and already experiences
unpleasant coldness whose facility gets randomized to temperature-reduced dialysis. In
fact, patients are told to bring jackets, hats, gloves, thick socks, and other warm clothing
to their treatments, even in the summer. To be cold to the point of shivering for several
hours a day, multiple days per week could threaten a patient’s adherence to their
treatment. The risks of failing to adhere to treatment or stopping treatment altogether is
death, which is more than minimal.
Finally, hemodialysis is an invasive and demanding medical treatment. Patients
are required to adhere to strict diets. They are advised to increase protein intake and limit
the amount of potassium, phosphorus, sodium, and fluid in their diet, and are given
regular tests to ensure they are meeting dietary goals. As a result, some patients are
acutely attuned to what goes into their bodies. When a patient’s hemodialysis treatment is
modified for the purposes of research without their consent, this amounts to bodily
intrusion—a major infringement of patients’ autonomy. This is because the MyTEMP
study changes the way in which hemodialysis is administered for the purposes of
research. It is within the scope of a patient’s autonomy to choose whether their treatment,
which directly enters their body, can be modified for the purposes of research.
Therefore, according to the specified principlism framework, the use of a waiver
of consent is not justified in the MyTEMP trial. Indeed, the approach to use a waiver of
consent in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials of individual-level therapeutic intervention
in the hemodialysis setting will not be justifiable in most cases. This is because of the
level of the study interventions. Individual-level interventions are, by definition, directly
delivered to individual participants. Because patients regularly interact with health care
providers, it is theoretically feasible to obtain their consent. Nevertheless, if informed
consent would render the research infeasible, studies evaluating individual-level
interventions will often involve infringements on patients’ interests in bodily integrity or
health information privacy. So even if we assume the research is infeasible to conduct
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with consent, poses no more than minimal risk, and can generate valuable knowledge,
failing to seek and obtain informed consent for individual-level interventions will often
constitute a major autonomy infringement. Thus, the approach to use a waiver of consent
for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials of individual-level therapeutic interventions will
not be justifiable in most cases. I leave it open that there may be some cases that meet all
four criteria and, consequently, the use of a waiver would be morally permissible.

3.4 Conclusion
This chapter began with a brief history of the development of the waiver of
consent. The waiver of consent was created to permit the conduct of retrospective
reviews of medical records, low-risk research in the social sciences, and public health
cluster-randomized trials evaluating cluster-level interventions. Given that the waiver of
consent was not developed with pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in mind, an
explication of the underlying philosophical framework was required to know when, if
ever, a waiver of consent can be used to facilitate the conduct of these trials. I argued that
there were several problems with the two frameworks posited in the literature to date. I
subsequently posited and defended the specified principlism framework as the most
promising foundation for justifying the use of a waiver of consent. According to the
specified principlism framework, respect for autonomy dictates that informed consent is
required except when the research: would not be feasible to conduct with informed
consent; poses no more than minimal risk; can generate scientifically and socially
valuable knowledge; and poses no more than a minor autonomy infringement. In most
cases of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials that evaluate individual-level interventions,
there will be major infringements on patient autonomy. As a result, the approach to use a
waiver of consent fails to resolve the conflict between the requirement to respect patient
autonomy and the social imperative to conduct pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.
How, then, can socially valuable clinical research proceed if encumbered by the
requirement to obtain informed consent? In the next chapter, I explore a third and final
approach: the use of alternative models of consent as a means of promoting and
protecting patient autonomy while simultaneously facilitating the conduct of pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials.
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Chapter 4: Alternative models of consent in pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials
This thesis aims to address the tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
between the requirement to respect patient autonomy and the imperative to conduct
socially valuable clinical research. As was established in chapter 1, pragmatic trials are
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention in real-world settings to generate
evidence that is directly applicable to the decisions of patients, health providers, and
health system managers. Trialists are increasingly using cluster-randomized designs
because they are believed to be inherently more pragmatic. By including whole clusters
without soliciting informed consent from prospective research participants, cluster
randomization can enhance both internal and external validity and ensure that
intervention delivery within the trial deviates as little as possible from routine care. But
including all-comers without their consent is clearly an infringement of their autonomy.
How ought this conflict be resolved?
Those who took the first approach, discussed in chapter 2, attempted to resolve
the conflict by arguing that there is an enforceable duty to participate in clinical research.
Those who took the second approach, discussed in chapter 3, attempted to resolve the
conflict by arguing that a waiver of consent could be broadly used to facilitate the
conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. It is noteworthy that both approaches
attempted to resolve the tension between the requirement to respect patient autonomy and
the imperative to conduct socially valuable clinical research by eliminating the need for
informed consent. In fact, the literature is almost exclusively concerned with the
question: when, if ever, should socially valuable clinical research proceed without
informed consent? I believe this has created a false dichotomy: the idea that either written
informed consent is obtained or not neglects to take account of the diversity of methods
that can be used to obtaining informed consent, some of which may be ethically justified
and practically feasible for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.
In this chapter, I proffer and defend a third and final approach to address the
tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. My approach is to investigate how the
ends of autonomy and pragmatism can be served simultaneously. Specifically, my
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solution to the overarching thesis question requires an answer to the focal question of this
chapter: can alternative models of consent promote and protect the autonomy of patients
and facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials?
To answer this question requires an investigation into how informed consent is
meant to respect the autonomy of research participants. In section 4.1, I explicate the
theory that informed consent is properly understood as an autonomous authorization. An
explication of autonomous authorization provides the conditions that, when met, allows
us to determine when an informed consent process achieves its goal of respecting the
autonomy of prospective research participants. Using these conditions, in section 4.2, I
explore four alternative models of consent—namely, simple opt-out consent, integrated
consent, short form consent, and electronic consent—and argue that the latter three
models can satisfy the conditions of an autonomous authorization. This means that
alternative consent models, when designed and implemented correctly, may be ethically
permissible and practically feasible for the broader set of pragmatic cluster-randomized
trials. In section 4.3, I address some of the implications of using alternative consent
models, and conclude in section 4.4 that this approach, in effect, resolves the tension in
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.

4.1 Informed consent as an autonomous authorization
Recall that the ethical principle of respect for autonomy requires “that individuals
[are] treated as autonomous agents” (National Commission, 1978a, p.4). This principle
means people should be free to choose and act in ways they see fit, and that we give due
regard for their decisions. It is operationalized in clinical research as the researcher’s
obligation to obtain the informed consent of prospective participants prior to their
enrollment in a study.25 It would seem, then, that a theory of what it means to be an
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Some philosophers argue that informed consent is inappropriately grounded in the ethical principle of
respect for autonomy. For example, Onora O’Neil (2003) claims that “if informed consent is ethically
important, this cannot be because it secures some form of individual autonomy” (p.5). This is because
“informed consent procedures protect choices that are timid, conventional, and lacking in individual
autonomy (variously conceived) just as much as they protect choices that are self assertive, self knowing,
critically reflective, and bursting with individual autonomy (variously conceived)” (p.6). She suggests that
“our aim in seeking others’ consent should be not to deceive or coerce those on the other end of a
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autonomous person is required to know how the informed consent process can act as a
means of protecting and promoting patient autonomy.26
However, determining whether a person is autonomous does not necessarily
guarantee that an informed consent will be provided. According to Ruth Faden and Tom
Beauchamp (1986)—who are credited with developing and defending the prevailing
theory of informed consent (Miller & Wertheimer, 2010, p.80-81)—the capacity to act
autonomously is distinct from acting autonomously. For example, they state that an
“autonomous person who signs a consent form without reading or understanding it is
qualified to give an informed consent, but has failed to do so” (Faden and Beauchamp,
1986, p.237, italics in original). While the capacity to act autonomously is a precondition
to providing an informed consent, on their view consents and refusals themselves are
properly understood as actions (p.235). Therefore, they posit that the theory underlying
informed consent should be a theory of autonomous actions rather than autonomous
persons.
Faden and Beauchamp (1986) claim that an informed consent is a particular kind
of autonomous action; namely, an autonomous authorization. On their view, informed
consent occurs if and only if a patient or prospective research participant “with (1)
substantial understanding and (2) in substantial absence of control by others (3)

transaction or relationship” (ibid). On this view, consent represents a transaction between patientparticipants and clinician-researchers, which ultimately is grounded in trust. However, trust-based views of
informed consent (see O’Neil, 2002) have been criticized when they are proposed as a comprehensive
theory of consent. Critics claim that intervening on patient-participants without their informed consent
primarily wrongs the individual, not future individuals due to a decline in public trust (Eyal, 2014).
Moreover, failing to obtain informed consent is problematic even in cases when the public could never find
out about such violations (ibid).
26
Some philosophers have taken this approach to developing a theory of informed consent. For example,
Benjamin Freedman (1975) argues that informed consent is a voluntary choice made by a responsible (i.e.,
competent, autonomous) person. Freedman posits that a responsible person makes choices “on the basis of
reasons, arguments, and beliefs…, remains open to the claims of reasons… [and] is capable of living with
his life-plan; he can live with the consequences of his choices” (p.35). Thus, on this view, if we can
determine that a person is responsible, we demonstrate respect for their autonomy by accepting their
choices.
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intentionally (4) authorizes a professional [to intervene]” (p.278). These are the four
conditions of an autonomous authorization, explicated as follows.

4.1.1 Substantial understanding
Faden and Beauchamp (1986) claim that we need an account of understanding
that can identify the conditions under which a person understands the nature and the
foreseeable implications of their actions (p.251). They state,
The typical pattern of understanding in informed consent settings is for patients or
subjects to come to understand that they must consent to or refuse a particular
proposal by understanding what is communicated in an informational exchange
with a professional (p.250, italics in original).
In other words, to have substantial understanding of an action, a person must (1)
understand that they are providing an authorization and (2) understand what they are
authorizing (p.300-304).
The first condition of substantial understanding is derived from an analytical
claim: a person cannot provide an autonomous authorization without providing an
authorization; thus, a person cannot understand that they have provided an informed
consent without understanding that their act of consent is an act of authorization. (Faden
and Beauchamp, 1986, p.301). For a person to understand that their act is an
authorization, a person “must understand, at a minimum, that by consenting, X has given
a specific agent, Y, express permission to do something,” (ibid) and that their express
permission is required for Y to do it. This is what Faden and Beauchamp call the
“permission-giving and transfer-of-control function of authorization” (p.279-280).
The second condition of substantial understanding—to understand what one is
authorizing—does not require professionals to disclose a long list of items. Although the
literature on informed consent has focused on the question of what professionals should
be obligated to disclose to patients and prospective participants when soliciting consent,
Faden and Beauchamp (1986) remodel the problem as follows: “If patients and subjects
are ignorant or inexperienced, what can professionals do to facilitate obtaining informed
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consents based on substantial understanding?” (p.305). They claim that “effective
communication is without peer as the most important form of understanding” (p.255,
italics in original).
Effective communication requires ample opportunity for discussion between
prospective participants and professionals. Patients and prospective participants must be
able to understand what the professional is saying when she is disclosing information and
when she is responding to their questions, while the professional must be able to
understand what is said to them in order to provide satisfactory answers to questions
(Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.314). The central idea is that the role of the professional
seeking informed consent is to teach—to explain clearly what is expected of the patient
or prospective participant and what should be expected of the professional. This involves
the use of illustrations, examples, words of encouragement, and attention to non-verbal
behaviour (e.g., body posture, unhurried, courteous, sufficient privacy) (p. 315).
Professionals soliciting consent for research will need to disclose information
about the study during the informed consent process to initiate the discussion. Faden and
Beauchamp suggest that only a “core disclosure” is needed to help prospective
participants achieve substantial understanding. This core disclosure, on their view, should
be guided by three considerations: professionals must disclose (1) the facts that
prospective participants subjectively consider to be important in deciding when to
participate; (2) the facts that the professional believes to be important for the decision;
and (3) the purpose of seeking consent, including “the nature and implications of consent
as an act of authorization” (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.308).
The disclosure of this information should serve to initiate effective
communication, as the satisfaction of substantial understanding need not occur during a
single encounter (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.315-316). In fact, Faden and
Beauchamp claim that an iterative feedback strategy is “simultaneously the best method
available for assessing understanding in the context of interpersonal communication and
achieving it” (p.328). Their recommended feedback loop strategy is to have prospective
participants restate, in their own words, what has been disclosed to them. In this way
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prospective participants and professionals can be assured that they have reached a shared
understanding about what is being authorized.27

4.1.2 Substantial noncontrol
The second condition of an autonomous authorization is substantial noncontrol.28
Faden and Beauchamp’s (1986) use of noncontrol expresses the negative right to not be
controlled—the right that others refrain from controlling one’s actions or choices—
measurable by the basic concepts of influence and resistance to influence (p.256). Some
actions are wholly noncontrolled, such as those that have not been the target of an
influence attempt or have been the target of an unsuccessful influence attempt. Other
actions are controlled to a greater or lesser degree depending on how they are influenced.
They claim that there is a continuum from completely controlling influences to
completely noncontrolling influences. On one extreme is coercion, which occurs when
acts are “entirely dominated by the will of another” (p.258). Coercive interventions
“always entirely compromise autonomy by wholly controlling action” (p. 259) because,
on their view, coercion occurs when one person intends to influence another person by
presenting a severe, credible, and irresistible threat (p.339). The coerced person’s choice
is wholly controlled; it is not their own, “but effectively that of the other” (p.339).
On the other extreme of the influence continuum is persuasion, defined as an
influence attempt that does “not deprive the actor of any way of willing what he or she

27

To be clear, the prospective participant and health professional need not have an identical understanding
about what is being authorized (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.310). Due to the specialized and technical
nature of many procedures, it cannot be expected of prospective participants to have the same level of
understanding as the health professional. But a prospective participant and health professional “must at
least share an understanding that is sufficiently broad and objective” (ibid). The approach to achieve shared
understanding “recognizes that an informed consent includes many of the features of a valid contract, chief
of which is that the parties agree to the essential features of the arrangement” (ibid). Thus, in the context of
clinical research, both parties should share an understanding that an authorization for research participation
is needed and should share an understanding of the essential features of what will be authorized.
28

The concept of noncontrol is synonymous with a narrow understanding of voluntariness, defined as
freedom from controlling conditions. According to Faden and Beauchamp (1986), and later reiterated by
Beauchamp and Childress (2019), the concept of voluntariness is often analyzed “in terms of the presence
of adequate knowledge, the absence of psychological compulsion, and the absence of external constraints”
(p.136). Such a broad definition leads to equating voluntariness with autonomy, and thus—to avoid
confusion—the concept of noncontrol is used as a condition of autonomous action.
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wishes to do or believe” (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.258). Persuasion is the
“intentional and successful attempt to induce a person, through appeals to reason, to
freely accept—as his or her own—the beliefs, attitudes, values, intentions, or actions
advocated by the persuader” (p.339). Persuasion attempts can be resisted, but once a
persuasive argument is accepted, the persuaded person “willingly acts or accepts a belief
as one’s own” (p.259) and, consequently, is uncontrolled.
On the continuum between completely noncontrolling and completely controlling
influences is deception, indoctrination, seduction, and incentivization, which are
subsumed under the generic term “manipulation” (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.259,
p.355-373). Manipulations can be as controlling as coercion or as noncontrolling as
persuasion (p.259), but all manipulative influences attempt to sway an individual to do
what the manipulator requests. The most common form of manipulation in the health care
context is informational manipulation, defined as a deliberate act of managing
information that changes a person’s understanding of a situation and motivates them to
do what the manipulator requests (Beauchamp and Childress, 2019, p.136).
Many types of informational manipulation, including lying and withholding
information, compromise autonomous choice to a greater or lesser degree. The way
information is disclosed, including tone of voice, body language, and framing
information positively or negatively, can also manipulate an individual’s choice. Faden
and Beauchamp (1986) claim that the threshold of a substantial noncontrolling influence
varies depending on the context and thus is difficult to establish (p.362), and “whether a
particular influence is compatible with substantial noncontrol will not be obvious and will
require experienced judgment and extensive knowledge of the situation and the person
giving consent” (p.373). Thus, they recommend that those seeking consent avoid, to the
greatest degree possible, all forms of manipulation. But they place no restrictions on the
use of persuasion because, on their view, it “is an acceptable form of influence in
informed consent contexts” (ibid).
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4.1.3 Intentional action
The third condition of an autonomous authorization is that it is an intentional
action. Faden and Beauchamp (1986) claim that acts are either intentional or not (p.248).
For an action to be intentional, the action must be “willed in accordance with a plan”
(p.245); otherwise, if there was no plan involved, the action would be accidental. The
term “willed” rather than “wanted” or “desired” is used to capture the breadth of
intentional actions. Actions can be intrinsically or instrumentally wanted, but they may
also be merely tolerated (p.245-246). It is common in health care settings that the act of
consenting is an intentional act of toleration; for instance, a person may not want a scar
on their face but nonetheless intentionally agrees to surgery to remove cancer that results
in a scar on their face (p.247). Whether or not an action is wanted or merely tolerated,
Faden and Beauchamp’s straightforward heuristic for determining whether an action is
intentional is for the actor, upon reflection, to be able to say, “I did as I planned” (p.243).

4.1.4 Authorization
The three criteria outlined above are the sufficient conditions of an autonomous
action. But what distinguishes informed consent as a particular kind of autonomous
action that is restricted to the medical and research contexts is the fourth and final
criterion—authorization. According to Faden and Beauchamp (1986), when a person
authorizes a professional to intervene, the person “both assumes responsibility for what
one has authorized and transfers to another one’s authority to implement it” (p.280). The
authorization is what permits the professional to do something that is mentioned or
detailed in the consent agreement. Without an authorization to intervene, there cannot be
in any meaningful sense an informed consent.

4.1.5 Effective consent
In sum, Faden and Beauchamp (1986) argue that informed consent is properly
understood as an autonomous authorization, which is provided when a patient or
prospective research participant with substantial understanding and in substantial absence
of control intentionally authorizes a professional to intervene. However, Faden and
Beauchamp distinguish autonomous authorization from what they call effective consent.
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Effective consent is analyzable in terms of “the web of cultural and policy rules and
requirements of consent that collectively form the social practice of informed consent in
institutional contexts where groups of patients and subjects must be treated in accordance
with rules, policies, and standard practices” (p.277). In other words, it is a policyoriented, legal, or institutional sense of informed consent (p.280). It is effective when “it
has been obtained through procedures that satisfy the rules and requirements defining a
specific institutional practice in health care or in research” (ibid).
Informed consent in policy contexts often rely on its interpretation as an
autonomous authorization (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.284).29 Although the
conditions of an autonomous authorization are not “logically necessary” conditions for an
effective consent,30 Faden and Beauchamp take it as “morally axiomatic that they ought

Consider Canada’s regulatory requirements for informed consent. According to these research
regulations, consent must be “free, informed, and ongoing” (CIHR et al., 2018). Article 3.1 to 3.3 address
each of these conditions respectively. Article 3.1 states that “consent shall be given voluntarily” because
individuals have a right to choose “to participate in research according to their own values, preferences and
wishes” (ibid). To ensure consent is voluntary, researchers and research ethics committees must “be
cognizant of situations where undue influence [i.e., manipulation], coercion or the offer of incentives may
undermine the voluntariness of a participant’s consent to participate in research” (ibid). It also states that
“coercion is the most extreme form of undue influence [and] would negate the voluntariness of a decision
to participate,” and that undue influence, manipulation, and incentives “at the extreme” can undermine
voluntariness (ibid). This aligns with Faden and Beauchamp’s explication of the condition of noncontrol—
so long as there exists substantial noncontrol, consent is freely given. Article 3.2 requires researchers to
“provide to prospective participants, or authorized third parties, full disclosure of all information necessary
for making an informed decision to participate in a research project” (ibid). The regulations do not specify
what information is necessary; rather, it provides a list of items to disclose that are “generally required for
informed consent” (ibid). In fact, it states that “not all the listed elements are required for all research,” and
“additional information may be required in particular types of research or under particular circumstances”
(ibid). This reflects Faden and Beauchamp’s depiction of the core disclosure process used to achieve
substantial understanding: the nature and implications of agreeing to participate should be made clear, but
many of the other elements depend on what patients and professionals believe to be important for the
decision. Article 3.2 also states that “the key to informed consent is that prospective participants understand
the information being conveyed to them by researchers” and that they “be given adequate time and
opportunity to assimilate the information provided, pose any questions they may have, and discuss and
consider whether they will participate” (ibid). This reflects Faden and Beauchamp’s claim that the best way
to achieve substantial understanding is effective communication. Article 3.3 states that “consent shall be
maintained throughout the research project” (ibid), which means that participants’ consent is revocable and,
consequently, researchers have an “ongoing duty to provide participants with all information relevant to
their ongoing consent to participate in the research” (ibid). Clearly, regulatory consent requirements rely on
consent interpreted as an autonomous authorization.
29

Tom Beauchamp, in his later work with James Childress (2019), claim that “health care professionals
cannot reasonably be expected in all circumstances to obtain a consent that satisfies the conditions of
highly demanding autonomy-protective rules” (p.121). They maintain that “autonomous choice—following
the first sense of ‘informed consent’—ought to serve as the benchmark for the moral adequacy of
30
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to serve… as the benchmark or model against which the moral adequacy of [effective
consent] is to be evaluated” (ibid). Since the goal of an informed consent process is to
facilitate autonomous decision-making by enabling prospective participants to decide
whether to participate in clinical research, the informed consent process should conform
to the conditions of an autonomous authorization. In other words, any informed consent
process used to recruit patients into research should be conducted with the intention to
maximize the likelihood that the conditions of an autonomous authorization can be
satisfied to protect and promote the autonomy of research participants.

4.2 Alternative models of consent
The conventional written informed consent process used in clinical research, as
described in the introductory chapter of this thesis, often involves an initial determination
of eligibility by one’s health provider and, if determined eligible by a member of the
research team, an invitation to participate. The invitation to participate typically consists
of a conversation with a third-party recruiter who, often using a lengthy form as a guide,
provides a full disclosure of all the elements of informed consent required by regulations.
The recruiter then answers questions to promote comprehension and gives the
prospective research participant ample time to read the form and voluntarily sign it. Since
the conventional written informed consent process poses methodological, logistical, and
financial barriers to the conduct of pragmatic trials, several alternative models of consent
have been proposed (McKinney et al., 2015; Kalkman et al., 2017).
In our review of the reporting of informed consent in 1,988 pragmatic trials
published between 2014 and 2019, we identified the use of four alternative models of
consent: simple opt-out consent; integrated consent; short form consent; and electronic
consent (Zhang et al., 2021). According to Kalkman and colleagues (2017), “all these

institutional rules of consent,” but recommend evaluating “institutional rules in terms of both respect for
autonomy and the probable consequences of imposing burdensome requirements on institutions and
professionals” (ibid).
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alternatives have the objective of providing patients the information they consider
relevant to their decision-making while better integrating the consent procedure within
routine clinical care” (p.184). Indeed, alternative models of consent are more friendly to
the pragmatic aims of trials than the conventional written informed consent process
because they aim to cause minimal deviations from clinical practice and achieve higher
enrollment of heterogenous populations.
But can alternative models of consent protect and promote the autonomy of
prospective research participants? An explication of autonomous authorization in the
previous section provided the conditions that, when met, allow us to determine when an
informed consent process can achieve its goal of protecting and promoting the autonomy
of research participants. In what follows, I examine whether the four alternative models
of consent that have been used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized
trials can conform to the conditions of an autonomous authorization.

4.2.1 Simple opt-out consent
Simple opt-out consent is a process wherein potential research participants are
included in research unless they decline verbally or in writing. This consent model
often accompanies broadcast notification. Broadcast notification is the use of general
notifications, such as posters placed in prominent locations within clinics, that inform
patients of ongoing research. Broadcast notification may also include specific notification
to affected patients by, for example, distributing pamphlets or letters.
Faden, Beauchamp, and Kass (2014) posit that broadcast notification with an optout mechanism (i.e., simple opt-out) can be used in pragmatic trials. They ask us to
consider “a pragmatic, randomized clinical trial that compares two widely used
hypertension medications” (p.767). Key features of their hypothetical example that, on
their view, would make it “ethically acceptable for the study to proceed… without
specific notification to affected patients” include the following features: (1) the
“clinician’s judgement is respected” by allowing her to make the final enrollment
decision and to deviate from the protocol for any patient at any time; (2) the study is
“unlikely to negatively affect expected clinical outcomes for patients;” (3) the
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interventions “are similar in administration and side-effect profiles…, have acceptable
side-effect profiles, and adverse events are rare;” and (4) it is “unlikely that patients
would have personal preferences for one drug over the other” (ibid). When these four
features are present in a pragmatic trial, Faden and colleagues suggest that “simply telling
patients about the study through a streamlined process and giving them an opportunity to
decline participation would be an ethically acceptable, warranted mechanism of
authorization. It may even be acceptable… [for] the study to proceed with broad
notification to the community of the system, without requiring that individual patients be
told about the randomization” (ibid).
Simple opt-out consent has been used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting. Consider the MyTEMP trial
(Textbox 1) in which patients at participating dialysis centres were provided a two-page
letter describing the study, including their centre’s allocated temperature protocol and the
right for patients to opt out (Al-Jaishi et al., 2020b). Although each centre ultimately
decided how to distribute the information sheets, the researchers suggested that the twopage letters be provided by an administrative assistant to patients when they register for
their dialysis session, or by a nurse while patients are dialyzing. Posters were also placed
in highly accessible areas31 at participating centres to notify patients of the ongoing trial
(see Figure 1 and 2). Patients could opt out of their centre’s allocated treatment protocol,
but since patient data and outcomes were obtained from centralized administrative data
sources there were no data collection procedures from which to opt out.
Although used to facilitate the conduct of the MyTEMP trial, does the use of
simple opt-out consent allow patients to autonomously authorize their participation in
research? According to McKinney and colleagues (2015), this consent model “honors
individual decisional rights to some extent but does not provide an individualized
approach to disclosure of information and consent” (p.498). Neither Faden and
colleagues nor McKinney and colleagues provide an argument with respect to how

31

For example, posters were placed in waiting areas and near scales where all patients are weighed before
treatment.
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patients’ autonomy is honoured. While practically appealing, does simple opt-out consent
plausibly satisfy the conditions of an autonomous authorization?

Figure 1: Poster placed in control arm facilities Figure 2: Poster placed in intervention arm
facilities in the MyTEMP trial.
in the MyTEMP trial.

I maintain that simple opt-out consent does not meet the requirements of an
autonomous authorization and, thus, does not respect the autonomy of research
participants. This consent model does not allow a patient to intentionally authorize their
participation and a failure to opt out does not constitute an intentional authorization. The
argument is simple: a person authorizes a professional to intervene when she “assumes
responsibility for what one has authorized and transfers to another one’s authority to
implement it,” (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, p.280) and, for this authorization to be
intentional, she should be able to say upon reflection, “I did as I planned.” Since the
default option on this consent model is participation, if a study proceeds with only
general notification to the community—for example, if posters are the only means of
communicating information with patients—then there is no assurance that people will be
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aware of their ability to decline participation. Indeed, the MyTEMP trial poster does not
indicate that patients can opt out; it only states that patients can talk to their kidney doctor
about how the trial may affect them. Evidently patients cannot provide an intentional
authorization if they are unaware of their option to opt out.
The distribution of written information alongside the use of posters may help to
mitigate the concern that patients are not intentionally authorizing their participation.
Consider Ben Saunders (2012) defense of simple opt-out consent schemes for organ
procurement. Saunders argues that an opt-out mechanism should be considered a form of
implied (sometimes called tacit) consent. Implied consent occurs when “the patient’s
actions [or inaction] indicate that they consent, although no express signal is given”
(p.70). An example, according to Saunders, is when the chairperson of a meeting declares
that a motion will be carried if no one voices an objection. For silence to be considered an
informed consent, Saunders claims that “it must be clearly communicated to all involved
that this is how their silence will be interpreted. Moreover, it must be possible for people
to opt out without facing unreasonable costs for doing so” (p.71). Similarly, if a simple
opt-out consent process includes written information provided to patients that clearly
communicates how patients can opt out of a study without facing unreasonable
repercussions, then—according to this argument—patients’ intentional silence should be
construed as an intentional, albeit implicit, authorization.
But for simple opt-out consent to conform to an autonomous authorization, it
must also be the case that all patients have substantial understanding that neglecting to
consult one of their health providers to opt out of the study constitutes their authorization.
Patients with end-stage renal disease have higher prevalence rates of cognitive
impairment and dementia than the general population (Kuo et al., 2019), with some
studies suggesting that 19% to 28% of patients beginning dialysis between 66-80 years of
age are diagnosed with dementia (Citroner, 2018) and the prevalence of cognitive
impairment is as high as 87% (Murray et al., 2006). Most patients treated with
hemodialysis have difficulty thinking clearly, concentrating, expressing themselves, and
remembering information; this is often described as the feeling of being in a “dialysis
fog,” or having “brain fog” or “kidney brain” during treatment (Home Dialysis Central,

101

2021). Simply distributing an information letter to this patient population provides no
assurance that all or even most patients will have read the information sheet, let alone
understand that their silence constitutes an informed consent.
Moreover, simple opt-out consent does not require any communication between
prospective participants and health providers to enroll patients into a study. It requires
patients to initiate discussion to refuse participation. But the physician-patient
relationship has long been recognized as a fiduciary relationship because of the power
differential between patients and health providers. Patients may be too intimidated to
approach their physician to initiate discussion, particularly when posters show that the
physician is also involved as a researcher in the trial. Other factors that can inhibit
patients receiving hemodialysis from seeking information from their physicians include
the fear of displeasing those who provide life-sustaining treatment or of appearing to
waste the physician’s time. Since communication between health providers and patients
is central to the facilitation of substantial understanding, patients may not adequately
understand what they are authorizing without some mechanism in place to ensure patients
can read and understand the information that has been provided to them.
Therefore, simple opt-out consent cannot conform to the conditions of an
autonomous authorization. Patients who remain unaware of their ability to opt-out can
neither provide an intentional authorization, nor have substantial understanding that
neglecting to opt-out constitutes an authorization to be involved in research. Hence, this
consent model should not be permitted unless a waiver of consent is granted by a
research ethics committee. According to the Tri-Council Policy Statement 2, one of the
criteria for a waiver of consent is a “plan to provide debriefing… that may also offer
participants the possibility of refusing consent and/or withdrawing data” (CIHR et al.,
2018). The use of broadcast notification with an opt-out mechanism is best understood as
an instance where waiver of consent is approved with a strategy for debriefing or
notifying patients of ongoing research that provides patients the opportunity to refuse the
intervention, the use of their data in research, or both. But, as was argued in the previous
chapter, a waiver of consent will not be permissible for most pragmatic clusterrandomized trials in the hemodialysis setting.
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4.2.2 Integrated consent
Kim and Miller (2014) propose an “integrated consent model” for pragmatic trials
that evaluate treatments used routinely in clinical practice “that have been validated
through well-controlled clinical trials” (p.770). The integrated consent model uses
consent procedures in clinical practice as a standard for obtaining informed consent in
clinical research:
When prescribing a treatment, physicians discuss its rationale, any alternatives,
and their likely consequences (including both potential benefits and likely side
effects) and obtain the patient’s agreement. In most cases, no written consent or
form is necessary, and often only a brief discussion is needed (p.770).
Analogously, when a health provider seeks to enroll a patient into a pragmatic trial, the
integrated consent model requires them to discuss pertinent information about the
research before obtaining the patient’s verbal consent. The information discussed
includes the purpose of research, research procedures (e.g., randomization), potential
benefits, risks, and alternative options. The disclosure of information would also follow a
script approved by a research ethics committee. If the patient decides to participate, the
health provider “does what she would ordinarily do in the course of her practice—that is,
document the clinical interaction. She would record the fact that the consent conversation
took place…that there was agreement, and that a treatment (A or B) was chosen—
including the process of random selection. She would also check a box [in their health
record] so that the patient’s outcomes are sent to the trial database” (ibid).
Kim and Miller’s clinical-style consent model is an important advance in
informed consent for pragmatic trials. It has been used to facilitate recruitment in
pragmatic trials, but to date it has not been used in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in
the hemodialysis setting. If it were used in the MyTEMP trial, clinical staff at
participating centres would discuss pertinent information about the trial before
documenting their verbal consent or refusal in the patient’s health record (see Textbox 3
for a potential script for this conversation).
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Textbox 3: Example script for integrated consent.
As we’ve discussed, your kidneys are not functioning, and you require hemodialysis to sustain your life.
Hemodialysis is not a cure for kidney failure; it cleans your blood by pumping it through a device that will
remove waste and excess fluids.
We’ve also discussed the many risks and side effects associated with hemodialysis. If you recall, heart
disease is the most common cause of death among patients receiving hemodialysis. This is because the
treatments used to effectively prevent heart disease in the general population (such as statins and antiplatelet drugs) are largely ineffective in patients on hemodialysis.
In some small studies, researchers found that using a cooler dialysate temperature compared to a standard
dialysate temperature was associated with a lower rate of death from heart disease. But we honestly do not
know if a cooler temperature is better than the standard temperature.
Our centre has agreed to participate in a clinical trial, called the MyTEMP trial, to examine the effects of
cooler dialysate temperature compared to the standard dialysate temperature. Eighty-four hemodialysis
centres in Ontario have been randomized (like a flip of a coin, so that we can obtain scientifically useful
results) to provide either temperature-reduced hemodialysis or the standard temperature from April 2017
until March 2021.
If you agree to participate in this research study, you will receive hemodialysis at the temperature our
centre has been told to provide to patients. This may be the standard temperature you would normally
receive, or it may be the colder temperature. There are no special procedures or visits required to
participate. You may, however, experience additional coldness. I recommend wearing additional layers or
bringing extra blankets to your dialysis session.
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the option to not participate at all or you may choose to
leave the study at any time (called withdrawal). If you choose to withdraw from the study, you should
inform me or another member of the clinical staff. Whatever you choose, it will not affect the usual medical
care that you receive, and your agreement to participate in the study does not relieve the researchers or our
centre from our legal and professional responsibilities. If at any point you or I think it would be good to
change the dialysate temperature, we can do that.
If you agree to participate, I will document our discussion and your decision on the electronic health record
system under a secure research page. You will not be paid for taking part in this study and there will be no
costs associated with participation.
Do you have any questions? [Answer any questions they may have.] May I have your verbal consent for
participation in this study?

However, there are two reasons why the integrated consent model might be
problematic for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting. First,
Kim and Miller (2014) stipulate that integrated consent is only applicable to pragmatic
trials that seek to evaluate treatments validated through previously conducted trials. But
routine hemodialysis care lacks a strong evidence base; in fact, nephrology has the fewest
clinical trials of any medical discipline, and many of the trials that have been conducted
suffer from poor design and reporting (Strippoli, Craig, & Schena, 2004). Since Kim and
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Miller require the study interventions to be validated through well-controlled clinical
trials, it seems that pragmatic trials evaluating many hemodialysis interventions may not
proceed with integrated consent.
I contend that Kim and Miller’s argument is too limiting. They posit that the
interventions need to be validated through previously conducted clinical trials, but do not
explain why they limit the scope of the integrated consent model in this way. One
plausible explanation is that integrated consent was developed to facilitate the conduct of
certain types of pragmatic trials, namely those that compare “two commonly prescribed
medications for an outpatient condition such as hypertension, [where] the only material
departure from clinical practice may be replacing the physician selection of treatment
with a randomized selection” (p.769). It could be, then, that the emphasis on the need for
validation from previously conducted clinical trials is to ensure that the only material
departure from clinical practice is randomization. In fact, they state that integrated
consent is permissible when “all the patient’s welfare interests are in line with what he
would receive in ordinary clinical care and the only unusual element—that of
randomization—is integrated into the clinical consent conversation” (p771). This means
that when interventions have been previously validated, or when the study interventions
are unlikely to adversely impact patients’ medical interests, it is permissible to use
integrated consent. Some treatments used routinely in hemodialysis care have not been
previously validated by clinical trials,32 but nonetheless are unlikely to adversely affect
patient interests because there is sufficient evidence to suggest parity with competent
care. Thus, Kim and Miller would likely agree that integrated consent can be used in
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials evaluating hemodialysis interventions if the
interventions have been previously validated or are unlikely to adversely impact patients’
medical interests.
Second, Kim and Miller (2014) claim that the integrated consent model can only
be used for pragmatic trials that meet the necessary regulatory criteria for a waiver or

32

Some treatments used routinely in hemodialysis care are only supported by evidence generated from nonrandomized trials, such as observational studies, or physiological evidence.
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alteration of consent. This is because “the proposed model does not include all the
elements of informed consent required by… federal regulations (e.g., it lacks explicit
statement regarding voluntariness and confidentiality, because the context renders them
unnecessary” (p.771). This does not have to be the case—all required elements of
informed consent can be verbally disclosed. But whether a pragmatic trial meets the
regulatory criteria for a waiver or alteration of consent need not be the determining factor
of whether the integrated consent model can be used. Instead, we ought to consider
whether integrated consent can conform to the conditions of an autonomous
authorization.
The integrated consent model undoubtedly allows prospective participants the
opportunity to provide an intentional authorization. In other words, this model is designed
to allow prospective participants to decide in favour of or against participating in
research. The question is whether prospective participant can satisfy the condition of
substantial understanding and substantial noncontrol. I believe that both the condition of
substantial understanding and substantial noncontrol can be satisfied by using an
integrated consent model.
Recall that the condition of substantial understanding is achieved primarily
through effective communication, used to assist patients in making an informed choice
about whether to participate in research. The integrated consent model aims to do just
that: a health provider has a clinical-style conversation with a patient wherein they
discuss pertinent information about the research in reasonably nontechnical language, and
the health provider answer all the patient’s questions. Recent empirical evidence suggests
that one-on-one discussions with prospective research participants is one of the most
effective ways to improve their understanding (compared to written information, test and
feedback quizzes, multimedia presentations, and other miscellaneous methods)
(Nishimura et al., 2013; Dellson et al., 2018; Houghton et al., 2020).
It is important that the information disclosed in the integrated consent process
includes the purpose, nature, and implications of consent, and the facts that both patients
and professionals believe to be important when deciding whether to participate. While the
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disclosure of information listed by Kim and Miller (2014)—i.e., the purpose of research,
randomization, potential benefits, risks, and alternative options—are facts commonly
considered to be important, it is not always sufficient for a patient to have substantial
understanding. According to Kim and Miller, the only difference between clinical
practice and a pragmatic trial comparing interventions used routinely in clinical practice
is the use of randomization. But this is not always true. Pragmatic trials are diverse. Some
may include nontherapeutic interventions or have additional data collection procedures.
Thus, patients should be aware of how participation in a trial will alter the trajectory of
the care they would otherwise receive. Allowing patients to ask questions also provides
an opportunity to ensure that the facts they believe to be important are disclosed.
The condition of substantial noncontrol can also be satisfied by using integrated
consent, but not the integrated consent model proposed by Kim and Miller (2014). They
state that their consent model does not include all the elements of informed consent;
specifically, “it lacks explicit statements regarding voluntariness and confidentiality,
because the context renders them unnecessary” (p.771). Faden and Beauchamp (1986)
recommend that those seeking consent avoid, to the greatest degree possible, all forms of
manipulation including the withholding of information (p.363). Withholding information
can compromise autonomous choice and, in this case, refraining from disclosing the
voluntary nature of the choice (i.e., to refuse participation entirely or withdraw from the
study at any time) risks undermining the prospective participant’s autonomy. If the
reason of withholding the voluntary nature of participation is the concern that too many
people will refuse participation, health professionals soliciting consent can use persuasion
“to induce a person, through appeals to reason, to freely accept—as his or her own—the
beliefs, attitudes, values, intentions, or actions advocated by the persuader” (p.339). In
other words, those soliciting consent can explain the voluntary nature of participating
while simultaneously encouraging participation.33
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An additional concern about control may be the power dynamic between health professionals and
patients. For example, patients on hemodialysis may fear that their care will be compromised if they refuse
to participate in a study conducted by their nephrologist. To address this concern, it is vital to stress the
voluntary nature of participation, which can be supplemented with a statement that any choice made will
not relieve researchers or clinical staff from their legal and professional responsibilities (see Textbox 3).

107

In sum, the integrated consent model proposed by Kim and Miller, with minor
modifications, can conform to the conditions of an autonomous authorization. Integrated
consent in its simplest form is a clinical-style consent process wherein a patient’s verbal
consent is documented in their medical record. If recruiters effectively communicate the
nature of the research, the implications of authorizing participation, and the facts that
patients and professionals deem to be important with adequate protections against
coercion and manipulation, a verbal disclosure without written documentation34 gives
prospective participants the opportunity to provide an autonomous authorization.

4.2.3 Short form consent
Short form consent refers to a process involving a simplified or condensed
consent form, often one or two pages, that is reviewed verbally with a prospective
research participant (McKinney et al., 2015). The form must contain all regulatory
elements of informed consent and be signed by the research participant. A written
summary of what will be disclosed verbally to the prospective participants must be
approved by a research ethics committee. If the prospective participant provides their
written consent, a copy of the summary and the short form are provided to them.
Short form consent is akin to integrated consent. It is a clinical-style consent
process wherein recruiters have a discussion with prospective participants about the
nature of the research, the implications of authorizing participation, and other important
facts about the trial. Prospective research participants can ask questions, and a brief
consent form (one or two pages) containing this information is provided to them. A
notable difference between short form consent and integrated consent is that a
prospective participant’s written signature on the brief form is required. Given the
similarities between these two consent models, short form consent can meet the
conditions of an autonomous authorization. With adequate protections against coercion
and manipulation, a verbal disclosure with written documentation gives prospective
participants the opportunity to provide an autonomous authorization.

34

Some research regulations, such as those in the United States (DHHS, 2018), require researchers to
justify a waiver of documentation in cases where consent is not signed by the research participants.
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4.2.4 Electronic consent
The term “electronic consent” (also called e-consent) encompasses a wide variety
of consent process (CT:IQ, 2019).35 It is often broadly defined as “the use of electronic
systems and processes that may employ multiple electronic media, including text,
graphics, audio, video, podcasts, passive and interactive websites, biological recognition
devices, and card readers, to convey information related to the study and to obtain and
document informed consent” (DHHS, 2016). For the purpose of this discussion,
electronic consent is limited to an in-centre consent process36 that involves clinical or
research staff members providing prospective research participants with an electronic
device (e.g., desktop or laptop computers, mobile phones, tablets) to access information
about the trial and to obtain an electronic signature on a digital form. Patients should have
an opportunity to contact members of the study team to ask questions prior to and after
providing their electronic signature, and they should be able to revisit the digital form
using secure login details.
This consent model will be used to facilitate the conduct of the HiLo trial, a
pragmatic cluster-randomized trial in the hemodialysis setting (Edmonston et al., 2021).
This trial explores whether “strict phosphate control improves, worsens, or has no effect
on clinical outcomes,” specifically all-cause mortality and all-cause hospitalization. They
plan to randomize 80 to 120 U.S. hemodialysis centres managed by DaVita Inc and the
University of Utah to either a higher (>6.5 mg/dl) or a lower (<5.5 mg/dl, current
standard of care) serum phosphate target protocol. The interventions, which consist of
phosphate binder prescriptions and dietary recommendations, will be implemented by
local dieticians. They expect to enroll 4,400 adults with kidney failure undergoing threetimes-weekly in-centre hemodialysis using electronic consent. Patients will be provided
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Electronic consent often refers to one of four different processes: (1) digital consent form with handsigned consent; (2) digital consent form on an approved device with electronic signature; (3) digital consent
form using cloud-based or online software with electronic signature; or (4) digital consent form using
biometric consent (i.e., consent is documented using fingerprint identification or face recognition
technology).
Electronic consent can also refer to an “at-home” or remote process. This model is similar to the standard
informed consent process, except the consultation and discussion occurs through an online medium (e.g.,
Skype, Zoom, WebEx) and the patient’s consent is provided verbally or via an electronic form.
36
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with tablets that connect to secure web-based videos. Three concise videos, currently
available on the study’s website (https://www.hilostudy.org), provide information on
“clinical research participation, phosphate and its management in kidney failure, and the
‘nuts and bolts’ of HiLo,” co-narrated by a nephrologist and a patient with kidney failure
(ibid). A central team of nephrologist will be available to answer questions by telephone.
The HiLo trial was approved centrally by the Duke University research ethics committee.
Some empirical evidence suggests that patients prefer electronic consent to
receiving written information (Karunaratne et al., 2010; Zeps, Northcott, & Weekes,
2020). Other potential benefits of electronic consent include: the ability to use certain
technological functions (e.g., text-to-speech software, translation software) to enroll
patients commonly excluded from research (e.g., visually impaired, non-English
language speakers); lower burden on site staff as they only facilitate the consent process;
and improved monitoring and management of consents, refusals, and withdrawals
(TransCelerate Biopharma Inc., 2017). These benefits are all important in pragmatic
trials, which aim to include all-comers—especially those who have previously been
excluded from research—with fewer or no additional research staff or resources.
But there are also substantial barriers to the use of electronic consent
(TransCelerate Biopharma Inc., 2017; Chen et al., 2020). Regulatory barriers include
longer research ethics committee approval times due to inexperience with or reluctance to
use technology, and some countries or institutions may not legally accept electronic
signatures. Logistic and financial barriers include the need for backup systems, longer
setup time and higher initial costs and resources than paper forms, and technical
limitations (e.g., the need to use certain software or devices). Additional concerns have
been raised about the willingness and ability of older adults to use technology to provide
consent, although recent findings from a mixed-methods study found that an electronic
consent process “is feasible to implement with older adults and acceptable to this
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population, but… efforts to optimize design of [electronic] consent forms for older adults
are warranted” (Jayasinghe et al., 2019, p.124).37
When the barriers to electronic consent are addressed, this consent model can
facilitate the conduct of pragmatic trials, as demonstrated by the HiLo trial. But can this
consent model conform to the conditions of an autonomous authorization? Like short
form consent and integrated consent, electronic consent allows prospective participants to
intentionally decide in favour of or against participating in research. The condition of
substantial noncontrol is likely to be met, particularly if those who create the digital
media are attentive to how the information is presented. Once again, the question is
whether prospective research participants can satisfy the conditions of substantial
understanding with this consent model.
Unlike short form consent and integrated consent, electronic consent does not
necessitate patient-provider interactions nor discussions to occur. Consider the HiLo trial.
Prospective research participants are provided with information about the trial through
various forms of digital media (text, graphics, and videos) and only if they have questions
will they reach out to a team of nephrologists to discuss the information. One potential
problem is whether substantial understanding can be achieved without a conversation
occurring between prospective participants and health professionals to ensure that there is
a shared understanding of what has been disclosed.
Faden and Beauchamp’s (1986) theory of informed consent is silent on the
question of how health professionals and prospective participants should come to an
agreement about participation. Recruiters often use one-on-one discussions to effectively
communicate information because it is “frequently the most available and critical means
to the end of understanding” (p.314). But one-on-one discussions are not a necessary
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The first part of this study involved focus groups to gather feedback from older adults (age 65 years or
older) about the advantages and disadvantages of a multimedia, interactive tablet-based consent process
compared to paper-based consent. The second part involved randomizing older adults to view either a
tablet-based consent or paper-based consent for a mock clinical trial. While “user-friendliness, immediate
comprehension, and retention of the tablet-based consent were similar to the paper-based consent”
(Jayasinghe et al., 2019, p.124), concerns about using a tablet-based consent process centered on the need
among older individuals for orientation to using the tablet itself.
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condition of an autonomous authorization, nor is it the only means to the end of
understanding (ibid). Growing evidence suggests that the use of interactive, multimedia
technology can improve patients’ comprehension and retention of key elements of
informed consent (Karunaratne et al., 2010; Friedlander et al., 2011; Rowbotham et al.,
2013; Rothwell et al., 2014; Jayasinghe et al., 2019; Zeps, Northcott, & Weekes, 2020).
Successful teaching also takes time, hence why Faden and Beauchamp claim that there is
nothing about informed consent that “demands that its conditions be satisfied in a single
sitting or setting” (p.315). Electronic consent provides patients the opportunity to review
information at any time and, like the HiLo trial’s website, it can contain additional
information to address common misunderstandings (e.g., the purpose of research).
Although one-on-one discussions are not necessary, it is prudent to have staff available
for one-on-one discussions if feasible. Staff should be trained or previously skilled in
communicating study-specific information to be responsive to the needs and concerns of
patients considering participation.

4.3 Implications of using alternative models of consent
Integrated consent, short form consent, and electronic consent can conform to the
conditions of an autonomous authorization. While these three consent models use
different media to relay information about the trial and to document the prospective
participant’s choice, each requires a person to intentionally authorize their participation in
research; otherwise, the patient is not included in the research study. These models differ
from simple opt-out consent, which does not seek an authorization but rather presumes it.
There is also nothing inherent in the design and implementation of integrated consent,
short form consent, or electronic consent that inhibits the researchers’ ability to
effectively communicate with prospective research participants to help them achieve
substantial understanding in the absence of control by others.
These alternative models of consent can also be consistent with the aims of
pragmatism. Trials are seldom purely pragmatic or purely explanatory, but various design
choices make a trial more or less pragmatic (Loudon et al., 2013). Pragmatic trials are
designed to mirror real-world settings; thus, a very pragmatic trial will include all or most
patients who would receive the interventions in clinical practice, recruit patients at the
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time of clinical presentation, minimally disrupt the workflow of participating clinics, and
be resource efficient (i.e., not require specialized training or additional staff). Whether
integrated consent, short form consent, or electronic consent is used, the consent process
can mirror procedures used for clinical consent and achieve high rates of recruitment.38
This means that when the research setting is a primary care setting without research staff,
research ethics committees ought to allow researchers flexibility in using verbal, written,
or electronic disclosure processes, provided they are otherwise consistent with regulatory
disclosure requirements.
There are also clear advantages of using integrated consent, short form consent, or
electronic consent over the conventional written informed consent process in pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials. On the one hand, the written informed consent process often
involves dedicated study coordinators or research staff to solicit, obtain, and record
consent. Consent forms are criticized for being lengthy, overly complicated, and can take
up to an hour to read. On the other hand, clinical style consent models, such as integrated
consent, short form consent, and electronic consent, are more cost-effective and practical.
These alternative consent models do not require specialized research staff; they are
simply integrated into the clinical consent process. Forms are clear and succinct or there
are no forms at all, and it takes less time to converse with one’s health provider about the
research study than to read a lengthy form and then ask questions. While it is widely
expected that there are advantages in terms of costs and feasibility, empirical studies may
be needed to substantiate these claims.
However, researchers and research ethics committees may not be considering
alternative models of consent. In our review of the reporting of informed consent in 1,988
pragmatic trials published between 2014 and 2019, only 53 trials (2.9%) reported the use
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High rates of recruitment have been achieved using integrated consent. For example, the Rethinking
Clinical Trials (REaCT) program uses integrated consent in their pragmatic oncology trials that compare
different approved cancer treatment strategies. Enrollment in traditional cancer trials is dismal; less than
5% of patients approached provide consent. But enrollment in REaCT trials are “well over 80% of those
approached,” and estimates suggest that “the integrated [consent] model allows a five-fold reduction in
costs, due to the ease of data collection and management, and to the efficiency of enrollment” (Ansari &
Petch, 2018).
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of alternative consent models (Zhang et al., 2021). In most cases (1,683 trials; 85%)
standard written informed consent was reported, which to some degree undermines that
concern that written informed consent inhibits the conduct of pragmatic trials.39 It is also
noteworthy that 139 trials (7.5%) reported no consent or a waiver of consent, and that
“trials that self-identified as pragmatic had a higher prevalence of not obtaining consent
than those that did not use this label” (ibid). These results demonstrate that researchers
and research ethics committees, when confronted with designing and reviewing a
pragmatic trial, will in most cases choose or approve written informed consent or no
consent. This is the false dichotomy to which I alluded at the outset of this chapter. The
choice should not be between the conventional written informed consent process and no
consent. In the same vein, the best approach to answering the overarching thesis
question—of how we can address the tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
between the requirement to respect the autonomy of prospective participants and the
imperative to conduct socially valuable research—is not to find ways to eliminate the
need for informed consent. What I have argued in this chapter is that the use of
alternative consent models can be consistent with the aims of pragmatism and the
requirement to protect and promote patient autonomy.
In fact, our recent interview and focus group study involving patients and families
with experience of hemodialysis found that “patient partners supported [consent]
approaches that allow patients to make an individual decision regarding trial
participation” (Nicholls et al., 2021, p.13). Participants stressed the importance of having
a choice regarding trial participation and “were significantly more willing to participate
in trials that employed a choice-based approach compared to trials that did not” (p.12).
While participants were indifferent about the specific process for enabling their choice,
they preferred active notification (e.g., information sheets) over passive notification (e.g.,
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It is also important to note that only 688 of 1,988 trials (34.6%) in the review were cluster randomized,
and that cluster randomization was significantly associated with not obtaining informed consent. Although
there was a high prevalence (85%) of reporting written informed consent in all 1,988 pragmatic trials, there
was poor reporting of justifications for not obtaining consent and, when justifications were provided, these
were not always in line with the minimum criteria stated in international ethics guidelines for research
involving humans.
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posters) (p.12). These findings are consistent with studies conducted by Courtright and
colleagues (2017) and Weinfurt and colleagues (2017).
Although alternative models of consent can be consistent with the aims of
pragmatism, there are certain implications for their use in cluster-randomized trials. As
described at the outset of this chapter, cluster randomization is an attractive design for
embedding pragmatic trials into the hemodialysis setting. But clusters are often
randomized before it is possible to identify and recruit research participants. According to
the Ottawa Statement on the Ethical Design and Conduct of Cluster Randomized Trials,
if informed consent cannot be obtained from participants before cluster randomization, it
should be sought as soon as possible after randomization and before the implementation
of any study interventions or data collection (Weijer et al., 2012).
When informed consent is sought after randomization, in either a clusterrandomized trial or a patient-randomized trial, this can be a source of selection bias
(particularly, identification and recruitment bias). Identification bias occurs when “the
assignment that was not properly randomized or the randomized assignment was not
sufficiently concealed, and so the person enrolling participants was aware of allocation
sequence and influenced which patients were assigned to each group based on their
prognostic factors” (Mansournia et al., 2017). Recruitment bias occurs when “an
investigator is aware of the random sequence and decides to enroll patients with certain
prognostic factors only if they are known to be assigned to a particular treatment
strategy” (ibid). In other words, when participants are enrolled by someone who is aware
of their cluster’s allocated intervention, or when participants provide consent based on
the knowledge of their cluster’s allocated intervention, this could induce differential
recruitment—either different numbers of patients included in the study arms, or
differences in the baseline characteristics of patients between the study arms (Higgins &
Green, 2008; Giraudeau & Ravaud, 2009; Easter et al., 2021, Eldridge et al., 2021).
Identification and recruitment bias may undermine the trial’s internal validity and the
researchers’ ability to detect any possible effects of the interventions, meaning that the
trial would not yield any scientifically useful information.
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The concern that informed consent may be a source of bias is commonly raised as
a justification for not obtaining informed consent in a cluster-randomized trial. When
everyone is included in research, there is no need to identify or recruit patients;
consequently, there is no potential for identification and recruitment bias. But the
potential for identification and recruitment bias in and of itself does not justify dispensing
with consent. Rather, it may necessitate changes to the informed consent process that can
prevent or mitigate potential selection biases (Eldridge, Kerry, & Torgerson, 2009;
Weijer & Taljaard, 2019).
To prevent selection bias, researchers should, when possible, identify and recruit
patients before clusters are randomized. Again, identification and recruitment bias can
both be prevented if the recruiters are not aware of what intervention will be allocated to
the participant, and if patients are not aware of which intervention they will receive if
they decide to participate. This will prevent recruiters enrolling patients based on certain
prognostic factors (e.g., a recruiter may decide only to enroll frail patients if they will be
in the intervention arm rather than the control arm) and prevent patients from deciding to
participate based on what they will receive.
If it is not possible to identify and recruit before randomization, blinded recruiters
or clinical staff trained on the importance of blinded recruitment should be used. Blinded
recruiters will be unaware of their cluster’s allocated intervention, whereas clinical staff
may be aware of the allocation but will refrain from informing patients about the
allocation to keep prospective participants blinded to avoid differential recruitment.
While this may lessen the pragmatic nature of a trial (because of the need to hire
additional research staff or train clinical staff to recruit patients), a less-than-ideal
pragmatic trial design may be necessary to mitigate the risk of bias that, if present, could
completely undermine the scientific validity of the study.
It is essential that participants, to the degree possible, remain blinded to the study
interventions. Researchers may be tempted to provide different information based on the
intervention to which the cluster has been allocated, but “whatever the timing of
recruitment, both intervention and control groups should be given similar information

116

about the trial before consent” (Eldridge, Kerry, & Torgerson, 2009). This means that
participants can be fully informed about the details of the trial while concealing their
cluster’s allocation status.
In most cases, the informed consent process will require a full disclosure of
important facts about the trial. But in some cases, participants may be able to determine
their allocation when the intervention is administered over time, which can lead to
performance bias or attrition. Performance bias occurs when there are systematic
differences in the care delivered or in patient behaviours between the study arms (other
than those differences due to the intervention under investigation). For example, if health
providers are aware of their cluster’s allocation, they might modify the type of care
delivered to certain patients; or informing patients in the control arm about the
intervention could cause them to seek out the active intervention.
If there is a demonstrably high risk of performance bias due to an inability to
maintain blinding, an alteration of consent may be required. The onus falls on researchers
to demonstrate that a full disclosure of required elements (e.g., the study objective,
hypothesis, and interventions) is incompatible with the scientific ends of the study, and
that research participation poses only minimal risk. In the altered consent process,
prospective participants “must be told they are participating in a trial and that information
is being withheld from [them] to protect the scientific validity of the study,” and after the
study is complete, “participants should be informed of the details of the trial, the
intervention to which they were allocated, and the results of the study” (Weijer &
Taljaard, 2019).
Only when a clear justification is provided that neither informed consent nor an
alteration of consent is feasible (and participation poses only minimal risk) may
researchers and research ethics committee consider simple opt-out consent or a waiver of
consent. In no case should a waiver of consent be approved for a drug or vaccine
intervention, as this would permit a standard of consent for research that is below that of
clinical practice.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter began with an explication of informed consent as an autonomous
authorization. Informed consent is provided when a prospective research participant, with
substantial understanding and in substantial absence of control by others, intentionally
authorizes a health professional to intervene. Given that the conditions of an autonomous
authorization are the benchmark against which the moral adequacy of effective consent is
to be evaluated, I examined four alternative models of consent that have been used in
pragmatic trials. I argued that simple opt-out consent could not conform to the conditions
of an autonomous authorization, and that it is properly conceived of as a waiver of
consent. I subsequently argued that integrated consent, short form consent, and electronic
consent can conform to the conditions of an autonomous authorization. As a result, the
use of alternative consent models can resolve the conflict between the requirement to
respect patient autonomy and the imperative to generate socially valuable knowledge
through the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The last two decades have seen an almost exponential increase in the number of
pragmatic trials. This is in part due to their potential to generate socially valuable
knowledge. However, existing ethics guidelines and regulatory frameworks were
developed for explanatory trials and are thus difficult to apply to pragmatic trials. The
lack of specific guidance for pragmatic trials has led to inadequate protections for
research participants in some cases (Horn et al., 2018; Goldstein et al., 2018a) and
unnecessary obstacles to socially valuable research in others (Roberts et al., 2020;
Almufleh & Joseph, 2021). As a member of an international, multidisciplinary team, I
helped identify ethical issues raised by pragmatic trials generally (Goldstein et al., 2018b;
Nicholls et al., 2019; Nicholls et al., 2021a) and pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in
hemodialysis settings (Goldstein et al., 2019; Al-Jaishi et al., 2020a; Nicholls et al., 2020;
Nicholls et al., 2021b).
This thesis focused on resolving one crucial issue posed by pragmatic clusterrandomized trials in hemodialysis settings, which is the tension between the requirement
to respect patient autonomy and the imperative to conduct socially valuable clinical
research. In chapter 1, I described the tension in detail. Briefly, informed consent
requirements are deeply rooted in ethics, human rights law, and regulations. However,
informed consent requirements can pose substantial methodological, logistical, and
financial challenges that can undermine the aims of pragmatic trials to mirror real-world
clinical settings and to include all patients who would receive the treatments under
investigation as a part of their routine clinical care. Moreover, trialists are increasingly
using cluster-randomized designs to further the ends of pragmatism because they are
believed to be inherently more pragmatic than patient-randomized designs. By
randomizing whole clusters (e.g., hemodialysis centres) without soliciting informed
consent from individual patients within, cluster randomization can achieve both internal
and external validity and ensure that intervention delivery within the trial deviates as little
as possible from routine care. But including all-comers without their informed consent is
clearly an infringement of their autonomy. The overarching question, then, is whether the
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infringement on patient autonomy is adequately justified by the imperative to conduct
socially valuable research.
To provide an answer for this question, I focus on the following sub-questions in
chapters 2 through 4 respectively: Do patients have an enforceable moral duty to
participate in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials without their informed consent? Should
a waiver of consent be broadly used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic clusterrandomized trials? Can alternative models of consent promote and protect the autonomy
of patients and facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials? Each of
these sub-questions represents a different approach to answering the overarching thesis
question. In what follows, I summarize the main arguments of each approach, describe
how each question above is ultimately answered, and explain how the answers to the subquestions constitute a solution to the overarching thesis question. Next, given the focus
on pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in hemodialysis settings, I clarify which of my
arguments generalize beyond the hemodialysis setting to other clinical contexts. I
conclude by raising two questions left unanswered in this thesis to be addressed in future
work.

5.1 Summary of approach 1: enforceable moral duty
To resolve the tension between the requirement to respect patient autonomy and
the imperative to conduct socially valuable research, I critically analyze the argument that
patients have a moral duty to participate in low-risk clinical research that offers the
prospect of direct therapeutic benefit. Although there has been considerable debate
among philosophers as to whether a moral duty to participate in clinical research exists,
the arguments articulated in favour of a moral duty only support a prima facie duty; a
duty that can be overridden by countervailing considerations. If we accept these
arguments as sound, then people ought to agree to participate in research unless they have
sufficient reasons to decline. However, these arguments, in and of themselves, fail to give
an account of how clinical research can proceed without obtaining informed consent from
prospective research participants.
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What is required to resolve the conflict is a convincing argument that supports an
enforceable moral duty—a duty that, by definition, obviates the requirement to obtain
informed consent. If such a moral duty exists, it would act as sufficient grounds to
override the requirement to obtain the informed consent of prospective research
participants, thereby allowing pragmatic cluster-randomized trials to proceed uninhibited.
Thus, I construct three of the strongest arguments in defense of an enforceable moral duty
grounded in social contract theory, deontological theory, and consequentialist theory
respectively.
First, the social contact argument posits that, by tacitly agreeing to live in a
society whose government provides publicly accessible health care, citizens incur an
enforceable duty to participate in clinical research analogous to our enforceable duty to
participate in the judicial system. Philosophers, such as John Harris (2005) and
Rosamond Rhodes (2017), argue that enforceability is justified only when the research is
socially and scientifically valuable; poses no more than minimal risk; and is in the
interest of participants and the public. A compelling case in which this enforceable duty
would be justified would be pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis
setting because of the poor prognosis of end-stage kidney disease, the lack of robust
evidence for many treatments routinely used in this setting, and patients who participate
in these trials may have some prospect of direct therapeutic benefit and are often the ones
who will benefit from the completion of the study (since end-stage kidney disease is a
chronic condition). Nevertheless, I argue that there are morally relevant differences
between the judicial and research contexts that undermine the analogy, and that the
implication of accepting their argument results in an unjust or practically unworkable
research system.
Second, the deontological argument, proffered by Rhodes (2008), posits that
rational agents have a perfect duty of self-preservation and, since participating in clinical
research that aims to preserve one’s own life or autonomy offers the best chance for
achieving the ends of self-preservation, rational agents have a perfect duty to participate
in such research. Once again, a compelling case for this enforceable duty would be
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting. Unlike most research
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contexts, the benefits gained by the completion of these studies often applies to current
and future patients as well as those who participate. Moreover, patients on hemodialysis
are at a greater risk of dementia and Alzheimer’s disease diagnoses; thus, a person is
acting to preserve their autonomy by participating in these trials. But I argued that
participating in clinical research does not necessarily offer patients a good chance, let
alone the best chance, for preserving one’s life or autonomy. Moreover, an enforceable
duty to participate in research is antithetical to one of the core tenets of Kantianism as
such a duty clearly prohibits people from adopting the ends of research as their own.
Third, I draw upon Peter Singer’s (1972) consequentialist argument supporting a
moral duty to prevent suffering and death by donating to charity to construct an
analogous argument that we have a duty to prevent suffering and death by participating in
clinical research, limited only by a sacrifice of something with comparable moral
significance. Enrolling patients into a pragmatic cluster-randomized trial in the
hemodialysis setting allows them to contribute to knowledge that can reduce suffering
and prevent death caused by end-stage renal disease and, when participation in research
minimally deviates from the care patients would otherwise receive, there is no sacrifice of
comparable moral importance. But I demonstrate that this argument rests on faulty
assumptions about the benefits of clinical research. Empirical evidence suggests that an
enforceable duty to participate would result in a greater number of individuals being
exposed to harms for little or no social benefit. Moreover, the consequentialist argument
results in a counter-intuitive conclusion: any research, regardless of the harms posed to
participants, can be conducted without consent provided that the research can prevent the
suffering and death of more people than those participating in the research.
Since each argument outlined above succumbs to persuasive counterarguments,
patients do not have an enforceable moral duty to participate in clinical research. Barring
any new and compelling arguments in support of such a duty, informed consent remains
an essential protection of patient autonomy and, thus, this approach fails to resolve the
tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. The question that remains is when, if ever,
is it permissible for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials to proceed without consent?
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5.2 Summary of approach 2: waiver of consent
In chapter 3, I examine an approach taken by philosophers and trialists alike who
argue that a waiver of consent can be broadly used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials. But research regulations, including the waiver of consent and
its component criteria, were not developed with pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in
mind. I provide an overview of the history of the development of the waiver of consent to
demonstrate that it was created to permit the conduct of retrospective reviews of medical
records with adequate privacy and confidentiality protections and low-risk research in the
social sciences. I show that the scope of a waiver of consent expanded to include public
health cluster-randomized trials that evaluate cluster-level interventions (i.e.,
interventions indivisible at the individual level, such as promoting lifestyle changes on
local radio), but it is unclear whether its scope should include pragmatic clusterrandomized trials that evaluate individual-level interventions (i.e., interventions directly
delivered to individual participants, such as prescribing drugs, physical activity regimens,
or hemodialysis treatments to patients).
To know when, if ever, a waiver of consent is justifiable in pragmatic clusterrandomized trials that evaluate individual-level interventions, I explicate two
philosophical frameworks that indicate when the use of a waiver of consent is justified.
First, the rights-based framework proposed by Gelinas and colleagues (2016) suggests
that the use of a waiver of consent is justified when obtaining informed consent is
impracticable and either patients’ rights are not infringed upon or, if an infringement
occurs, the rights infringement is minor and outweighed by the expected social value of
research. Based on this framework, the use of a waiver of consent would be justified for
many pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting, specifically when
they “involve aspects of care over which institutions, not patients, hold a right of control”
(p.39). But I argue that this framework construes autonomy-based rights too narrowly,
fails to consider that the right to be free of experimentation without consent may be
absolute, and—most importantly—neglects to explicate how patients’ rights can be
overridden by the prospect of generating socially valuable knowledge.
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Second, the presumed consent framework suggests that the use of a waiver of
consent is justified only when an overwhelming majority of the prospective research
participants would agree, if asked. Baker and Merz (2018) ground the use of a waiver of
consent in the legal doctrine of privilege, while Kim and Miller (2016) ground it in the
ethical principle of respect for autonomy. Based on this framework, the use of a waiver of
consent would be rarely (if ever) justified for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the
hemodialysis setting because empirical evidence suggests that many people do not take
part in research when asked. But even if an overwhelming majority of hemodialysis
patients would agree to participate in research, I argue that neither privilege nor respect
for autonomy can ground a waiver of consent. Although privilege can be invoked as a
defense for not obtaining consent in emergency settings, I argue that privilege cannot
ground exceptions to consent in non-emergency settings (i.e., the waiver of consent). I
also argue that, if a waiver of consent is grounded in respect for autonomy, people would
be able to make an autonomous decision without the act of making a choice—a clearly
absurd proposition. Without a foundation in ethics or law, the presumed consent
framework fails to ground the use of a waiver of consent. But even if a novel foundation
could be provided, I argue that the reliance on patient preferences would unduly restrict
the use of a waiver of consent from research that it was created to permit.
Given the flaws in both frameworks, I advance a specified principlism framework
as a more promising foundation for the waiver of consent. Briefly, the specified
principlism framework is used to resolve conflicts between abstract principles by using
the method of reflective equilibrium to generate exception conditions to the ethical norms
generated by the principles. Thus, the criteria of the waiver of consent are a specification
of the exceptional cases in which it is morally permissible for the imperative to conduct
socially valuable clinical research to override the requirement to respect patient
autonomy. By appealing to cases in which the use of a waiver of consent is
uncontroversial, I demonstrate that the use of waiver of consent is justifiable when the
research: (1) would not be feasible to conduct with informed consent; (2) poses no more
than minimal risk; (3) can generate scientifically and socially valuable knowledge; and
(4) poses no more than a minor autonomy infringement. I subsequently demonstrate that
the MyTEMP trial would not meet all these criteria.
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I conclude that, in most cases of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials that evaluate
individual-level interventions, there will be more than a minor autonomy infringement on
patient autonomy. This was because studies evaluating individual-level interventions will
often involve infringements on bodily integrity or the use of sensitive health information.
This means that a waiver of consent should not be broadly used to facilitate the conduct
of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials that evaluate individual-level interventions in the
hemodialysis setting and, therefore, this approach fails to resolve the tension in pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials.

5.3 Summary of approach 3: alternative consent models
Due to the inadequacies of the first two approaches, my strategy for resolving the
tension in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials is motivated by the question: can the ends
of autonomy and pragmatism be served simultaneously? In chapter 4, I argue that it is
possible to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials while protecting
and promoting the autonomy of prospective research participants. My solution is to draw
a distinction between consent requirements in existing policy and informed consent as an
autonomous authorization. An autonomous authorization is provided when prospective
research participant with substantial understanding and in substantial absence of control
intentionally authorizes a professional to intervene. As the goal of an informed consent
process is to facilitate autonomous decision-making, any consent process used in clinical
research should be conducted with the intention to maximize the likelihood that the
conditions of an autonomous authorization can be satisfied.
Since the conventional written informed consent process poses a barrier to the
conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials and because the use of a waiver of
consent should rarely be used to facilitate their conduct, I explore four middle-ground
alternative models of consent that have been used in pragmatic trials—simple opt-out
consent, integrated consent, short form consent, and electronic consent—to see whether
they conform to the conditions of an autonomous authorization. Simple opt-out consent
refers to a process wherein potential research participants are included in research unless
they decline verbally or in writing. While used to facilitate the conduct of the MyTEMP
trial, I argue that this alternative consent model does not satisfy the conditions of an
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autonomous authorization as a failure to opt out of a study does not constitute an
intentional authorization. Moreover, distributing information via posters or letters
provides no assurance that all patients, or even most patients, will understand that not
opting out constitutes their consent.
Subsequently, I argue that the latter three alternative consent models can satisfy
the conditions of an autonomous authorization. Both integrated consent and short form
consent are clinical-style consent processes wherein health providers briefly discuss with
prospective participants the nature of the research, the implications of authorizing
participation, and the important facts about the trial. In integrated consent, consent is
provided verbally. In short form consent, consent is documented in writing. Electronic
consent makes use of electronic devices and a variety of media to disclose information
about the trial, prospective research participants can contact members of the study team
to ask questions, and consent is documented in digital form. Each approach uses different
media to relay information about the trial and to document the prospective participant’s
choice, but they all require prospective participants to intentionally authorize their
participation and provide ample opportunity for prospective participants to achieve
substantial understanding absent control from others.
I maintain that integrated consent, short form consent, and electronic consent can
be designed and implemented consistent with the aims of pragmatism. Pragmatic trials
aim to recruit all or most patients at the time of their clinical presentation, while
minimally disrupting the workflow of participating hemodialysis facilities and being
resource efficient. These consent models have all been used to facilitate the conduct of
pragmatic trials, are consistent with clinical consent procedures, do not require
specialized staff or training, and are likely more cost-efficient and practical than the
conventional written informed consent process. This means that clinical-style consent
models are ethically permissible and feasible for pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in
the hemodialysis settings. In other words, these models can promote and protect the
autonomy of patients and facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.

126

5.4 Generalizability
In sum, this thesis answers the question of how we strike an appropriate balance
between the requirement to respect patient autonomy and the imperative to conduct
socially valuable pragmatic cluster-randomized trials. My solution to the overarching
thesis question is to argue that alternative models of consent can serve the ends of
autonomy and pragmatism simultaneously.
While this thesis focused on pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the
hemodialysis setting, many of the arguments within extend straightforwardly to
pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in other clinical contexts. With respect to the moral
duty to participate in clinical research, the MyTEMP trial (Al-Jaishi et al., 2020b) was
used to illustrate the type of clinical research for which patients could plausibly have an
enforceable duty to participate. In fact, pragmatic cluster-randomized trials conducted in
hemodialysis settings provide a compelling case in which an enforceable duty could be
justified based on the social contract, deontological, and consequentialist arguments put
forth in chapter 2.
However, the reasons why each of these arguments fails does not depend on
features of hemodialysis. The social contract argument fails because the judicial system
and research context differ in substantial and meaningful ways that undermine the
argument by analogy, and operationalizing the enforceable duty will either
disproportionately burden those with illness or result in an inferior recruitment system
than the current volunteer-based system. The deontological argument fails because—
aside from an enforceable duty being antithetical to one of the core tenets of
Kantianism—participating in clinical research, whether it is in the hemodialysis setting or
another setting, is not a patient’s best chance for preserving their life or autonomy. And
the consequentialist argument fails because it rests on the faulty assumption that the more
people who participate in research the greater the social benefits, and because it would
allow for research participants to be exposed to substantial harm, including death, without
their consent. Hence, these arguments generalize beyond the hemodialysis context.
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The arguments in chapter 3 also extend straightforwardly to pragmatic clusterrandomized trials in other clinical contexts. The history of the waiver of consent shows
that it was developed to facilitate the conduct of retrospective reviews of medical records
and low-risk research in the social sciences. Its scope expanded over time but has never
included pragmatic cluster-randomized trials that evaluate individual-level interventions
in the hemodialysis setting. This does not mean that the scope of the waiver of consent
cannot be expanded to include these or other trials. To know when a waiver of consent is
justified beyond the scope of what it was developed to permit, the underlying
philosophical framework can be used, but its application (i.e., whether the waiver of
consent can be broadly used to facilitate a particular type of research) will be context
dependent.
The specified principlism framework can be informative for pragmatic clusterrandomized trials that evaluate individual-level interventions across a variety of clinical
settings. Recall that, according to this framework, a waiver of consent will be justified for
any research study that (1) would not be feasible to conduct with informed consent; (2)
poses no more than minimal risk; (3) can generate scientifically and socially valuable
knowledge; and (4) poses no more than a minor autonomy infringement. While I argue
that the use a waiver of consent cannot be broadly used to facilitate pragmatic clusterrandomized trials in the hemodialysis setting, this was due to the level of the MyTEMP
trial’s interventions rather than the clinical setting in which it was conducted. As
individual-level interventions such as prescribing drugs, administering vaccines, or
modifying the temperature of patients’ hemodialysis treatments are directly delivered to
patients, these will involve more than a minor infringement on patients’ autonomy
interests if informed consent is not obtained. Thus, pragmatic cluster-randomized trials
that evaluate individual-level interventions will often pose more than a minor autonomy
infringement irrespective of the clinical context.
Finally, the arguments in chapter 4 generalize beyond the context of hemodialysis
settings. In this chapter, pragmatic cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting
were used to illustrate how each consent model has been or could be used to facilitate
their conduct. However, the arguments about whether the four alternative models of
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consent—simple opt-out consent, integrated consent, short form consent, and electronic
consent—can satisfy the conditions of an autonomous authorization did not rely on
features of the hemodialysis setting. The reason why simple opt-out consent cannot
satisfy the conditions of an autonomous authorization was because it does not permit
intentional action. For an action to be intentional, it must be willed in accordance with a
plan; patients enrolled in research should be able to say, “I did as I planned,” upon
reflection. A general notification (e.g., via posters) that all patients will be included in
research unless they decline provides no assurance that people will be aware of their
ability to decline participation. Since this model of consent cannot satisfy all the
conditions of an autonomous authorization, it cannot protect and promote the autonomy
of patients enrolled in a pragmatic cluster-randomized trial in any clinical contexts.
Furthermore, the argument that integrated consent, short form consent, and
electronic consent can satisfy the conditions of an autonomous authorization implies that
these clinical-style consent models can be used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic
cluster-randomized trials in the hemodialysis setting and other clinical contexts. I argue
that these approaches differ from simple opt-out consent, as they all seek an intentional
authorization from prospective participants and allow health professionals to effectively
communicate information about the research to help participants achieve substantial
understanding absent control from others. This means that, when the research setting is a
clinical setting without research staff, research ethics committees ought to allow health
providers to obtain consent using verbal, written, or electronic disclosure processes,
provided they are otherwise consistent with regulatory disclosure requirements.

5.5 Future work
There are at least two central questions left unanswered in this thesis that ought to
be addressed in future work. First, I argue that a waiver of consent cannot be broadly
used to facilitate the conduct of pragmatic cluster-randomized trials of individual-level
interventions because failing to obtain informed consent for individual-level interventions
will constitute more than a minor autonomy infringement. But whether there are limited
circumstances in which the use of a waiver of consent is justifiable for pragmatic clusterrandomized trials of individual-level interventions is unclear.
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Consider the following. Individual-level interventions, such as drugs or vaccines,
are directly delivered to patients in research. A waiver of consent should not be granted
for these types of interventions because it is a clear violation of a patient’s interest in
bodily integrity to be given these interventions without their consent for the purposes of
research. Hence, granting a waiver of consent for a pragmatic cluster-randomized trial
evaluating individual-interventions such as a drug or vaccine would pose more than a
minor autonomy infringement. But when, if ever, does not obtaining informed consent
for an individual-level intervention pose no more than a minor autonomy infringement?
Might there be circumstances in which the autonomy infringement, as a result of not
obtaining consent from patients for an individual-level intervention, is minor? For
example, a pragmatic cluster-randomized trial could evaluate the comparative
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of two types of surgical suture material (e.g., silk
versus nylon) used on patients after they experience a particular injury. While these
interventions are directly delivered to patients, it seems outside the scope of patient
autonomy to decide which type of suture material can be used to mend their wound. More
work is required to delineate when waiving consent requirements for an individual-level
intervention constitutes no more than a minor autonomy infringement.
A second question that warrants further investigation is how vulnerable research
participants should be identified and protected in pragmatic cluster-randomized trials.
Consider the following. Pragmatic cluster-randomized trials aim to include a
heterogeneous sample of patients so that their results are broadly applicable to the general
patient population. Including all patients who would receive the treatments under
investigation as a part of their routine care will likely involve the enrollment of
vulnerable people in need of additional protections. According to the Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (2016) ethics guidelines, vulnerable
groups and individuals are those who “may have an increased likelihood of being
wronged or of incurring additional harm” (p.57) by participating in research. Vulnerable
research participants may include those who lack decision making capacity (e.g.,
children, adults with dementia), those in hierarchical relationships (e.g., employees), and
institutionalized persons (e.g., prisoners).
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My solution to use clinical-style consent models to resolve the conflict between
the requirement to respect patient autonomy and the imperative to conduct socially
valuable pragmatic cluster-randomized trials provides insufficient protection for
prospective research participants who are vulnerable. For instance, an electronic consent
process may simply involve the distribution of an electronic device to patients. If a
patient suffers from a cognitive impairment, the distribution of an electronic device with
information about the trial to obtain their electronic signature will not suffice.
Researchers will need to identify those with cognitive impairments (and others who are at
an increased likelihood of incurring autonomy wrongs) to offer additional protections.
But if researchers hire additional research staff to administer capacity assessments, they
may inadvertently undermine the pragmatic aim of mirroring the clinical settings by
changing the way care is delivered. Although vulnerable research participants need
additional protections, more work is required to understand the degree to which
pragmatism is in tension with vulnerability and how the ethical requirement to identify
and protect vulnerable participants should be balanced with the aims of pragmatic trials.
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